Night march of

altered direction,

towards the

southern

sea.

counsel. They saw plainly that the route which

the Athe- they had originally projected, over the Akræan cliff into the Sikel regions of the interior and from thence to Katana, had become impracticable; and that their unhappy troops would be still less in condition to force it on the morrow than they had been on the day preceding. Accordingly they resolved to make off during the night, leaving numerous fires burning to mislead the enemy; but completely to alter the direction, and to turn down towards the southern coast on which lay Kamarina and Gela. Their guides informed them that if they could cross the river Kakyparis, which fell into the sea south of Syracuse, on the south-eastern coast of Sicily-or a river still farther on called the Erineus -they might march up the right bank of either into the regions of the interior. Accordingly they broke up in the night, amidst confusion and alarm; in spite of which, the front division of the army under Nikias got into full march, and made considerable advance. By daybreak this division reached the south-eastern coast of the island not far south of Syracuse and fell into the track of the Helôrine road, which they pursued until they arrived at the Kakyparis. Even here, however, they found a Syracusan detachment beforehand with them, raising a redoubt, and blocking up the ford; nor could Nikias pass it without forcing his way through them. He marched straight forward to the Erineus, which he crossed on the same day, and encamped his troops on some high ground on the other side1.

Except at the ford of the Kakyparis, his march
Thucyd. vii. 80-82.

1

He Separation pos- under

of the two divisions

Demosthe

across the

Erineus.

had been all day unobstructed by the enemy. thought it wiser to push his troops as fast as sible in order to arrive at some place both of safety Nikias and and subsistence, without concerning himself about nês. The the rear division under Demosthenês. That divi- first division, the larger half of the army, started both later Nikias gets and in greater disorder. Unaccountable panics river and darkness made them part company or miss their way, so that Demosthenês, with all his efforts to keep them together, made little progress, and fell much behind Nikias. He was overtaken by the Syracusans during the forenoon, seemingly before he reached the Kakyparis',-and at a moment when the foremost division was nearly six miles ahead, between the Kakyparis and the Erineus.

1 Dr. Arnold (Thucyd. vol. iii. p. 280, copied by Göller ad vii. 81) thinks that the division of Demosthenês reached and passed the river Kakyparis; and was captured between the Kakyparis and the Erineus. But the words of Thucyd. vii. 80, 81 do not sustain this. The division of Nikias was in advance of Demosthenês from the beginning, and gained upon it principally during the early part of the march, before daybreak; because it was then that the disorder of the division of Demosthenês was the most inconvenient: see c. 81-ws Tŷs VUKTÒS TÓTE Evveтapáxonoav, &c. When Thucydidês therefore says that "at daybreak they arrived at the sea” (ἅμα δὲ τῇ ἕῳ ἀφικνοῦνται ἐς τὴν θάXaTTav, c. 80), this cannot be true both of Nikias and Demosthenês. If the former arrived there at daybreak, the latter cannot have come to the same point till some time after daybreak. Nikias must have been beforehand with Demosthenês when he reached the sea-and considerably more beforehand when he reached the Kakyparis: moreover we are expressly told that Nikias did not wait for his colleague-that he thought it for the best to get on as fast as possible with his own division.

It appears to me that the words ȧpiкvouvrai, &c. (c. 80) are not to be understood both of Nikias and Demosthenês, but that they refer back to the word aurois, two or three lines behind: "the Athenians (taken generally) reached the sea”. -no attention being at that moment paid to the difference between the front and the rear divisions. The Athenians might be said, not improperly, to reach the sea-at the time when the division of Nikias reached it.

The rear division

mosthenes

is pursued, and forced

to sur

render.

When the Syracusans discovered at dawn that
their enemy had made off in the night, their first
impulse was to accuse Gylippus of treachery in
having permitted the escape. Such ungrateful sur-
mises, however, were soon dissipated, and the cavalry
set forth in rapid pursuit, until they overtook the rear
division, which they immediately began to attack
and impede. The advance of Demosthenês had
been tardy before, and his division disorganized;
but he was now compelled to turn and defend him-
self against an indefatigable enemy, who presently
got before him, and thus stopped him altogether.
Their numerous light troops and cavalry assailed
him on all sides and without intermission; employ-
ing nothing but missiles, however, and taking care
to avoid any close encounter. While this unfortu-
nate division were exerting their best efforts both to
defend themselves, and if possible to get forward,
they found themselves enclosed in a walled olive-
ground, through the middle of which the road
passed; a farm bearing the name, and probably
once the property, of Polyzêlus, brother of the
despot Gelon'. Entangled and huddled up in this
enclosure, from whence exit at the farther end in
the face of an enemy was found impossible, they
were now overwhelmed with hostile missiles from
the walls on all sides. Though unable to get at
1 Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27.

