Fort Sumter, and several heavily armed batteries on James and Sullivan's Islands. It was seen in flank and reverse by the enemy's artillery. Its communication with Charleston being in the hands of the enemy, and entirely practicable to him during the night, its armament and garrison could be easily maintained at the maximum standard of strength and efficiency. 96. Against the formidable direct and flank fire to which the approaches would be exposed from the batteries which covered and protected Fort Wagner, we could expect to effect nothing, excepting, possibly, the demolition of Fort Sumter, which from its barbette guns could deliver, and had delivered, over both Wagner and Gregg, an accurate and destructive fire. 97. The early elimination of Fort Sumter from the contest, considered simply as auxiliary to the reduction of Fort Wagner, was, therefore, greatly to be desired, and arrangements were at once commenced and the necessary orders given to place the breaching guns in position. 98. At this stage of the operations it became necessasy to subdivide the engineering operations, civil and military, and assign to each assistant engineer a definite and specified field of labor. 99. Col. E. W. Serrell, First New York Volunteer Engineers, in addition to his duties as regimental commander, was charged with the construction of wharves in Light-House Inlet on Morris and Folly Islands, with certain projected fortifications on Black Island, and with the erection of a battery in the marsh between Morris and James Islands, to be used against Charleston City. To Maj. T. B. Brooks, aide-de-camp, was intrusted the direction of the engineering operations on the right, comprising the approaches to Fort Wagner, and the construction of such batteries, magazines, defensive arrangements, &c., as might be required in that quarter. First Lieut. Charles R. Suter, Corps of Engineers, was charged with the construction of a depot powder magazine, and other duties. Lieutenant [Peter S.] Michie had charge on the left. First Parallel. 100. On July 18, immediately after our second repulse at Fort Wagner, orders were given to convert the position occupied by our right batteries on the 18th of July, and named Battery Reynolds, into a strong defensive line, capable of resisting a formidable sortie. From that time this line took the name of the first parallel." 101. A row of inclined palisading, reaching entirely across the island, was planted about 200 yards in advance of the line, with a re-· turn of 50 yards on the right. This return was well flanked by two guns on the right of the parallel. The parapet between the guns was arranged for infantry defense, a bomb-proof magazine was constructed, and the armament of the line modified and increased, so that the parallel contained eight siege and field guns, ten siege mortars, and three Requa's rifle batteries.* These works were all completed by the 23d of July. 102. July 21, I directed an emplacement for one 8-inch Parrott rifle to be prepared next the marsh, on our left and to the rear of the first parallel. It was to be used against Fort Sumter, and its dis *See Major Brooks' report, p. 264. 2 R R-VOL XXVIII, PT I tance from that work was 4,200 yards. Major Brooks was charged with this work. Second Parallel. : 103. July 23. On the night of the 23d the "second parallel" was established by the flying sap, about 600 yards in advance of the first, upon a line running diagonally across the island, in a direction approximately northwest and southeast, by taking advantage of a narrow ridge which stretched across the island at that point and extended some distance into the marsh. The end of this ridge on the left rested boldly on Vincent's Creek. 104. It being the intention to place, directly in the rear of the second parallel, as many breaching guns against Fort Sumter as the place would accommodate, provided it should be found practicable to establish them there, under the concentrated fire to which the position was exposed, orders were issued to give to its defensive arrangements the most formidable character. 105. The creek on the left was spanned by two booms of floating timber, to keep off sorties from boats. An obstacle, consisting of abatis, inclined palisading, and wire entanglements, was placed several yards in advance, with its left resting on the creek, and with a return on the right perfectly flanked by six light guns in the parallel. On the right the parallel itself was extended by a defensive barricade to low-water mark, terminating at that. point in a strong crib work on which was placed three Requa batteries and two field howitzers to sweep the beach. This was called the Surf Battery, and was a novel and not unimportant feature of that portion of our approaches. 106. July 26, directed breaching batteries against Fort Sumter to be established.in the second parallel. 107. Major Brooks, assistant engineer, upon whom this duty devolved, although entertaining and expressing pretty decided views of the impracticability of such an undertaking, under the heavy, direct, and flank fire to which the fatigue parties would be exposed, nevertheless entered zealously upon the work. 108. No serious difficulty in executing the appropriate work of the engineers was apprehended, but in the slow and tedious labor of moving into position and mounting the heavy guns and carriages under a constant and severe fire from the front and one flank, it was greatly feared that we would not only lose many valuable lives, but that the gun carriages as well as the sling-carts, gins, and other appliances necessary for such work would be destroyed by the enemy's fire. 109. The work was successfully accomplished, however, with unusual rapidity and without serious loss. The transportation to these batteries, and the labor of mounting the carriages and guns, could be performed during the night time only. 110. The defensive arrangements of the second parallel were, for all practical purposes, complete by the 26th of July, and comprised, besides the formidable obstacle in front of it already referred to, 290 linear yards of parapet arranged for infantry fire, and twenty-one pieces of light artillery. It also contained three 30-pounder Parrott rifles and one Wiard field gun, to be used against Fort Wagner and Battery Gregg. 