subsequently; but the prominent difficulties, as declared, were the want of labor and transportation. After the failure of the attack by iron-clads on the 7th of April, and they had retired, the works could have been armed with a certain class of guns taken from the closed casemates of Fort Sumter. Difficulties would have occurred with the carriages and ordnance stores. These guns, however, would not have answered for what was required for the armament at the south end of Morris Island or Black Island. Some guns, reported to be of the class wished for, having, as I understood, arrived from Europe at Wilmington, were asked for and refused. As the enemy persisted in his occupation, although the works were not completed at the south end of Morris Island, the armament was increased by a captured 30-pounder Parrott, a light Whitworth, and three 10-inch seacoast mortars. It was, I have understood, intended to have constructed bomb-proof and hospital arrangements at the south end of Morris Island, but they had hardly been commenced.

To the 4th question. In my opinion it would have been possible, had the works at the south end of the island been completed, and with the small force at our disposal, for the enemy by a bold dash from their iron-clads and gunboats to have cut off the retreat of the troops south of Craig's Hill. Nevertheless, as it was intended that the whole beach should be swept with grape, and the landing is quite difficult, it is, in my opinion, doubtful whether he would have undertaken so hazardous an enterprise. He would probably have attempted to shell out the work at the south end directly, or, still more, so changed his point of attack-or what is still more probable, had we been fully prepared, he never would have made it.

To the 5th question. Up to the 8th or 9th of July, the enemy, as far as could be ascertained, had constructed no works on Little Folly, excepting to shelter his pickets from our shells. An expedition had been organized to cross the inlet, drive in his pickets, and ascertain his works as early as the 6th, but had been delayed by the weather and the character of our boats. His works, such as they were, were discovered on the 9th, and a scouting expedition, under Captain Haskell, on the night of the 8th reported a fleet of boats moored as if in readiness to attempt a crossing. There is no doubt, from the character of the guns which he used-of which there were about thirty of different caliber, from 30-pounder Parrotts down-that they had been placed on temporary platforms, behind the sand-hills for the most part. Any shot heavier than a 30-pounder Parrott fired on the 10th came from the gunboats or from the works on Big Folly.

To the 6th question. The enemy was reported at work on the night of the 8th, and opened fire at about 5 o'clock on the morning of the 10th.

To the 7th question. From the best source of information, the enemy's force consisted of four brigades, one of which landed on James Island, besides the fleet; probably in all, say, 10,000 men.

To the 8th question. My force of infantry was in all 2,462 effective-1,184 on James Island, 612 on Morris Island, 204 on Sullivan's Island, and 462 in Charleston.

To the 9th question. I do not know that a better disposition could have been made, for had we concentrated on Morris Island, the enemy would at once have turned to James Island. He might have gone to Sullivan's Island by way of Long Island, but having a foothold on James, and that being the most vital approach to Charleston, could he have taken our extended lines by a coup de 7 RR-VOL XXVIII, PT I

main, he would have selected that route. The opportunity would have been given him had we reduced the small force of infantry on that island. Had I had the troops, I should have thrown 2,500 men on Morris Island to meet this attack. These would have been about as many as could have been advantageously used, and is about the fullest strength the garrison has been increased to at any one time since the 10th of July. James Island, under the circumstances, ought -the enemy having a position upon it-to have been watched by from 3,000 to 5,000 infantry, besides the cavalry and artillery. An estimate for defense must, of course, be made as against certain attacks, and while the enemy has transportation in abundance, with a powerful steam navy, both offensive and transport, while ours is deficient in both respects and not sufficient for current service, he having the option which route to choose, we are compelled to guard all at once, to such an extent as will prevent a complete surprise of some one of them. These remarks will, I think, answer the 10th, 11th, 12th, and 13th interrogatories. In answer to the 14th, 15th, and 16th, I think, had we decreased our force on James Island, by any number sufficient to have given positive strength to any other point, and the enemy had chosen, and acted with as much éclat as he did at the south end of Morris Island, or at either of the two assaults on Battery Wagner, he could have penetrated our long unguarded lines in a day, and obtained possession of the approaches to Charleston, which, if he chose to make use of them, would have at once cut off our communications with Morris Island and Fort Sumter. I consider it fortunate, under all circumstances, that, situated as we were, the enemy chose the Morris Island route.

To the 17th, 18th, 19th, and 20th questions, I would answer that there has been no time since the 15th of April that the enemy could not have thrown a force, by the Edisto, into Saint Andrew's Parish, cutting our communications with Savannah, and threatening our city in that direction, rendering it necessary to guard that approach, and also necessitating the retention of certain troops in that locality until the last moment, or until the enemy's attack had been fully developed. The forces in the Second, Third, and Fourth Military Districts have always been small; but, small as they were, they fully employed our means of transport when they had to be removed with rapidity.