2 Thucyd. vii. 81. Kaì róre yvoùs (sc. Demosthenês) Toùs Evpakoσíovs
διώκοντας οὐ προὐχώρει μᾶλλον ἢ ἐς μάχην ξυνετάσσετο, ἕως ἐνδιατρίβων
κυκλοῦταί τε ὑπ ̓ αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐν πολλῷ θορύβῳ αὐτός τε καὶ οἱ μετ ̓ αὐτοῦ
Αθηναῖοι ἦσαν ἀνειληθέντες γὰρ ἔς τι χώριον, ᾧ κύκλῳ μὲν τειχίον περιῆν,
ὁδὸς δὲ ἔνθεν τε καὶ ἔνθεν, ἐλάας δὲ οὐκ ὀλίγας εἶχεν, ἐβάλλοντο
περισταδόν.

I translate odòs dè évßev te kaì ëvoev differently from Dr. Arnold, from

1

the enemy, and deprived even of the resources of an active despair, they endured incessant harassing for the greater part of the day, without refreshment or repose, and with the number of their wounded continually increasing; until at length the remaining spirit of the unhappy sufferers was thoroughly broken. Perceiving their condition, Gylippus sent to them a herald with a proclamation; inviting all the islanders among them to come forth from the rest, and promising them freedom if they did so. The inhabitants of some cities, yet not many-a fact much to their honour--availed themselves of this offer, and surrendered. Presently, however, a larger negotiation was opened, which ended by the entire division capitulating upon terms, and giving up their arms. Gylippus and the Syracusans enMitford, and from others. These words are commonly understood to mean that this walled plantation was bordered by two roads, one on each side. Certainly the words might have that signification; but I think they also may have the signification (compare ii. 76) which I have given in the text, and which seems more plausible. It certainly is very improbable that the Athenians should have gone out of the road, in order to shelter themselves in the plantation; since they were fully aware that there was no safety for them except in getting away. If we suppose that the plantation lay exactly in the road, the word dveiλnőévTES becomes perfectly explicable, on which I do not think that Dr. Arnold's comment is satisfactory. The pressure of the troops from the rear into the hither opening, while those in the front could not get out by the farther opening, would naturally cause this crowd and huddling inside. A road which passed right through the walled ground, entering at one side and coming out at the other, might well be called óðòs ëvdev te kai ëvdev. Compare Dr. Arnold's Remarks on the Map of Syracuse, vol. iii. p. 281; as well as his note on vii. 81.

I imagine the olive-trees to be here named, not for either of the two reasons mentioned by Dr. Arnold, but because they hindered the Athenians from seeing beforehand distinctly the nature of the enclosure into which they were hastening, and therefore prevented any precautions from being taken-such as that of forbidding too many troops from entering at once, &c.

Gylippus overtakes

gaged that the lives of all should be spared; that is, that none should be put to death either by violence, or by intolerable bonds, or by starvation. Having all been disarmed, they were forthwith conveyed away as prisoners to Syracuse-6000 in number. It is a remarkable proof of the easy and opulent circumstances of many among these gallant sufferers, when we are told that the money which they had about them, even at this last moment of pressure, was sufficient to fill the concavities of four shields'. Disdaining either to surrender or to make any stipulation for himself personally, Demosthenês was on the point of killing himself with his own sword the moment that the capitulation was concluded; but his intention was prevented, and he was carried off a disarmed prisoner, by the Syracusans2.

On the next day, Gylippus and the victorious and attacks Syracusans overtook Nikias on the right bank of the Erineus, apprised him of the capitulation of Demosthenês, and summoned him to capitulate also.

the division of Nikias.

He demanded leave to send a horseman, for the purpose of verifying the statement; and on the return of the horseman, he made a proposition to Gylippus-that his army should be permitted to return home, on condition of Athens reimbursing to Syracuse the whole expense of the war, and furnishing hostages until payment should be made; one citizen against each talent of silver. These conditions were rejected; but Nikias could not

1 Plutarch, Nikias, c. 27; Thucyd. vii. 82.

2 This statement depends upon the very good authority of the contemporary Syracusan Philistus: see Pausanias, i. 29, 9; Philisti Fragm. 46, ed. Didot.