From October 1st to November 1st, in Piastres 47, to the £ Sterling. Tatar from Constantinople to Tabriz, living Expenses, Horses, &c. Passport and Firmaun, Custom-house, Present to English Janissary, Expences on the Road for Guards, 3500 0 60 0 IN PERSIA, From November 1st to December 1st, in Tomauns, value 12 Shil Brought forward £ 324 15 0 From Jan. 22 to Feb. 25th, in Persian Rupees 8, to a Tomaum. Passage in Arab Boat to Bombay, Share of Stock, &c. to Muscat, Expenses at Muscat, Servants, &c. 200 0 68 0 50 0 20 £ 330 2 0 Deduct Sale of the two Horses, Total of joint Expences for two persons,.. BEING less than a Sea Voyage costs. After having been informed in London that our journey would require £ 1,100, I need not say how surprized we were in finding so small a sum sufficient. The best Inns at the different Towns through which we passed. Paris Hotel Does Isles Brittaniques, (French) Meuric (English). Dijon Du Prince Conde, du Parc, du Comte d'Artois. Lyons des Ambassadeurs Place Belle Cour, du Parc &c. Avignon de L'Europe. Marseilles des Ambassadeurs, de Beauvau. Smyrna Lodging House Madame Maracino. Constantinople do. Guisippino Vitale. DISTANCES OF THE WHOLE JOURNEY. LATE WARS IN INDIA. ART. IX.-1.-Narrative of the Burmese War, detailing the Operations of Major-General Sir Archibald CAMPBELL'S Army, from its landing at Rangoon in May, 1824, to the Conclusion of the Treaty of Peace at Yandaboo, in February, 1826,-by Major SNODGRASS, Military Secretary to the Commander of the Expedition, and Assistant Political Agent in Ava.— London: John Murray, 1827, 8vo. pp. 319. 2.-Documents illustrative of the Burmese War.- With an Introductory Sketch of the Events of the War, and an Appendix.Compiled and Edited by Horace Hayman WILSON, Esq. -Calcutta: from the Government Gazette Press, by G. Ĥ. Huttmann, 1827. 3. Debate at the East India House on Bhurtpore Affairs.—Asiatic Journal, March, 1827. WHEN the Empire of England in India had reached the mountains and the jungles, that divide Hindostan, on the East and South-east, from the dominions of the King of Ava, a hope was very naturally indulged, that, every enemy within the Peninsula having been subdued, a long period of peace and tranquillity would supervene. Scarcely, however, had the successor to the Noble Marquiss of HASTINGS assumed the reins of Government, until active preparations were set on foot, for again moving into the field of war; and the scene of hostilities was destined to be, in one part, on a frontier, alike strong against the inroad of an enemy, as impervious to the progress of an assailing force; and in another, in a country, of which little or nothing was known, as regarded either its natural, or artificial means of defence. The alacrity, displayed in taking arms against the Burmese, proclaimed an apprehension, on the part of the British Government, that the ambition of the King of Ava was about to manifest itself in aggressions of a most formidable nature, as the pretensions of that power, set forward when the Marquiss of HasTINGS was engaged in chastising the Pindaries, had been extravagant and extraordinary.. It was due to the character, and the honour of England, to withstand the claims urged by the Burmese; and consistent with a wise policy, to watch narrowly the measures, by which it might be attempted to enforce them. It may be doubted, however, whether the danger, with which we were threatened, had attained a magnitude commensurate with the means employed to avert it; and when the march of an army to Umrapoora was first talked of, in vindication of the affront, offered to our sovereignty, by the aggressions in Asam, and the attack on the worthless sand bank of Shapooree, it was not without difficulty, that the rumour obtained general belief. The encroachments of the Burmese on the Eastern and South-eastern frontier were regarded, however, as important, from their indicating a perseverance on the part of the Court of Ava, in the pretensions, from which the fear of Lord HASTINGS' chastisement had deterred them. When these pretensions were first urged, the moment appeared particularly auspicious for carrying them into effect; and the communications, which passed between the Burmese and the Mahratta States, placed it beyond doubt, that the former were well acquainted with the formidable conspiracy, that had been entered into against our power; and were encouraged to take advantage of it. A masterly stroke of policy, on the part of Lord HASTINGS paralized the exertions of the Court of Ava, his Lordship caused it to be communicated, that the Governor General regarded the letter from the Raja of Ramree, demanding the cession of Dacca, Moorshedabad and Chittagong, as unauthorized by the Court of Ava-adding, at the same time that if avowed, war would instantly be declared. This had the effect of detaching the King of Ava from the confederacy, with which he had been tempted so far to proceed. IT is difficult to imagine what could have tempted the Bur-mese, at a subsequent period, when all was peace in the Peninsula, and the Company