I also take pleasure in recording the services of Col. Alfred Rhett, who, during the siege of Battery Wagner, had command of Fort Sumter, and with his brave garrison endured a long and terrific bombardment from the enemy's batteries by land and sea. His conduct throughout gained my approval and satisfaction. I commend, also, to the attention of the War Department the indefatigable zeal of my personal and general staff, who on all occasions were found equal to the calls made on their energy, activity, and devotion to the service. Respectfully submitted. G. T. BEAUREGARD, General S. COOPER, Adjutant-General, Richmond, Va. General. HDQRS. DEPT. OF S. CAROLINA, GEORGIA, AND FLORIDA, Charleston, S. C., September 30, 1863. GENERAL: The published report of Brigadier-General Gillmore,* of the 7th instant, to his Government, relative to his acquisition of Batteries Wagner and Gregg, contains several errors, which I feel called upon to correct. 1. Seventy-five men were not taken on Morris Island, for only two boats' crews, about 19 men and 27 soldiers, or about 46 men in all, were captured by the enemy's armed barges between Cumming's Point and Fort Sumter. 2. Colonel Keitt's captured dispatches could not have shown that the garrisons of Wagner and Gregg amounted to between 1,500 and 1,600 effective men on the day of the evacuation (6th instant), for Colonel Keitt reported that morning 900 men all told, only about two-thirds of whom could be considered effectives, the others being wounded or more or less disabled from exposure for so long a period to the weather and the incessant fire (day and night) of the enemy's land and naval batteries. The forces holding these works and the north end of Morris Island during the fifty-eight days' siege varied from 1,000 to 1,200 men, seldom exceeding the latter number when it could be avoided. 3. Battery Wagner was not a work of the most formidable kind, but an ordinary field work with thick parapets, but with ditches of little depth. The sand thrown up by the enemy's shells and drifted by the winds during so long a siege had nearly filled up the ditches in many places, and had partially covered up the explosive shells, spiked planks, and pikes placed in the ditch for its defense. 4. The bomb-proof of Wagner could not contain 1,800 men, or more than about 600, the garrison of the work being about 800 men. 5. "Nineteen pieces of artillery and a large supply of excellent ammunition were captured." The pieces of heavy and light artillery left in Wagner and Gregg were more or less damaged, and all with their vents not too much enlarged were spiked. The carriages, chassis, &c., were more or less disabled by the enemy's shot and shell. Only 1,800 (200 in Wagner, 1,600 in Gregg) pounds of ammunition were left, to explode the magazines and bomb-proofs; but, unfortunately, through some accident, the fuses left burning did not ignite the powder. * See inclosure, p. 93. 6. The city of Charleston may be completely covered by General Gillmore's guns on Morris Island, but at the distance of 4 miles from his advanced battery to the nearest point of the city. I will conclude by stating that, strange as it may appear, the total loss in killed and wounded on Morris Island from July 10 to September 7, was only 641 men, and, deducting the killed and wounded due to the landing on July 10 and to the assaults of July 11 and 18, the killed and wounded due to the terrible bombardment, which lasted almost uninterruptedly night and day during fifty-eight days, amounted to 296 men, many of whom were only slightly wounded. It is still more remarkable that during the same period of time, when the enemy fired 6,202 shots and shells at Fort Sumter, varying in weight from 30 pounds to 300 pounds, only 3 men were killed and 49 wounded. Indeed, the hand of the Almighty would seem to have protected the heroic garrison of that now historic work. Respectfully, your obedient servant, General S. COOPER, G. T. BEAUREGARD, Adjt. and Insp. Gen. C. S. Army, Richmond, Va. [Inclosure.] Official report of the occupation of Morris Island. The following is General Gillmore's official report of the occupation of Morris Island: HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, GENERAL: I have the honor to report that Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg are ours. Last night our sappers crowned the crest of the counter-scarp of Fort Wagner on its sea front, masking all its guns, and an order was issued to carry the place by assault at 9 o'clock this morning, that being the hour of low tide. About 10 o'clock last night the enemy commenced evacuating the island, and all but 75 made their escape from Cumming's Point in small boats. Captured dispatches show that Fort Wagner was commanded by Colonel Keitt, of South Carolina, and garrisoned by 