Renewed attack by the Athe nians. to march to Syracuse in a body across the interior of the island, under the conduct of the envoys themselves. But this part of the scheme was frustrated by Nikias, who was rendered more vigilant by the present desperate condition of his affairs, than he had been in reference to the cross march of Gylippus. At his instance, the Sikel tribes Kentoripes and Halikyæi, allies of Athens, were prevailed upon to attack the approaching enemy. They planned a skilful ambuscade, set upon them unawares, and dispersed them with the loss of 800 men. All the envoys were also slain, except the Corinthian, who conducted the remaining force (about 1500 in number) to Syracuse'. This reverse-which seems to have happened about the time when Demosthenês with his armament were at Korkyra on the way to Syracuseso greatly dismayed and mortified the Syracusans, that Gylippus thought it advisable to postpone awhile the attack which he intended to have made immediately on the reinforcement arriving. The delay of these few days proved nothing less than the salvation of the Athenian army. It was not until Demosthenês was approaching Gylippus on Rhegium, within two or three days' sail of Syracuse, that the attack was determined on without farther delay. Preparation in every way had been made for it long before, especially for the most effective employment of the naval force. The captains and ship-masters of Syracuse and Corinth had now become fully aware of the superiority of Athenian nautical manœuvre, and of the causes upon which Thucyd. vii. 33. 1 Thucyd. vii. 32, 33. 2 tages of the Athenian fleet in the harbour. Their naval possible in space. tactics im the narrow that superiority depended. The Athenian trireme was of a build comparatively light, fit for rapid motion through the water, and for easy change of direction: its prow was narrow, armed with a sharp projecting beak at the end, but hollow and thin, not calculated to force its way through very strong resistance. It was never intended to meet, in direct impact and collision, the prow of an enemy: such a proceeding passed among the able seamen of Athens for gross awkwardness. In advancing against an Disadvanenemy's vessel, they evaded the direct shock, steered so as to pass by it-then by the excellence and exactness of their rowing, turned swiftly round, altered their direction, and came back before the enemy could alter his or perhaps rowed rapidly round him—or backed their ship stern foremost— until the opportunity was found for driving the beak of their ship against some weak part of his-against the midships, the quarter, the stern, or the oarblades without. In such manoeuvres the Athenians were unrivaled: but none such could be performed unless there were ample sea-room-which rendered their present naval station the most disadvantageous that could be imagined. They were cooped up in the inmost part of a harbour of small dimensions, close on the station of their enemies, and with all the shore, except their own lines, in possession of those enemies; so that they could not pull round from want of space, nor could they back water because they durst not come near shore. In this contracted area, the only mode of fighting possible was by straightforward collision, prow against prow; a process, which not only shut out all their superior ments in Syracusan to the nar row space. manoeuvring, but was unsuited to the build of their triremes. On the other hand, the Syracusans, under the advice of the able Corinthian steersman Aristo, altered the construction of their triremes to meet the special exigency of the case, disregarding all idea of what had been generally looked upon as Improve- good nautical manœuvring'. Instead of the long, thin, hollow, and sharp, advancing beak, striking ships suited the enemy considerably above the water-level, and therefore doing less damage-they shortened the prow, but made it excessively heavy and solidand lowered the elevation of the projecting beak: so that it became not so much calculated to pierce, as to break in and crush by main force all the opposing part of the enemy's ship, not far above the water. What were called the epôtids-"ear-caps' or nozzles projecting forwards to the right and left of the beak, were made peculiarly thick and sustained by under-beams let into the hull of the ship. In the Attic build, the beak stood forwards very prominent, and the epôtids on each side of it were kept back, serving the same purpose as what are called Catheads in modern ships, to which