time for sailing out again. Before night, such arrangements were completed. At the earliest dawn of next day, the Syracusans re-appeared, with the same demonstrations both of land-force and naval force as before. The Athenian fleet having gone forth to meet them, several hours were spent in the like indecisive and partial skirmishes, until at length the Syracusan fleet sailed back to the city-again without bringing on any general or close combat. The Athenians, construing such retirement of the enemy as evidence of backwardness and unwillingness to fight', and supposing the day's duty at an end, retired on their side within their own station, disembarked, and separated to get their dinners at leisure-having tasted no food that day. defeat of nians. But ere they had been long ashore, they were Complete astonished to see the Syracusan fleet sailing back the Atheto renew the attack, in full battle order. This was a manœuvre suggested by the Corinthian Aristo, the ablest steersman in the fleet; at whose instance, the Syracusan admirals had sent back an urgent request to the city authorities, that an abundant stock of provisions might for that day be brought down to the sea-shore, and sale be rendered compulsory; so that no time should be lost, when the fleet returned thither, in taking a hasty meal without dispersion of the crews. Accordingly the fleet, after a short, but sufficient interval, allowed for refreshment thus close at hand, was brought back unexpectedly to the enemy's station. Confounded 1 Thucyd. vii. 40. Οἱ δ' Αθηναῖοι, νομίσαντες αὐτοὺς ὡς ἡσσημένους σφῶν πρὸς τὴν πόλιν ἀνακρούσασθαι, &c. at the sight, the Athenian crews forced themselves again on board, most of them yet without refreshment, and in the midst of murmurs and disorder'. On sailing out of their station, the indecisive skirmishing again commenced, and continued for some time—until at length the Athenian captains became so impatient of prolonged and exhausting fatigue, that they resolved to begin of themselves, and make the action close as well as general. Accordingly the word of command was given, and they rowed forward to make the attack, which was cheerfully received by the Syracusans. By receiving the attack instead of making it, the latter were better enabled to ensure a straightforward collision of prow against prow, excluding all circuit, backing, or evolutions, on the part of the enemy: at any rate, their steersmen contrived to realise this plan, and to crush, stave in, or damage, the forepart of many of the Athenian triremes, simply by superior weight of material and solidity on their own side. The Syracusan darters on the deck, moreover, as soon as the combat became close, were both numerous and destructive; while their little boats rowed immediately under the sides of the Athenian triremes, broke the blades of their oars, and shot darts in through the oar-holes, against the rowers within. At length the Athenians, after sustaining the combat bravely for some time, found themselves at such disadvantage, that they were compelled to give way and to seek shelter within their own station. The armed merchant-vessels which Nikias had planted before the openings in the palisade Thucyd. vii. 40. 1 were now found of great use in checking the pursuing Syracusans; two of whose triremes, in the excitement of victory, pushed forward too near to them and were disabled by the heavy implements on board-one of them being captured with all her The general victory of the Syracusans, however, was complete: seven Athenian triremes were sunk or disabled, many others were seriously damaged, and numbers of seamen either slain or made prisoners'. crew. Danger of nian armaarrival of the Athe ment nês with armament. Overjoyed with the result of this battle, which seems to have been no less skilfully planned than bravely executed, the Syracusans now felt confident of their superiority by sea as well as on land, and Demosthecontemplated nothing less than the complete de- the second struction of their enemies in the harbour. The generals were already concerting measures for renewed attack both by land and by sea, and a week or two more would probably have seen the ruin of this once triumphant besieging armament, now full of nothing but discouragement. The mere stoppage of supplies, in fact, as the Syracusans were masters of the mouth of the harbour, would be sure to starve it out in no long time, if they maintained their superiority at sea. All their calculations were suspended, however, and the hopes of the Athenians for the time revived, by the entry of Demosthenês and Eurymedon with the second armament into the Great Harbour; which seems to have taken place on the very day, or on the second day, after the recent battle. So important were the consequences which turned upon that postThucyd. vii. 42. 1 Thucyd. vii. 41. 2 Voyage of ponement of the Syracusan attack, occasioned by the recent defeat of their reinforcing army from the interior. So little did either party think, at that moment, that it would have been a mitigation of calamity to Athens, if Demosthenês had not arrived in time; if the ruin of the first armament had been actually consummated before the coming of the second! Demosthenês, after obtaining the required reinforcements at Korkyra, had crossed the Ionian sea to the islands called Choerades on the coast of Iapygia; where he took aboard a band of 150 Messapian darters, through the friendly aid of the native prince Artas, with whom an ancient alliance was renewed. Passing on farther to Metapontum, already in alliance with Athens, he was there reinforced with two triremes and three hundred darters, with which addition he sailed on to Thurii. Here he found himself cordially welcomed; for the philoAthenian party was in full ascendency, having recently got the better in a vehement dissension, and passed a sentence of banishment against their opponents'. They not only took a formal resolution to acknowledge the same friends and the same enemies as the Athenians, but equipped a regiment of 700 hoplites and 300 darters to accompany Demosthenês, who remained there long enough to pass his troops in review and verify the completeness of each division. After having held this review on the banks of the river Sybaris, he marched his troops by land through the Thurian territory to the banks of the river Hylias which Thucyd. vii. 33-57. divided it from Kroton. He was here met by Krotoniate envoys, who forbade the access to their territory upon which he marched down the river to the sea-shore, got on shipboard, and pursued his voyage southward along the coast of Italytouching at the various towns, all except the hostile Lokri1. effect of his entry into the Great Harbour. His entry into the harbour of Syracuse-accom- Imposing plished in the most ostentatious trim, with decorations and musical accompaniments-was no less imposing from the magnitude of his force, than critical in respect to opportunity. Taking Athenians, allies, and mercenary forces, together-he conducted 73 triremes, 5000 hoplites, and a large number of light troops of every description; archers, slingers, darters, &c., with other requisites for effective operation. At the sight of such an armament, not inferior to the first which had arrived under Nikias, the Syracusans lost for a moment the confidence of their recent triumph, and were struck with dismay as well as wonder3. That Athens could be rash enough to spare such an armament, at a moment when the full burst of Peloponnesian hostility was reopening upon her, and when Dekeleia was in course of being fortifiedwas a fact out of all reasonable probability, and not to be credited unless actually seen. And probably, the Syracusans, though they knew that Demosthenês was on his way, had no idea beforehand of the magnitude of his armament. On the other hand, the hearts of the discomfited 2 Plutarch, Nikias, c. 21. 1 Thucyd. vii. 35. 3 Thucyd. vii. 42. |