1,400 effective men, and Battery Gregg by between 100 and 200. Fort Wagner is a work of the most formidable kind. Its bomb-proof shelter, capable of holding 1,800 men, remains intact after the most terrible bombardment to which any work was ever subjected. We have captured nineteen pieces of artillery and a large supply of excellent ammunition. The city and harbor of Charleston are now completely covered by my guns. I have the honor to be, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Maj. Gen. H. W HALLECK, Q. A. GILLMORE, Brigadier-General, Commanding. General-in-Chief. ADDENDA NO. 1. CHARLESTON, S. C., CONFIDENTIAL.] Brig. Gen. R. S. RIPLEY, Commanding First Military District: GENERAL: I am informed, to my utter surprise, that the honorable Secretary of War is of the following opiniou relative to the attack of the enemy on Morris Island on the 10th ultimo: I have no disposition to criticise military operations, or point out errors and omissions which can no longer be avoided or remedied, but you compel me, in selfdefense, to advert to the true cause of the lodgment made by the enemy on Morris Island. According to my conception, it was not the want of infantry force at the command of that department, but, as I had before supposed was universally admitted, the want of adequate work of defense at the lower end of the island, known long to be the external gate of the city, and the establishment by the enemy, without the knowledge of the military authorities, of powerful land batteries on Folly Island, screened and concealed until fully prepared to open upon or with all the effect of a surprise, by the woods, which had been allowed to remain unfelled on that island. That these, and not the want of men, were the true causes of the possession effected by the enemy, is shown by their inability to improve their success by the capture of Forts Wagner and Gregg. It is no pleasure to me to refer to these causes of disaster, but under the implications of your letter I could not say less. You will please make to these headquarters, at your earliest convenience, a full and detailed report on the subject, referring especially to the following points: 1st. Was not the presence of the enemy in force on Folly and Little Folly Islands known, and to what extent were his movements ascertained? 2d. What measures had been adopted, ordered, or contemplated for the protection of the south end of Morris Island, including flanking batteries on Black Island, commanding crossing of Light-House Inlet, and at Marsh Point, to flank Morris Island in front of Wagner? 3d. Why were not all those works constructed; and, if constructed, could they have been armed? 4th. Even with works on the south end of Morris Island, and the small force then available for its defense, could not the enemy have landed, with the assistance of their gunboats and iron-clad fleet, a strong force on the beach north of Craig's Hill during the night, cut off the retreat of the troops south of it, and then crossed, almost unmolested, Little Folly Inlet? 5th. What works did the enemy construct on Little Folly Island, up to July 10? What caliber and number of pieces did he put in position? 6th. How long did it take him from the time he broke ground until he opened fire ? 7th. What was about his force then on Little Folly and Folly Islands, and on board of transports? 8th. What were your forces of infantry in the district, and how distributed? 9th. Could a better disposition have been made of them? 10th. What should have been the full force at each point for the proper defense of Morris, James, and Sullivan's Islands? 11th. Do our means of transportation, and other circumstances of tide and locality, admit a rapid concentration of force from one point to the other? 12th. Which of those three lines of approach was most vital to Charleston ? 13th. Might not the enemy have intended a feint on Morris Island, and then a rapid concentration on James Island? 14th. How long would it have then required him to take possession of it, and what would have been the result as to the safety of Charleston and its harbor, by establishing his batteries from Fort Johnson to Battery Glover? 15th. How could we have then maintained our communications with Sumter and Morris Island, his iron-clads having command, meanwhile, of the outer harbor? 16th. Was it not a fortunate circumstance the enemy attacked Morris instead of James Island? 17th. From the apparent number of troops and vessels in North Edisto, about the 10th of July last, was it not possible for the enemy to have concentrated his forces rapidly on James Island, and attempt to cross the Upper Stono, to march into Saint Andrew's Parish? 18th. Was it not, then, necessary to guard also that line of approach? 