Third. Battery Meade, First Lieut. Henry Holbrook, Third Rhode Island Volunteer Artillery, commanding, comprising two 100-pounder Parrott rifles, against the gorge wall of Fort Sumter, both pieces firing percussion shell exclusively.

Fourth. Battery Kearny, First Lieut. S. S. Atwell, Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, commanding, comprising three 30-pounder Parrott rifles and three Coehorn mortars. The guns will operate against Battery Gregg with shot and shell, unless otherwise directed, and the mortars against Fort Wagner, exploding the shell just over the fort.

Fifth. The Naval Battery, Commander F. A. Parker, U. S. Navy, commanding, comprising two 8-inch Parrott rifles and two 80-pounder Whitworth rifles, against the gorge wall and barbette fire of Fort Sumter, at the discretion of the battery commander.

Sixth. Battery Reynolds, Capt. A. E. Greene, Third Rhode Island Volunteer Artillery, commanding, comprising five 10-inch siege mortars, against Fort Wagner, exploding the shells just before striking.

Seventh. Battery Weed, Capt. B. F. Skinner, Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, commanding, comprising five 10-inch siege mortars, to fire the same as Battery Reynolds.

Eighth. Battery Hays, Capt. R. G. Shaw, Third Rhode Island Volunteer Artillery, commanding, comprising one 8-inch Parrott rifle, against the gorge wall of Fort Sumter, with shot exclusively; and seven 30-pounder Parrott rifles against Fort Wagner or Battery Gregg, as may from time to time be ordered.

Ninth. Battery Reno, Capt. A. W. Colwell, Third Rhode Island Volunteer Artillery, commanding, comprising one 8-inch and two 100-pounder Parrott rifles, against the gorge wall of Fort Sumter; one 100-pounder to fire shot, and the other pieces to fire percussion shell, exclusively.

Tenth. Battery Stevens, Lieut. J. E. Wilson, Fifth U. S. Artillery, commanding, comprising two 100-pounder Parrott rifles, against the gorge wall of Fort Sumter, one piece firing shot, and the other percussion shell, exclusively.

Eleventh. Battery Strong, Capt. S. H. Gray Seventh Connecticut Volunteer Infantry, commanding, containing one 10-inch Parrott rifle, against the gorge wall of Fort Sumter, firing shot and percussion shell, commencing with the former. Twelfth. Battery Kirby, Lieut. Charles Sellmer, Eleventh Maine Volunteer Infantry, commanding, comprising two 10-inch seacoast mortars, against Fort Sumter, the shells to be exploded within the fort just before striking.

II. The brigadier-general commanding takes this occasion to remind the officers and men under his command, and especially those to whom he has this day assigned the posts of honor and of danger, that the eyes of a beneficent country are fixed upon them, with not only the ardent hope, but the confident expectation, of success. The nation is indeed waiting to crown you the victors of Sumter. We need not, and must not, fail. Let us fearlessly do our whole duty to our beloved country, and in the language of our late companion in arms, the gallant and lamented Strong, "Put our trust in God."*

By order of Brig. Gen. Q. A. Gillmore:

ED. W. SMITH, Assistant Adjutant-General.

131. Exact distance of breaching guns from the center of gorge wall of Fort Sumter: Battery Brown, two 8-inch Parrott rifles, 3,516 yards; Battery Rosecrans, three 100-pounder Parrott rifles, 3,447 yards; Battery Meade, two 100-pounder Parrott rifles, 3,428 yards; Naval Battery, two 80-pounder Whitworth rifles and two 8-inch Parrott rifles, 3,938 yards; Battery Hays, one 8-inch Parrott rifle, 4,172 yards; Battery Reno, one 8-inch and two 100-pounder Parrott rifles, 4,272 yards; Battery Stevens, two 100-pounder Parrott rifles, 4,278 yards; Battery Strong, one 10-inch Parrott rifle, 4,290 yards.

132. The breaching guns were served from day to day with great care and deliberation. The firing from the batteries in the second. parallel was seriously interfered with, and, at times, partially suspended, by the galling fire from Fort Wagner to which the cannoneers were exposed. The combined fire of our mortars and light pieces, aided by gunboats and iron-clads, failed to subdue this annoyance entirely, and we were obliged to turn some of our breach

*Paragraph II was omitted from Gillmore's report.

ing guns upon the work. There was imminent danger, indeed, that our most efficient, because most advanced, batteries would be hopelessly disabled before the work should be accomplished. Nothing of the kind, however, happened. A heavy northeasterly storm set in on the 18th, and raged for two days, very materially diminishing the accuracy and effect of our fire.

133. Soon after midnight on the night of August 21, the Marsh Battery opened on the city of Charleston, firing only a few shots. Firing was resumed the second night thereafter, but the piece (an 8-inch Parrott rifle) burst at the 36th discharge, blowing out the entire breach in rear of the vent. Copies of the correspondence with General Beauregard upon the subject of this firing on the city are given in Appendix I.*

134. On the 24th of August, I reported to the General-in-ChiefThe practical demolition of Fort Sumter as the result of our seven days' bombardment of that work.†

Firing from the breaching batteries ceased, for the time, on the evening of the 23d.

Tabular statement of firing at Fort Sumter during the seven days' bombardment, from the 17th to the 23d of August, 1863.

The barbette tier of the work was entirely destroyed. A few unserviceable pieces, still remaining on their carriages, were dismounted a week later. The casemates of the channel fronts were more, or less thoroughly searched by our fire. We had reliable information that but one serviceable gun remained in them, and that pointed up the harbor toward the city. The fort was reduced to the condition of a mere infantry outpost, alike incapable of annoying our approaches to Fort Wagner or of inflicting injury upon the iron-clads. The enemy soon after commenced removing the dismounted guns by night, and not many weeks elapsed before several of them were mounted in other parts of the harbor. The period during which the weakness of the enemy's interior defenses was most palpably apparent was during the ten days subsequent to the 23d of August. 135. Meanwhile, on the night of August 18, active operations were *Printed in "Correspondence, etc.," post.