To the 21st question. From the Second District, Nelson's battalion of 260 effectives arrived on the morning of the 10th of July, and proceeded to Morris Island in time to re-enforce the garrison after it had retreated to Battery Wagner. The Marion Artillery, four guns and 39 effectives, arrived on the 12th, and was placed on James Island. From the Third Military District, a battalion of the Eleventh South Carolina Regiment, 400 offectives, arrived on the 12th of July, but soon had to return to guard our communications with Savannah.

The 22d, 23d, and 24th questions can be answered. According to my information, there were 1,795 effective infantry in Georgia. Of these, 1,430 effectives arrived in detachments on the 10th, 12th, and 13th of July. Colonel Olmstead's command, composed of detachments of the First, Twelfth, Eighteenth, and Sixty-third Georgia Regiments, 534 cffectives, arrived on the 10th, and proceeded at once to Morris Island, and assisted in the repulse of the attack on the morning of the 11th.

To the 25th question. As soon as it was positively ascertained that the attack was imminent, I believe that every available man was

ordered to this point, and that requisitions were made for troops from North Carolina and other sources. I reported the matter and the necessities personally to the headquarters of the department, and took the orders for the quartermasters to provide transportation. The troops reported to me as they came in, and were stationed without one moment's delay. Up to the 9th of July there had been no other appearances to indicate the enemy's positive intentions than previously. Nay, from intelligence received from Richmond, coupled with the incorrect accounts of the battle of Gettysburg, the cause of the arrival of transports in the Stono was questionable, and we knew not whether they brought troops or came to take those on Folly Island away. I know that strenuous objections were urged against sending the troops, in April or May last, from this department while the enemy was in force in our front, and while it was contemplated to dislodge him from his position; and it is also within my knowledge that the War Department had the opinion that the enemy's force had been greatly reduced. The truth of this opinion was questioned, and continued observations were made, resulting in the information that the enemy was still in our front in force. What we he had not the means of ascertaining [sic] which could only be learned by the assistance of naval means. The naval officers had been applied to, but could not co-operate on account of the defective character of their iron-clads, and they had no other vessels. The above will answer the 26th, 27th, and 28th interrogatories.

Calls were made, through the State authorities, for labor for months previous to the attack, but this subject not being under my charge or control, I can only state that I have always understood that they were not responded to satisfactorily. I know that the supply of labor was limited in the extreme, and the weak garrisons were called on to supply certain deficiencies. My observations on this point can best be learned by a reference to my correspondence concerning the preparation of Morris Island for defense, alluded to heretofore, commencing May 24, and continued. This is already at department headquarters.

To the 31st question. I believe, had the works for the defense of Morris Island been completed and armed, that with the troops of my command, with small re-enforcements, we could have held the southern extremity of Morris Island until larger had arrived from other points, and, if no other method of attack had been attempted, the chances, in my mind, were that his whole attempt would have been repulsed. As for the prolonged defense, I think it may be considered that the defense of our advanced works, Batteries Wagner and Gregg, and Fort Sumter, against two powerful assaults, and open trenches of attack armed with the most powerful modern artillery, for nearly fifty days, has been tolerably good already. I hope it will be prolonged still further, and successfully. Should Charleston fall, it certainly will be due to want of labor and troops, but the ultimate cause of an abridgment to the defense of Charleston is, in my mind, clearly attributable to the abandonment of Cole's Island. This situation, far stronger by nature than Battery Wagner, and well fortified by art, with a far heavier armament, approachable only by water by the enemy, and then by his light-draught vessels, with two approaches by water and two by land in our hands, which could be garrisoned by 2,000 men, nearly all of whom were provided with bomb-proof shelters, without an attack, or the slightest demonstration of one, was abandoned. By this abandonment, against which I

urged and advised in vain, the enemy obtained his point-d'appui, and a convenient post, with the choice of two routes of attack, one by James and the other by Morris Island. The first led directly to the city, the other to its outer defenses. The first was attempted, and was defeated by the gallantry of our troops at Secessionville, and the circumstance, somewhat fortuitous and in no wise attributable to the commander who ordered the evacuation of Cole's Island, that the place was fortified, although some miles from that position. The second attack has been attempted, and has progressed thus far with a fearful loss of life to the enemy, and a considerable loss of matériel and fortifications to us. The loss of the whole garrison at Cole's Island, and the position, would have advanced the enemy no farther than he was at any time during the last fifteen months; and, as I have said, the chances of its defense were good. Indeed, I believe it was stronger by itself than all the lines and works which have ever been projected for the defense of Charleston, and, if held, would have forced the enemy to make either a purely land or a purely naval attack, and these separated from each other by considerable distances. We were tolerably well prepared for either. Few men answered to repel the naval attack; our advanced positions and the nature of the country would have compelled the enemy to give us time for the concentration of troops to repel the other. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. RIPLEY, Brigadier-General, Commanding.

