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sentence of exclusion hindered him from taking any ostensible part, but it did not hinder him from being present as a spectator; and when he saw his chariot proclaimed victorious under the title of Boeotian, his impatience to make himself known became uncontrollable. He stepped into the midst of the lists, and placed a chaplet on the head of the charioteer, thus advertising himself as the master. This was a flagrant indecorum, and known violation of the order of the festival: accordingly the official attendants with their staffs interfered at once in performance of their duty, chastising and driving him back to his place with blows'. Hence arose an increased apprehension of armed Lacedæmonian interference. None such took place, however: the Lacedæmonians, for the first and last time in their history, offered their Olympic sacrifice at home, and the festival passed off without any interruption. The boldness of the Eleians in

1 Thucyd. v. 50. Λίχας ὁ ̓Αρκεσιλάου Λακεδαιμόνιος ἐν τῷ ἀγῶνι ὑπὸ τῶν ῥαβδούχων πληγὰς ἔλαβεν, ὅτι νικῶντος τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ ζεύγους, καὶ ἀνακηρυχθέντος Βοιωτῶν δημοσίου κατὰ τὴν οὐκ ἐξουσίαν τῆς ἀγωνίσεως, προελθὼν ἐς τὸν ἀγῶνα ἀνέδησε τὸν ἡνίοχον, βουλόμενος δηλῶσαι ὅτι ἑαυτοῦ ἦν τὸ ἅρμα.

We see by comparison with this incident how much less rough and harsh was the manner of dealing at Athens, and in how much more serious a light blows to the person were considered. At the Athenian festival of the Dionysia, if a person committed disorder or obtruded himself into a place not properly belonging to him in the theatre, the archon or his officials were both empowered and required to repress the disorder, by turning the person out, and fining him, if necessary. But they were upon no account to strike him. If they did, they were punishable themselves by the dikastery afterwards (Demosth. cont. Meidiam, c. 49).-It has been remarked to me that more summary measures would probably be required to maintain order in an open racecourse than in a closed theatre. Some allowance ought reasonably to be made for this difference.

It will be seen, however, that the Lacedæmonians remembered and VOL. VII.

G

Depressed estimation

of Sparta throughout

putting this affront upon the most powerful state in Greece is so astonishing, that we can hardly be mistaken in supposing their proceeding to have been suggested by Alkibiadês and encouraged by the armed aid from the allies. He was at this moment not less ostentatious in humiliating Sparta than in showing off Athens.

Of the depressed influence and estimation of Sparta, a farther proof was soon afforded by the Greece- fate of her colony the Trachinian Herakleia, estaHerakleia. blished near Thermopyla in the third year of the war. That colony-though at first comprising a numerous body of settlers, in consequence of the general trust in Lacedæmonian power, and though always under the government of a Lacedæmonian harmost had never prospered. It had been persecuted from the beginning by the neighbouring tribes, and administered with harshness as well as peculation by its governors. The establishment of the town had been regarded from the beginning by the neighbours, especially the Thessalians, as an invasion of their territory; and their hostilities, always vexatious, had, in the winter succeeding the Olympic festival just described, been carried to a greater point of violence than ever. They had defeated the Herakleots in a ruinous battle, and slain Xenarês the Lacedæmonian governor. But though the place was so reduced as to be unable to maintain itself without foreign aid, Sparta was too much embarrassed by Peloponnesian enemies and

revenged themselves upon the Eleians for this insult twelve years afterwards, during the plenitude of their power (Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 2, 21 ; Diodor. xiv. 17).

waverers to be able to succour it; and the Bootians, observing her inability, became apprehensive that the interference of Athens would be invoked. Accordingly they thought it prudent to occupy Herakleia with a body of Boeotian troops; dismissing the Lacedæmonian governor Hegesippidas for alleged misconduct. Nor could the Lacedæmonians prevent this proceeding, though it occasioned them to make indignant remonstrance'.

1 Thucyd. v. 51, 52.

B.C. 419.

New policy

of Athens

attempted

by Alkibiadês.

CHAPTER LVI.

FROM THE FESTIVAL OF OLYMPIAD 90, DOWN TO THE
BATTLE OF MANTINEIA.

SHORTLY after the remarkable events of the Olym-
pic festival described in my last chapter, the Ar-
geians and their allies sent a fresh embassy to invite
the Corinthians to join them. They thought it a
promising opportunity, after the affront just put
upon Sparta, to prevail upon the Corinthians to
desert her but Spartan envoys were present also,
and though the discussions were much protracted,
no new resolution was adopted. An earthquake-
possibly an earthquake not real, but simulated for
convenience-abruptly terminated the congress.
The Corinthians,-though seemingly distrusting
Argos now that she was united with Athens, and
leaning rather towards Sparta,-were unwilling to
pronounce themselves in favour of one so as to make
an enemy of the other1.

In spite of this first failure, the new alliance of Athens and Argos manifested its fruits vigorously in the ensuing spring. Under the inspirations of Alkibiadês, Athens was about to attempt the new experiment of seeking to obtain intra-Peloponnesian followers and influence. At the beginning of the war she had been maritime, defensive, and simply conservative, under the guidance of Periklês. After Thucyd. v. 48-50.

1

the events of Sphakteria, she made use of that great advantage to aim at the recovery of Megara and Boeotia, which she had before been compelled to abandon by the Thirty Years' truce-at the recommendation of Kleon. In this attempt she employed the eighth year of the war, but with signal ill-success; while Brasidas during that period broke open the gates of her maritime empire, and robbed her of many important dependencies. The grand object of Athens then became, to recover these lost dependencies, especially Amphipolis: Nikias and his partisans sought to effect such recovery by making peace, while Kleon and his supporters insisted that it could never be achieved except by military efforts. The expedition under Kleon against Amphipolis had failed-the peace concluded by Nikias had failed also: Athens had surrendered her capital advantage, without regaining Amphipolisand if she wished to regain it, there was no alternative except to repeat the attempt which had failed under Kleon. And this perhaps she might have done (as we shall find her projecting to do in the course of about four years forward), if it had not been, first, that the Athenian mind was now probably sick and disheartened about Amphipolis, in consequence of the prodigious disgrace so recently undergone there: next, that Alkibiadês, the new chief adviser or prime minister of Athens, (if we may be allowed to use an inaccurate expression, which yet suggests the reality of the case) was prompted by his personal impulses to turn the stream of Athenian ardour into a different channel.

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