+ See Bombardment of Fort Sumter, post.

AND GA. COASTS, AND IN MID. AND E. FLA. resumed on the approaches to Fort Wagner, by debouching with the full sap from the left of the third parallel. The spring tides, aided by a powerful northeast storm, had submerged the trenches to a depth of 2 feet in many places, and washed down the parapets. At the second parallel the Surf Battery had barely escaped entire destruction, about one-third of it having been carried away by the sea. Its armanent had been temporarily removed to await the issue of the storm. The progress of the sap was hotly opposed by the

enemy.

At one point in particular, about 200 yards in front of Wagner, there was a ridge affording good cover, from which we received an unceasing fire of small-arms, while the guns and sharpshooters in Wagner opened vigorously at every lull in the fire directed upon it from our batteries and the gunboats. The firing from the distant James Island batteries was steady and accurate.

One attempt on the 21st to obtain possession of the ridge with infantry having failed, it was determined to establish another parallel.

Fourth Parallel.

136. On the night of August 21, the fourth parallel was opened about 100 yards from the ridge above mentioned, partly with the flying and partly with the full sap. At the place selected for it the island is about 160 yards in width above high water.

It was now determined to try and dislodge the enemy from the ridge with light mortars and navy howitzers in the fourth parallel and other mortars in rear firing over those in front. The attempt was made on the afternoon of August 25, but did not succeed.

Fifth Parallel.

137. Brigadier-General Terry was ordered, on the 26th of August, to carry the ridge at the point of the bayonet, and hold it. This was accomplished, and the fifth parallel established there on the evening of the same day. This brought us to within 240 yards of Fort Wagner. The intervening space comprised the narrowest and shallowest part of Morris Island. It was simply a flat ridge of sand, scarcely 25 yards in width, over which the sea, in rough weather, swept entirely across to the marsh on our left.

Approaches by the flying sap were at once commenced from the right of the fifth parallel, and certain means of defense in the parallel itself were ordered. It was soon ascertained that we had now reached the point where the really formidable defensive arrangements of the enemy commenced. An elaborate and ingenious system of torpedo mines, to be exploded by the tread of persons walking over them, was encountered, and we were informed by the prisoners taken on the ridge that the entire area of firm ground between us and the fort, as well as the glacis of the latter on its south and east fronts, was thickly filled with these torpedoes. This knowledge brought to us a sense of security from sorties, for the mines were a defense to us as well as to the enemy.

By daybreak on the 27th, our sappers had reached with an unfinished trench to within 100 yards of Fort Wagner.

138. The dark and gloomy days of the siege were now upon us. Our daily hopes were on the increase, while our progress became discouragingly slow and even fearfully uncertain. The converging fire

from Wagner alone almost enveloped the head of our sap, subtending, as it did, an angle of nearly 90 degrees, while the flank fire from the James Island batteries increased in power and accuracy.

To push forward the sap, in the narrow strip of shallow, shifting sand by day, was impossible, while the brightness of the prevailing harvest moon rendered the operation almost as hazardous by night. Matters, indeed, seemed at a stand-still, and a feeling of despondency began to pervade the rank and file of the command.

FINAL BOMBARDMENT AND CAPTURE OF FORT WAGNER.

139. In this emergency it was determined to commence simultaneously and vigorously two distinct methods of attack, viz:

First. To keep Wagner perfectly silent with an overpowering curved fire, so that our engineers would have only the more distant batteries of the enemy to annoy them; and,

Second. To breach the bomb-proof with rifled guns, and thus deprive the enemy of their only shelter in the work.

Accordingly all the light mortars were moved to the front, and placed in battery; the capacity of the fifth parallel and the advanced trenches for sharpshooters was enlarged and improved; the rifled guns in the left breaching batteries were trained upon the fort and prepared for prolonged action, and powerful calcium lights, to aid the night work of our cannoneers and sharpshooters, and blind those of the enemy, were got in readiness. The co-operation of the powerful battery of the New Ironsides, Captain [Stephen C.] Rowan, during the daytime, was secured.

140. These final operations against Fort Wagner were actively inaugurated at break of day on the morning of September 5. For forty-two consecutive hours the spectacle presented was of surpassing sublimity and grandeur. Seventeen siege and Coehorn mortars unceasingly dropped their shells into the work over the heads of our sappers and the guards of the advanced trenches; nine rifled guns, in the left batteries, pounded away at the southwest angle of the bomb-proof, while during the daytime the New Ironsides, with astonishing regularity and precision, kept a constant stream of shells from her eight-gun broadside ricochetting over the water against the parapet of Wagner, whence, rebounding upward, they dropped nearly vertically, exploding in or over the work and searching every part of it. The calcium lights turned night into day, throwing our own men into impenetrable obscurity, while they brilliantly illuminated every object in front and brought the minutest detail of the fort in sharp relief. In a short time the fort became silent, exhibiting but little sign of life.

Our sappers rapidly pushed forward their works, suffering from the James Island batteries principally, which, night and day, kept up a galling fire upon the head of the sap, following its progress toward the work, until so near that friends as well as foes would be endangered by it. From this moment the men in the advanced trenches enjoyed entire immunity from danger. Indeed,, the sense of security was so great that they fearlessly exposed themselves to view, and the reliefs off duty defiantly mounted the parapets of their works to while away their leisure time, or groping their way forward among the torpedoes with a skill which the most bitter experience only could have conferred, approached the ditch, and took a deliberate survey of the fort and its surroundings.