pected than formidable. Their fortifications were feeble-in some parts low, in other parts even tumbling down; nor had they even taken the precaution to close their gates at night: so that the barbarians under Diitrephês, entering the town without the smallest difficulty, began at once the work of pillage and destruction. The scene which followed was something alike novel and revolting to Grecian eyes. Not only were all the houses, and even the temples, plundered-but the Thracians farther manifested that raging thirst of blood which seemed inherent in their race. They slew every living thing that came in their way; men, women, children, horses, cattle, &c. They burst into a school, wherein many boys had just been assembled, and massacred them all. This scene of bloodshed, committed by barbarians who had not been seen in Greece since the days of Xerxes, was recounted with horror and sympathy throughout all Grecian communities, though Mykalêssus was in itself a town of secondrate or third-rate magnitude'. cians driven slaughter Thebans. The succour brought from Thebes, by Mykales- The Thrasian fugitives, arrived unhappily only in time to back with avenge, but not to save, the inhabitants. The b Thracians were already retiring with the booty which they could carry away, when the Bootarch Skirphondas overtook them both with cavalry and hoplites; after having put to death some greedy 1 Thucyd. vii. 29, 30, 31. I conceive that ovơn où μeyáλn is the right reading--and not ovσn peyáλy-in reference to Mykalêssus. The words is enì peyébet in c. 31 refer to the size of the city. The reading is however disputed among critics. It is evident from the language of Thucydidês that the catastrophe at Mykalêssus made a profound impression throughout Greece. Athenian station at -decline of the naval superiority of Athens. plunderers who tarried too long in the town. He compelled them to relinquish most of their booty, and pursued them to the sea-shore; not without a brave resistance from these peltasts, who had a peculiar way of fighting which disconcerted the Thebans. But when they arrived at the sea-shore, the Athenian ships did not think it safe to approach very close, so that not less than 250 Thracians were slain before they could get aboard'; and the Athenian commander Diitrephês was so severely wounded that he died shortly afterwards. The rest pursued their voyage homeward. Meanwhile the important station of Naupaktus Naupaktus and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf again became the theatre of naval encounter. It will be recollected that this was the scene of the memorable victories gained by the Athenian admiral Phormion in the second year of the Peloponnesian war2, wherein the nautical superiority of Athens over her enemies, as to ships, crews, and admiral, had been so transcendently manifested. In that respect, matters had now considerably changed. While the navy of Athens had fallen off since the days of Phormion, that of her enemy had improved: Ariston, and other skilful Corinthian steersmen, not attempting to copy Athenian tactics, had studied the best mode of coping with them, and had modified the build of their own triremes accordingly, at Corinth as well as at Syracuse. Seventeen years before, 1 Thucyd. vii. 30; Pausanias, i. 23, 3. Compare Meineke, ad Aristophanis Fragment. "Hpwes, vol. ii. p. 1069. 2 See above, vol. vi. ch. xlix. p. 264 of this History. See the preceding chapter. Phormion with eighteen Athenian triremes would have thought himself a full match for twenty-five Corinthian. But the Athenian admiral of this year, Konon, also a perfectly brave man, now judged so differently, that he constrained Demosthenês and Eurymedon to reinforce his eighteen triremes with ten others-out of the best of their fleet, at a time when they had certainly none to spare-on the ground that the Corinthian fleet opposite of 25 sail was about to assume the offensive against him'. near Nau indecisive Soon afterwards Diphilus came to supersede Naval battle Konon with some fresh ships from Athens, which paktusmade the total number of triremes 33. The Corin- result. thian fleet, reinforced so as to be nearly of the same number, took up a station on the coast of Achaia opposite Naupaktus, at a spot called Erineus, in the territory of Rhypes. They ranged themselves across the mouth of a little indentation of the coast, or bay in the shape of a crescent, with two projecting promontories as horns : each of these promontories was occupied by a friendly land-force, thus supporting the line of triremes at both flanks. This was a position which did not permit the Athenians to sail through the line, or manœuvre round it and in the rear of it. Accordingly, when the fleet of Diphilus came across from Naupaktus, it remained for some time close in front of the Corinthians, neither party venturing to attack; for the straightforward collision was destructive to the Athenian ships with their sharp, but light and feeble beaks-while it was favourable to the solid bows, and thick epôtids or ear-projec 1 Thucyd. vii. 31. Compare the language of Phormion, ii. 88, 89. tions, of the Corinthian trireme. After considerable delay, the Corinthians at length began the attack on their side-yet not advancing far enough out to sea, to admit of the manoeuvring and evolutions of the Athenians. The battle lasted some time, terminating with no decisive advantage to either party. Three Corinthian triremes were completely disabled, though the crews of all escaped by swimming to their friends ashore: on the Athenian side, not one trireme became absolutely waterlogged, but seven were so much damaged, by straightforward collision with the stronger bows of the enemy, that they became almost useless after they got back to Naupaktus. The Athenians had so far the advantage, that they maintained their station, while the Corinthians did not venture to renew the fight: moreover both the wind and the current set towards the northern shore, so that the floating fragments and dead bodies came into possession of the Athenians. Each party thought itself entitled to erect a trophy; but the real feeling of victory lay on the side of Corinth, and that of defeat on the side of Athens. The reputed maritime superiority of the latter was felt by both parties to have sustained a diminution; and such assuredly would have been the impression of Phormion, had he been alive to witness it'. This battle appears to have taken place, so far as we can make out, a short time before the arrival of Demosthenês at Syracuse, about the close of the month of May. We cannot doubt that the Athenians most anxiously expected news from that 1 Thucyd. vii. 34. Last news of the Athe nians from ruin of the Syracuse not offi known to officer, with some account of victories obtained in Sicily, to console them for having sent him away at a moment when his services were so cruelly wanted at home. Perhaps they may even have indulged army there hopes of the near capture of Syracuse, as a means cially made of restoring their crippled finances. Their disap- them. pointment would be all the more bitter when they came to receive, towards the end of June or beginning of July, despatches announcing the capital defeat of Demosthenês in his attempt upon Epipolæ, and the consequent extinction of all hope that Syracuse could ever be taken. After these despatches, we may perhaps doubt whether any others subsequently reached Athens. The generals would not write home during the month of indecision immediately succeeding, when Demosthenês was pressing for retreat, and Nikias resisting it. They might possibly however write immediately on taking their resolution to retreat, at the time when they sent to Katana to forbid farther supplies of provisions:-but this was the last practicable opportunity for closely afterwards followed their naval defeat, and the blocking up of the mouth of the Great Harbour. The mere absence of intelligence would satisfy the Athenians that their affairs in Sicily were proceeding badly. But the closing series of calamities, down to the final catastrophe, would only come to their knowledge indirectly; partly through the triumphant despatches transmitted from Syracuse to Sparta, Corinth, and Thebes-partly through individual soldiers of their own armament who escaped. According to the tale of Plutarch, the news was first made known at Athens through a stranger, |