triumphant from one end of India to another, to renew the aggressions, which had already nearly brought upon them the same vengeance, that had overtaken others. An impression may have been taken up, that with the Marquiss of HASTINGS, the master spirit, of whom the enemies of India had learned to stand in awe, had taken his departure: and it may have been deemed expedient, to tempt again the experiment of encroaching on the Company's dominions, before the new ruler should have had time to prove, by prompt and vigorous measures, like those of his. predecessor, that he was qualified to maintain for the British power in India, the same high supremacy, to which Lord HASTINGS had raised it. The astonishment of the Court of Ava, on finding, that the aggressions in Cachar, and the frontier of Chittagong, were to be avenged by an attack on Rangoon, at the very opposite extremity of the empire, and by a march on the Capital itself, by the high road of the Irawaddy, may be easily imagined: and the rapidity, with which BUNDOOLAH, the most distinguished of their Generals was soon after called from Aracan, to encounter the English army in Pegu, was at least creditable to the Court of Ava, and gave earnest of the activity of the enemy, with whom we were about to engage. It has, however, been questioned, how far it would not have been better, to have engaged the enemy on the field of his own choice, and to have encouraged him, by a display of apparent weakness, to penetrate into our provinces, in prosecution of his ambitious views, until such time, as we should have been able to collect a force in his rear, sufficient to prevent him from again reaching his own territories, and thus terminating at a blow the war with Ava. From what we now know, and we may say, from what has always been known, of the arrogance of the Burmese, founded on their ignorance of our power and resources, there cannot be a doubt, that by such a policy, we might have soon found the Burmese General with all his army in our power. But as we retreated, in apparent fear of their arms, their presumption would have encreased, and they would have been thrown more and more off their guard, until it was too late to retrieve their error; and the Burmese army, which for months molested our gallant troops in the marshes of Pegu, would in all probability have been conducted captives to the Capital of India. It may indeed be objected to this, that the villages within our provinces would have been left to be pillaged, and the inhabitants enslaved by the Burmese: but it was perhaps possible to have provided against any very serious evils of this kind, at the same time, that the advantages contemplated were secured. IT appears, indeed, from the Historical Sketch of Mr. WILSON, that such was something like the view taken at one period by the late Commander-in-Chief Sir Edward PAGET, as we find him recommending the formation of different corps, on the South-east frontier, and suggesting, that they should be confined to defensive operations. It is true the liberation of Asam and Cachar from the Burmese yoke, and the adoption of offensive operations on the coasts of the enemy, are embraced in the original plan of Sir Edward PAGET; but at what particular juncture the change in this plan which the Expedition to Rangoon indicated, took place, it is not easy to say, nor does it appear, how far the late Commander-in-Chief concurred in a system of warfare, so opposite to that, which he had pointed out. It was determined, however, to strike a grand and impressive blow, and by seizing on Rangoon, and if necessary, marching on the Capital of Ava, to conquer such concessions from the enemy, as should effectually guard against the dangers, to which our frontier had been exposed for a series of years. While means were taking to accomplish this object, these dangers appeared to increase. The Burmese army in Aracan had crossed the Naaf, the boundary between the territories of the Company, and those of the King of Ava, and at Ramoo, they had unfortunately succeeded, in cutting to pieces a detachment of our troops. Burning with a desire to avenge the death of their comrades, who fell victims, less to the bravery of the enemy, than to their own rash courage, in opposing him with means so inadequate, and with support, in case of repulse, so distant and so ineffectual, the Bengal army saw, with feelings of shame, the Burmese quietly encamped within the Company's territories; and with those of the deepest disappointment, they heard of their retreat into Aracan, while they were in hopes of intercepting them, by entering the Naaf in their rear, before they could break up their camp at Ramoo. The effects of the defeat of Captain NOTON's divisionat Ramoo have however been much exaggerated; and a belief has been created, that within Calcutta itself we trembled, lest the heroes of Rutnapalung should pay us a visit, and at least exact a tribute for the clemency, which they might be disposed to shew us, before returning to their own country. The panic, if it ever did exist to any |