111. The breaching batteries against Fort Sumter located in this parallel contained two 8-inch Parrott rifles, and five 100-pounder Par rott rifles. They were located at a mean distance of 3,525 yards from Fort Sumter, and were in readiness to open fire on the 15th of August. 112. In the meantime Colonel Serrell had been ordered, on the 25th of July, to establish a breaching battery in the first parallel, to be armed with two 200-pounder Parrott rifles and two 80-pounder Whitworth rifles. The use of these guns and the service of a detachment of men to man them had been kindly offered by Admiral Dahlgren. The battery was called the Naval Battery, and was under the efficient command of Capt. Foxhall A. Parker throughout the bombardment, which commenced on the 17th day of August." 113. July 27, directed Lieutenant Michie to commence the construction of breaching batteries against Fort Sumter on the land ridges to the left and rear of the Beacon House, near the marsh. These batteries were pushed forward rapidly under the fire of the James Island batteries. 114. A 10-inch Parrott rifle having arrived from the north (the only one used by us in our operations prior to the capture of Fort Wagner), it was decided to locate it on the left, with a view to its security from the enemy's fire. The duty of preparing a position for it was assigned to Lieutenant Michie. 115. The breaching batteries established in this locality were at a mean distance of 4,300 yards from Fort Sumter, and comprised one 10-inch Parrott rifle, two 8-inch Parrott rifles, and four 100-pounder Parrott rifles. All these pieces took an effective part in the first bombardment of Fort Sumter, from the 17th to the 23d of August, although some of them did not open until the third day. 116. August 2. Between the 15th and 20th of July, Colonel Serrell and Lieutenant Michie had made several examinations of the marsh to the westward of Morris Island, in order to determine the practicability of placing a battery there, within effective range of the city of Charleston and the shipping at the wharves. 117. This marsh, like other salt marshes on this coast, consists of a bed of soft black mud, from 16 to 18 feet in depth, overgrown with reeds and grass, traversed by numerous deep and tortuous bayous, and subject to daily overflow by the tides. 118. The difficulties which presented themselves, viewing the undertaking as simply an attempt to solve a complicated problem in practical engineering, appeared very great, leaving out of the question the severe artillery fire to which the working parties would be exposed, without the possibility of securing any protection until the battery should be nearly completed. 119. The experience in the marshes on the Savannah River, above Fort Pulaski, in 1862, came to our aid, and contributed largely to the speedy and successful completion of the work. 120. A number of experiments to ascertain the sustaining power of the marsh mud were made, and from the data thus obtained a plan of a battery for one 8-inch Parrott rifle, submitted by Colonel Serrell, was approved, with but slight modifications, and he was charged with its construction. 121. It was located at a point nearly midway between Morris and James Islands, 7,000 yards from the lower end of Charleston City, and was named the Marsh Battery, although it is generally known as the "Swamp Angel," a name conferred upon it by the soldiers. A deep creek directly in front of the battery, across which a strong boom was constructed a few yards lower down, rendered the position secure against attack from infantry or boat parties. 122. The Marsh Battery consisted of a sand-bag epaulement, supported by a grillage composed of round timbers crossing each other at right angles, in two layers, and resting on the surface of the marsh, In this grillage, in rear of the epaulement, there was a rectangular opening large enough to receive the platform of the gun, and surrounded by sheathing piles which reached through the mud into the solid substratum of sand. Within this rectangular space layers of marsh grass, canvas, and sand were placed, on which rested a closely fitting sub-platform of planks. On these planks the gun platform was placed. The epaulement and gun were therefore so far independent of each other that the subsidence or displacement of the one would not necessarily involve that of the other. This battery was completed and in readiness to open fire on the 21st of August. 123. August 9. On the 9th of August Major Brooks was directed to establish the third parallel with the flying sap, about 330 yards in advance of the right of the second parallel, and to commence the approaches between the two parallels by the same method. 