the anchors are suspended but in the Corinthian build, the beak projected less and the epôtids more-so that they served to strike the enemy: instead of having one single beak, the Corinthian ship might be said to have three nozzles. The Syracusans relied on the narrowness of the space, for shutting out the Athe • Thucyd. vii. 36. τῇ δὲ πρότερον ἀμαθίᾳ τῶν κυβερνητῶν δοκούσῃ εἶναι, τὸ ἀντίπρωρον ξυγκρούσαι, μάλιστ ̓ ἂν αὐτοὶ χρήσασθαι· πλεῖστον γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ σχήσειν, &c. 2 Diodor. xiii. 10. Compare Thucyd. vii. 34-36; Diodor. xiii. 10; Eurip. Iph. Taur, up to cusans attack upon nian naval station. nian evolutions, and bringing the contest to nothing more than a straightforward collision; in which the weaker vessel would be broken and stove in at the prow, and thus rendered unmanageable. Having completed these arrangements, their land- The Syraforce was marched out under Gylippus to threaten threaten one side of the Athenian lines, while the cavalry the Atheand the garrison of the Olympieion marched up the other side. The Athenians were putting themselves in position to defend their walls from what seemed to be a land attack, when they saw the Syracusan fleet, 80 triremes strong, sailing out from its dock prepared for action: upon which they too, though at first confused by this unexpected appearance, put their crews on shipboard, and went out of their palisaded station, 75 triremes in number, to meet the enemy. The whole day passed off however in desultory and indecisive skirmish; with trifling advantage to the Syracusans, who disabled one or two Athenian ships, yet merely tried to invite the Athenians to attack, without choosing themselves to force on a close and general action'. 1335. See also the notes of Arnold, Poppo, and Didot, on the passages of Thucydidês. It appears as if the avrηpides or sustaining beams were something new, now provided for the first time-in order to strengthen the epôtid and render it fit to drive in collision against the enemy. The words which Thucydidês employs to describe the position of these ȧvrnpides, are to me not fully intelligible, nor do I think that any of the commentators clear them up satisfactorily. It is Diodorus who specifies that the Corinthians lowered the level of their prows, so as to strike nearer to the water-which Thucydidês does not mention. A captive ship, when towed in as a prize, was disarmed by being deprived of her beak (Athenæus, xii. p. 535). Lysander reserved the beaks of the Athenian triremes captured at Ægospotami to grace his triumphal return (Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 3, 8). 1 Thucyd. vii. 37, 38. Additional preparations of Nikias battle renewed. It was competent to the Athenians to avoid altogether a naval action (at least until the necessity arose for escorting fresh supplies into the harbour) by keeping within their station; and as Demosthenês was now at hand, prudence counselled such reserve. Nikias himself, too, is said to have deprecated immediate fighting, but to have been outvoted by his two newly-appointed colleagues Menander and Euthydemus; who, anxious to show what they could do without Demosthenês, took their stand upon Athenian maritime honour, which peremptorily forbade them to shrink from the battle when offered'. Though on the next day the Syracusans made no movement, yet Nikias foreseeing that they would speedily recommence, and noway encouraged by the equal manifestations of the preceding day, caused every trierarch to repair what damage his ship had sustained; and even took the precaution of farther securing his naval station by mooring merchant-vessels just alongside of the openings in the palisade, about 200 feet apart. The prows of these vessels were provided with dolphins-or beams lifted up on high and armed at the end with massive heads of iron, which could be so let fall as to crush any ship entering2: any Athenian trireme which might be hard-pressed, would thus be enabled to get through this opening where no enemy could follow, and choose her own 1 Plutarch, Nikias, c. 20. Diodorus (xiii. 10) represents the battle as having been brought on against the wish and intention of the Athenians generally, not alluding to any difference of opinion among the commanders. 2 Thucyd. vii. 41. ai kepaîai deλpwopópoɩ: compare Pollux, i. 85, and Fragment vi. of the comedy of the poet Pherekratês, entitled "Aypto-Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Græc. vol. ii. p. 258, and the Scholiast. ad Aristoph. Equit. 759. |