Revived courage of the Athe nians. Judicious and deci tions of Demosthenês. and beleaguered Athenians again revived as they welcomed their new comrades. They saw themselves again masters by land as well as by sea; sive resolu- and they displayed their renewed superiority by marching out of their lines forthwith and ravaging the lands near the Anapus; the Syracusans not venturing to engage in a general action, and merely watching the movement with some cavalry from the Olympieion. But Demosthenês was not imposed upon by this delusive show of power, so soon as he had made himself master of the full state of affairs, and had compared his own means with those of the enemy. He found the army of Nikias not merely worn down with long-continued toil, and disheartened by previous defeat, but also weakened in a terrible degree by the marsh fever general towards the close of summer, in the low ground where they were encamped'. He saw that the Syracusans were strong in multiplied allies, extended fortifications, a leader of great ability, and general belief that theirs was the winning cause. Moreover, he felt deeply the position of Athens at home, and her need of all her citizens against enemies within sight of her own walls. But above all, he came penetrated with the deplorable effects which had resulted from the mistake of Nikias, in wasting irreparably so much precious time, and frittering away the first terrorstriking impression of his splendid armament. All these considerations determined Demosthenês to act without a moment's delay, while the impression produced by his arrival was yet unimpaired-and 1 Thucyd. vii. 47-50. to aim one great and decisive blow, such as might, if successful, make the conquest of Syracuse again probable. If this should fail, he resolved to abandon the whole enterprise, and return home with his armament forthwith'. and plans sthenês. By means of the Athenian lines, he had posses- Position sion of the southernmost portion of the slope of of DemoEpipola. But all along that slope from east to west, immediately in front or to the north of his position, stretched the counter-wall built by the Syracusans; beginning at the city-wall on the lowest ground, and reaching up first in a north-westerly, next in a westerly direction, until it joined the fort on the upper ground near the cliff, where the road from Euryâlus down to Syracuse passed. The Syracusans as defenders were on the north side of this counter-wall; he and the Athenians on the south side. It was a complete bar to his progress, and he could not stir a step without making himself master of it; towards which end there were only two possible means-either to storm it in front, or to turn it from its western extremity by marching round up to the Euryâlus. He began by trying the first method. But the wall was abundantly manned and vigorously defended; his battering machines were all burnt or disqualified, and every attempt which he made was completely repulsed2. There remained only the second method-to turn the wall, ascending by circuitous roads to the heights of Euryâlus behind it, and then attacking the fort in which it terminated. But the march necessary for this purpose-first, 1 Thucyd. vii. 42. VOL. VII. 2 Thucyd. vii. 43. Nocturnal march of Demosthe nês to sur polæ, and turn the Syracusan line of defence. up the valley of the Anapus, visible from the Syracusan posts above; next, ascending to the Euryâlus prise Epi- by a narrow and winding path-was so difficult, that even Demosthenês, naturally sanguine, despaired of being able to force his way up in the daylight, against an enemy seeing the attack. He was therefore constrained to attempt a night-surprise, for which, Nikias and his other colleagues consenting, he accordingly made preparations on the largest and most effective scale. He took the command himself, along with Menander and Eurymedon (Nikias being left to command within the lines)'-conducting hoplites and light troops, together with masons and carpenters, and all other matters necessary for establishing a fortified postlastly, giving orders that every man should carry with him provisions for five days. Fortune so far favoured him, that not only all these preliminary arrangements, but even his march itself, was accomplished without any suspicion of the enemy. At the beginning of a moonlight night, he quitted the lines, moved along the low ground on the left bank of the Anapus and parallel to that river for a considerable distance then following various roads to the right, arrived at the Euryâlus or highest pitch of Epipolæ, where he found himself in the same track by which the Athenians in 1 Thucyd. vii. 43. Diodorus