ADDENDA NO. 3.

HDQRS. DEPT. SOUTH CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, Charleston, S. C., September 24, 1863.

At 11 a. m., 4th instant, a meeting of officers was convened by the commanding general at his office, for the purpose of enabling him to determine how much longer he should attempt to hold the north end of Morris Island. Present: General G. T. Beauregard, commanding; Maj. Gen. J. F. Gilmer, second in command; Brig. Gen. R. S. Ripley, commanding First Military District; Brig. Gen. Thomas Jordan, chief of staff and acting recorder; Brig. Gen. Johnson Hagood; Brig. Gen. A. H. Colquitt; Lieut. Col. D. B. Harris, chief engineer of the department.

Brigadier-Generals Hagood and Colquitt have both recently commanded on Morris Island, and Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, who had frequently visited Morris Island during operations, and was present during the assault made by enemy on the night of July 18, in company with Major-General Gilmer had inspected the works on the night of the 3d instant, by order of the commanding general.

The first question addressed to these officers was as follows:

1st. How long do you think Fort Wagner can be held without regard to safoty of garrison?

Generals Colquitt and Hagood replied that in their belief enemy could now storm and carry parapet of Battery Wagner before our men could be gotten out of the bomb-proofs, and we would then be held at a fatal disadvantage; that if enemy should continue his approaches as now, by zigzags, up to the ditch, some eight or ten days would probably elapse before he could be expected to take work by regular approaches, but that an assault could be made successfully some days sooner, should enemy advance somewhat nearer, by constructing another parallel and thence dash forward and storm work.

Colonel Harris thought enemy would seek to take work by regular approaches, for which ten days would be necessary. The chances of success of an attempt to carry work after a partial approach somewhat nearer them than at present, would, he believed, be unfavorable for enemy. An attempt to carry work by storm or assault at present would scarcely be successful.

2d. How long can the fort be held with a fair prospect of saving its garrison with the means of transportation at our command and circumstances relative thereto, as heretofore indicated by actual experience?

General Hagood did not think garrison of Battery Wagner can be saved without we steal a march on enemy, and that when enemy approaches nearer he will be certain to get knowledge of any movement toward evacuation.

General Colquitt thought enemy may take the position at his pleasure; may light up the work now with calcium lights; that the chances for saving garrison are diminishing daily; but both thought with proper precautions garrison might be successfully withdrawn.

Colonel Harris did not believe enemy would attempt assault, but would seek to take by regular approaches on salient; hence, garrison might be saved within two days of the time enemy would be able to reach ditch, or the completion of his approaches.

3d. How long after the loss or evacuation of Wagner could Fort Gregg be held?

General Hagood. If vigorously attacked, Battery Gregg would fall immediately after Wagner was carried.

General Colquitt would evacuate both same night.

Colonel Harris believed, if vigorously followed up, Battery Gregg must fall immediately after the enemy shall get possession of Wagner. In case reduction of Wagner is delayed a week, can, however, throw up intermediate works for infantry to check advance of enemy, and delay fall of Battery Gregg, say, three days.

4th. Can the heavy guns-two in Wagner and three in Gregg-in those two works be removed before their evacuation without endangering the safety of the works and their garrisons?

Generals Hagood and Colquitt thought the columbiads could be removed without endangering safety of garrison, especially if precautions were taken to assure the men that these guns were removed because now useless, and to be replaced by others more effective in this stage of defense. The columbiads do not materially enhance strength of works at this time.

Colonel Harris thought, if obstinate resistance is to be made, guns should not be removed.

5th. Can we take the offensive suddenly, with a fair prospect of success, by throwing during the night 3,000 men on north end of Morris Island, making in all 4,000 men available, bearing in mind that no re-enforcements could be sent there until night, and perhaps none for several nights, according to the movements of enemy's ironclads and the fire of his land batteries ?

Generals Hagood and Colquitt did not think the offensive can now be undertaken with our present means of transportation, and thought it would certainly fail if attempted.

At 2.30 p. m. Brigadier-Generals Hagood and Colquitt were dismissed to their posts, and at 3 p. m. the conference was adjourned to meet again at 8 p. m.

At 8 p. m. the conference was resumed. Present: General G.