Nikias prevails with

bly to send

others as

envoys to Sparta in order to

embarrass

ment.

and goes far to justify the general charge of habitual duplicity so often alleged against the Lacedæmonian character1.

The disgraced envoys would doubtless quit Athens the assem- immediately: but this opportune earthquake gave himself and Nikias a few hours to recover from his unexpected overthrow. In the assembly of the next day, he still contended that the friendship of Sparta was clear up the preferable to that of Argos, and insisted on the prudence of postponing all consummation of engagement with the latter until the real intentions of Sparta, now so contradictory and inexplicable, should be made clear. He contended that the position of Athens, in regard to the peace and alliance, was that of superior honour and advantage—the position of Sparta, one of comparative disgrace: Athens had thus a greater interest than Sparta in maintaining what had been concluded. But he at the same time admitted that a distinct and peremptory explanation must be exacted from Sparta as to her intentions, and he requested the people to send himself with some other colleagues to demand it. The Lacedæmonians should be apprised that Argeian envoys were already present in Athens with propositions, and that the Athenians might already have concluded this alliance, if they could have permitted themselves to do wrong to the existing alliance with Sparta. But the Lacedæmonians, if their intentions were honourable, must show it forthwith-1. By restoring Panaktum, not demolished, but standing. 2. By restoring Amphipolis

1 Euripid. Andromach. 445-455; Herodot. ix. 54; Thucyd. iv. 50.

Failure of the embassy Spartacludes the

of Nikias at

Athens con

alliance

with Argos,

Elis, and

also. 3. By renouncing their special alliance with the Boeotians, unless the Boeotians on their side chose to become parties to the peace with Athens1. The Athenian assembly, acquiescing in the recommendation of Nikias, invested him with the commission which he required; a remarkable proof, after the overpowering defeat of the preceding day, how strong was the hold which he still retained upon them, and how sincere their desire to keep on Mantineia. the best terms with Sparta. This was a last chance granted to Nikias and his policy-a perfectly fair chance, since all that was asked of Sparta was just -but it forced him to bring matters to a decisive issue with her, and shut out all further evasion. His mission to Sparta failed altogether: the influence of Kleobûlus and Xenarês, the anti-Athenian Ephors, was found predominant, so that not one of his demands was complied with. And even when he formally announced that unless Sparta renounced her special alliance with the Boeotians or compelled the Boeotians to accept the peace with Athens, the Athenians would immediately contract alliance with Argos-the menace produced no effect. He could only obtain, and that too as a personal favour to himself, that the oaths as they stood should be formally renewed; an empty concession, which covered but faintly the humiliation of his retreat to Athens. The Athenian assembly listened to his report with strong indignation against the Lacedæmonians, and with marked displeasure even against himself, as the great author and voucher of this unperformed 1 Thucyd. v. 46.

Conditions

of this con

alliance.

treaty; while Alkibiadês was permitted to introduce the envoys, (already at hand in the city,) from Argos, Mantineia and Elis, with whom a pact was at once concluded1.

The words of this convention, which Thucydidês gives us doubtless from the record on the public column, comprise two engagements—one for peace, another for alliance.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleivention and ans, have concluded a treaty of peace by sea and by land, without fraud or mischief, each for themselves and for the allies over whom each exercise empire. [The express terms in which these states announce themselves as imperial states and their allies as dependencies, deserve notice. No such words appear in the treaty between Athens and Lacedæmon. I have already mentioned that the main ground of discontent on the part of Mantineia and Elis towards Sparta, was connected with their imperial power.]

Neither of them shall bear arms against the other for purposes of damage.

The Athenians, Argeians, Mantineians, and Eleians, shall be allies with each other for one hundred years. If any enemy shall invade Attica, the three contracting cities shall lend the most vigorous aid in their power at the invitation of Athens. Should the forces of the invading city damage Attica and then retire, the three will proclaim that city their enemy and attack it: neither of the four shall in Thucyd. v. 46; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 10.

* Thucyd. v. 47. ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι.

that case suspend the war, without consent of the others.

Reciprocal obligations are imposed upon Athens, in case Argos, Mantineia, or Elis, shall be attacked.

Neither of the four contracting powers shall grant passage to troops through their own territory or the territory of allies over whom they may at the time be exercising command, either by land or sea, unless upon joint resolution'.

In case auxiliary troops shall be required and sent under this treaty, the city sending shall furnish their maintenance for the space of thirty days, from the day of their entrance upon the territory of the city requiring. Should their services be needed for a longer period, the city requiring shall furnish their maintenance, at the rate of three Æginæan oboli for each hoplite, light-armed or archer, and of one Æginæan drachma or six oboli for each horseman, per day. The city requiring shall possess the command, so long as the service required shall be in her territory. But if any expedition shall be undertaken by joint resolution, then the command shall be shared equally between all.

Such were the substantive conditions of the new alliance. Provision was then made for the oathsby whom? where? when? in what words? how often? they were to be taken. Athens was to

1 Thucyd. v. 48. καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἂν ἄρχωσιν ἕκαστοι. The tense and phrase here deserve notice, as contrasted with the phrase in the former part of the treaty-τῶν ξυμμάχων ὧν ἄρχουσιν ἑκάτεροι.

The clause imposing actual obligation to hinder the passage of troops, required to be left open for application to the actual time.

Complicated relations among the Grecian

treaty and

alliance.

swear on behalf of herself and her allies; but Argos, Elis, and Mantineia, with their respective allies, were to swear by separate cities. The oaths were to be renewed every four years; by Athens, within thirty days before each Olympic festival, at Argos, Elis, and Mantineia; by these three cities, at Athens, ten days before each festival of the greater Panathenæa. "The words of the treaty of peace and alliance, and the oaths sworn, shall be engraven on stone columns, and put up in the temples of each of the four cities—and also upon a brazen column, to be put up by joint cost, at Olympia, for the festival now approaching."

"The four cities may by joint consent make any change they please in the provisions of this treaty, without violating their oaths'."

The conclusion of this new treaty introduced a greater degree of complication into the grouping and association of the Grecian cities than had ever states as to before been known. The ancient Spartan confederacy, and the Athenian empire, still subsisted. A peace had been concluded between them, ratified by the formal vote of the majority of the confederates, yet not accepted by several of the minority. Not merely peace, but also special alliance had been concluded between Athens and Sparta; and a special alliance between Sparta and Boeotia. Corinth, member of the Spartan confederacy, was also member of a defensive alliance with Argos, Mantineia, and Elis; which three states had concluded a more intimate alliance, first with each other (without Co1 Thucyd. v. 47.