19th. From the small force of infantry in the Second, Third, and Fourth Military Districts, and the difficulties and insufficiency of our means of transportation, could much assistance have been expected or derived from them? 20th. Were not the forces in the Second and Third Districts absolutely required where they were, to the last moment, to guard our important communication with Savannah ? 21st. When did they get here, and how many? 22d. How much infantry force was in Georgia? 23d. How many came from there? 24th. When did they arrive? 25th. Did not, in your judgment, these headquarters do all that our restricted means permitted to be done, to afford you all the aid possible from other districts, and, so far as you are aware, even from North Carolina, and from the Government itself at Richmond? (See my telegrams on the subject, if you desire.) 26th. Did not these headquarters object most strenuously, to the last, in sending troops, in April and May, to the State of Mississippi, stating the enemy's force was still too great in this department, and such a depletion would endanger Charleston or Savannah, or their communications with each other? 27th. Did not the War Department insist, on the contrary, that the enemy's forces had been greatly reduced, if not mostly withdrawn, to attack Mobile or re-enforce Banks on 'the Mississippi River? 28th. Was not the truth of this information doubted, if not denied, at these headquarters ? 29th. Were not ample calls made, during the last six months, for negro labor to construct all the works required for the complete defense of Charleston ? 30th. Were those calls answered satisfactorily? 31st. With those works completed and armed, and the troops we had then in this district, would not Charleston have been safe until re-enforcements could have been sent from other points for its prolonged defense? 32d. Should it fall, will it not be due entirely, first, to the want of troops on the 10th of July last, and then of labor? Respectfully, your obedient servant, G. T. BEAUREGARD, N. B. Battery Wagner was located by General Pemberton, and nearly finished when I arrived here in September, 1862. Istrengthened it greatly by adding three heavy guns to its sea face, where it had none; also by traverses between its land guns, bomb-proofs, and closing its gorge, &c. I then located and built Battery Gregg at Cumming's Point, where I always intended, whenever practicable, to put a strong work, well armed, if the guns could be had. A good work southeast of Morris Island was also contemplated, with advanced rifle-pits, and a battery for a few field guns, in embrasure, and well traversed. ADDENDA NO. 2. HEADQUARTERS FIRST MILITARY DISTRICT, Brig. Gen. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff, &c.: GENERAL: In answer to the letter of General Beauregard's of yesterday, I beg to say that I fear it will take more time than General Beauregard might desire, for me to make a report which might be considered a full and detailed report of the circumstances which took place during the several months preceding the attack on Morris Island. I will, however, proceed to answer his interrogations as fully as possible, and make up any deficiencies when time is allowed. To the 1st question. I would answer that the presence of the enemy on Folly and Little Folly Islands was known from the time that he landed, just before the attack of the 7th of April. His movements were ascertained by means of observations from Long, Battery, Black, and Morris Islands, and reported upon almost daily. They consisted for some weeks in throwing up defensive works on Folly. The force was variously estimated at from three to six regiments, and, as his defensive operations progressed, his works across the neck of Folly were plainly observed and reported upon. They were about 3,000 yards from Light-House Inlet. To the 2d question. In the early part of March last, the commanding general, with me, visited Morris Island, and then determined and ordered the location of five guns, four shell guns and one rifled 24-pounder, in detached batteries, to sweep the beach and crossing to Morris Island from Little Folly. Some time afterward, it was determined to locate a battery in the marsh at the mouths of Vincent's Creek, to flank Morris Island in front of Wagner. It was also intended to place a battery on Black Island, to flank the crossing of Light-House Inlet. The battery at Vincent's Creek was to have two or three guns of long range. A communication from James to Morris Island was also ordered. To the 3d interrogatory. I would state that these operations being under the engineer department, and in no way under my charge, can only give my opinions. Some reasons why they were not completed were alluded to in my correspondence with the headquarters of the department of the 24th of May, 6th and 14th of June, and |