tells us that Demosthenês took with him 10,000 hoplites, and 10,000 light troops-numbers which are not at all to be trusted (xiii. 11). Plutarch (Nikias, c. 21) says that Nikias was extremely averse to the attack on Epipole: Thucydidês notices nothing of the kind, and the assertion seems improbable. The course taken by Demosthenês in his night-march will be found marked on Plan II. annexed to this volume. coming from Katana a year and a half before—and Gylippus in coming from the interior of the island about ten months before-had passed, in order to get to the slope of Epipolæ above Syracuse. He reached, without being discovered, the extreme Syracusan fort on the high ground-assailed it completely by surprise-and captured it after a feeble resistance. Some of the garrison within it were slain; but the greater part escaped, and ran to give the alarm to the three fortified camps of Syracusans and allies, which were placed one below another behind the long continuous wall', on the declivity 1 Thucyd. vii. 42, 43. Kai (Demosthenês) óρôv тò πаpateixioμa tŵv Συρακοσίων, ᾧ ἐκώλυσαν περιτειχίσαι σφᾶς τοὺς ̓Αθηναίους, ἁπλοῦν τε δν, καὶ εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως, καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου, ῥᾳδίως ἂν αὐτὸ ληφθὲν (οὐδὲ γὰρ ὑπομεῖναι ἂν σφᾶς οὐδένα) ἠπείγετο ἐπιθέσθαι τῇ πείρα. vii. 43. καὶ ἡμέρας μὲν ἀδύνατα ἐδόκει εἶναι λαθεῖν προσελθόντας καὶ ἀναβάντας, &c. Dr. Arnold and Göller both interpret this description of Thucydidês (see their notes on this chapter, and Dr. Arnold's Appendix, p. 275) as if Nikias, immediately that the Syracusan counter-wall had crossed his blockading line, had evacuated his circle and works on the slope of Epipolæ, and had retired down exclusively into the lower ground below. Dr. Thirlwall too is of the same opinion (Hist. Gr. vol. iii. ch. xxvi. p. 432-434). This appears to me a mistake. What conceivable motive can be assigned to induce Nikias to yield up to the enemy so important an advantage? If he had once relinquished the slope of Epipolæ to occupy exclusively the marsh beneath the southern cliff-Gylippus and the Syracusans would have taken good care that he should never again have mounted that cliff; nor could he ever have got near to the Tapareixioμa. The moment when the Athenians did at last abandon their fortifications on the slope of Epipolæ (rà avw Teíxn) is specially marked by Thucydidês afterwards-vii. 60: it was at the last moment of desperation, when the service of all was needed for the final maritime battle in the Great Harbour. Dr. Arnold (p. 275) misinterprets this passage, in my judgement, evading the direct sense of it. The words of Thucydides, vii. 42εἰ ἐπικρατήσειέ τις τῶν τε Ἐπιπολῶν τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ αὖθις τοῦ ἐν αὐταῖς στρατοπέδου-are more cor Partial success at plete and ruinous defeat finally. of Epipolæ as well as to a chosen regiment of six hundred Syracusan hoplites under Hermokratês', who formed a night-watch or bivouac. This regiment hastened up to the rescue, but Demosthenês and the Athenian vanguard, charging impetuously forward, drove them back in disorder upon the fortified positions in their rear. Even Gylippus, and the Syracusan troops advancing upwards out of these positions, were at first carried back by the same retreating movement. So far the enterprise of Demosthenês had been first-com- successful beyond all reasonable hope. He was master not only of the outer fort of the Syracusan position, but also of the extremity of their counterwall which rested upon that fort: the counter-wall was no longer defensible, now that he had got on the north or Syracusan side of it-so that the men on the parapet, where it joined the fort, made no resistance and fled. Some of the Athenians even began to tear down the parapets, and demolish this part of the counter-wall; an operation of extreme importance, since it would have opened to Demosthenês a communication with the southern side of the counter-wall, leading directly towards the Athenian lines on Epipolæ. At any rate, his plan of turning the counter-wall was already carried-if he rectly conceived by M. Firmin Didot in the note to his translation, than by Arnold and Göller. The orрatóñedov here indicated does not mean the Athenian Circle, and their partially completed line of circumvallation on the slope of Epipolæ. It means the ground higher up than this, which they had partially occupied at first while building the fort of Labdalum, and of which they had been substantially masters until the arrival of Gylippus, who had now converted it into a camp or στρατόπεδον of the Syracusans. 1 Diodor. xiii. 11. |