124. From this period forward the fire from James Island, Wagner, Gregg, and Sumter, and from the enemy's sharpshooters in Fort Wagner, was severe and almost unceasing. Indeed, on the 10th, our advance was stopped entirely from this cause, and it became a question of grave doubt whether we could push forward our trenches much farther with the advantages so entirely on the side of the enemy. Meanwhile the garrison of Fort Sumter was industriously engaged in strengthening its passive means of defense. Sand-bags were piled up against the gorge walls from its junction with the northwest face to the sally-port so as to protect the magazine near that angle. The sand-bag filling of the gorge casemates was greatly added to, and the traverses on the terre-plein were enlarged. 125. At this period of the siege it was not supposed that it would be necessary to sap entirely up to Fort Wagner, in order to insure its capture, for on the presumption that Fort Sumter would be demolished from positions which we then held, it was considered probable that a complete investment of Morris Island at night could be established and maintained by picket-boats. Our batteries stopped the communication by day. 126. An attempt to illuminate the waters near Cumming's Point with calcium lights placed in the left batteries, was but partially successful, as the distance-over 3,000 yards-was too great for the apparatus which we had. The idea was to throw a cone of light upon the water approach, and station the guard-boats in the obscurity just outside the lateral limits of the cone. The plan, I am convinced, was entirely practicable, and with powerful reflectors and an efficient picket-boat organization would have given decisive results. 127. It was decided not to push the sap toward Fort Wagner beyond the third parallel until the fire upon Fort Sumter had been opened. 128. My communication to the General-in-Chief, of August 10, is as follows: Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, General-in-Chief, U. S. Army. Washington, D. C. : SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 28th ultimo, in answer to my request for re-enforcements. The unexpected reduction of my effective force by sickness was, at the time I wrote, quite alarming. I admit that I had not taken into consideration the probable effect of the resumption of active operations upon men who had been idle for an entire year. It has, in truth, acted like a process of reacclimation. All but two regiments of the forces ordered from Major-General Foster's department are here. If my command continues to improve in health, I shall require no more men than I now have, to accomplish the reduction of Fort Sumter. After that is done, the monitors must take the lead, in accordance with the project which was discussed and informally adopted when I left Washington. General Beauregard has, for the defense of Charleston, twice as many men and more than five times as much artillery as I have. I therefore beg the Department not to lose sight of the fact that after the gate is opened to the monitors and ironclads, by the reduction of Fort Sumter, the army here, so long as it remains greatly inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, must remain defensively upon these sea islands. My operations are progressing satisfactorily. I expect to open a heavy fire on Fort Sumter on the 14th instant. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Q. A. GILLMORE, On the 16th of August, I wrote to the General-in-Chief as follows: Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.: SIR: I have to report a steady progress in our operations here. In consequence of the inferior and irregular quality of the only powder in this department suitable for heavy guns, a fact which was not suspected by my ordnance officer_until developed by our preliminary practice after the magazines had been filled, I was unable to open my batteries on the 14th, agreeably to my expectations, as stated in my letter of the 10th instant. I have borrowed some powder from the navy, which (with some recently arrived from the north) will enable me to open to-morrow, the 17th instant. Two monitors, with one rifled gun each, are expected to co-operate with me against Sumter, at a distance of about 2,000 yards. The others will remain abreast of Fort Wagner, to keep down its fire. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, Q. A. GILLMORE, 129. A sufficient number of breaching guns being in readiness on the 16th of August to warrant our opening upon Fort Sumter, and arrangements having been made with Admiral Dahlgren to assist in subduing the fire of Battery Gregg and Fort Wagner, particularly that of the sharpshooters in the latter, from which we apprehended considerable annoyance to our breaching batteries in the second parallel, the following order was issued: 130. SPECIAL ORDERS, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH, In the Field, Morris Island, S. C., August 16, 1863. I. All the breaching batteries established against Fort Sumter that are completed and in condition for efficient service, and the other batteries herein below named, will be opened at break of day to-morrow. Those in process of construction will commence firing as soon as the several pieces in succession are ready to open effectively. The firing will continue from day to day, under the immediate supervision of the chief of artillery, commencing at daybreak and ending at dusk in the evening, with such intermission during the heat of the day as may from time to time be ordered, as follows: First. Battery Brown, Capt. C. G. Strahan, Third Rhode Island Volunteer Artillery, commanding, comprising two 8-inch Parrott rifles, against the gorge wall of Fort Sumter, one piece firing shot, and the other percussion shell, exclusively. Second. Battery Rosecrans, Capt. J. J. Comstock, jr., Third Rhode Island Volunteer Artillery, commanding, comprising three 100-pounder Parrott rifles, against the gorge wall of Fort Sumter, one piece to fire percussion shell, and two pieces to fire shot, exclusively. |