of Egesta had been exposed; the hopes of allies for Athens in the island were seen to be futile; while Syracuse, armed with a Spartan general and Peloponnesian aid, had not only become inexpugnable, but had assumed the aggressive: lastly, the chance of a renewal of Peloponnesian hostility against Attica had been now raised into certainty. While perseverance in the siege of Syracuse, therefore, under circumstances so unpromising and under such necessity for increased exertions at home, was a melancholy imprudence in itself-perseverance in employing Nikias converted that imprudence into ruin, which even the addition of an energetic colleague in the person of Demosthenês was not sufficient to avert. Those who study the conduct of the Athenian people on this occasion, will not be disposed to repeat against them the charge of fickleness which forms one of the standing reproaches against democracy. Their mistake here arose from the very opposite quality; from inability to get clear of two sentiments which had become deeply engraven on their minds-ideas of Sicilian conquest, and confidence in Nikias. from tain and A little more of this alleged fickleness-or easy Hostilities escape from past associations and impressibility to Sparta ceractual circumstances-would have been at the pre- impending. sent juncture a tutelary quality to Athens. She would then have appreciated more justly the increased hazards thickening around her both in Sicily and at home. War with Sparta, though not yet actually proclaimed, had become impending and inevitable. Even in the preceding winter, the Lacedæmonians had listened favourably to the re commendation of Alkibiadês' that they should establish a fortified post at Dekeleia in Attica. They had not yet indeed brought themselves to execution of this resolve; for the peace between them and Athens, though indirectly broken in many ways, still subsisted in name—and they hesitated to break it openly, partly because they knew that the breach of peace had been on their side at the beginning of the Peloponnesian war; attributing to this fault their capital misfortune at Sphakteria. Athens on her side had also scrupulously avoided direct violation of the Lacedæmonian territory, in spite of much solicitation from her allies at Argos. But her reserve on this point gave way during the present summer, probably at the time when her prospect of taking Syracuse appeared certain. The Lacedæmonians having invaded and plundered the Argeian territory, thirty Athenian triremes were sent to aid in its defence, under Pythodôrus with two colleagues. This armament disembarked on the eastern coast of Laconia near Prasiæ and committed devastations: which direct act of hostilitycoming in addition to the marauding excursions of the garrison of Pylus, and to the refusal of pacific redress at Athens-satisfied the Lacedæmonians that the peace had been now first and undeniably broken by their enemy, so that they might with a safe conscience recommence the war3. Such was the state of feeling between the two great powers of Central Greece in November 414 B.C., when the envoys arrived from Syracuse-envoys 1 Thucyd. vi. 93. Thucyd. vi. 105; vii. 18. 2 Thucyd. vii. 18. of Sparta to Attica and to send farther re inforcements to from Nikias on the one part, from Gylippus and the Resolution Syracusans on the other-each urgently calling for invade farther support. The Corinthians and Syracusans forthwith, vehemently pressed their claim at Sparta; Alkibiadês also renewed his instances for the occupation of Dekeleia. It was in the face of such impending Sicily. liability to renewed Peloponnesian invasion that the Athenians took their resolution, above commented on, to send a second army to Syracuse and prosecute the siege with vigour. If there were any hesitation yet remaining on the part of the Lacedæmonians, it disappeared so soon as they were made aware of the imprudent resolution of Athens; which not only created an imperative necessity for sustaining Syracuse, but also rendered Athens so much more vulnerable at home, by removing the better part of her force. Accordingly, very soon after the vote passed at Athens, an equally decisive resolution for direct hostilities was adopted at Sparta. It was determined that a Peloponnesian allied force should be immediately prepared, to be sent at the first opening of spring to Syracuse; and that at the same time Attica should be invaded, and the post of Dekeleia fortified. Orders to this effect were immediately transmitted to the whole body of Peloponnesian allies; especially requisitions for implements, materials, and workmen, towards the construction of the projected fort at Dekeleia'. 1 1 Thucyd. vii. 18. like prepa rations throughout Greece during the winter of 414-413 B.C. CHAPTER LX. FROM THE RESUMPTION OF DIRECT HOSTILITIES BE- Active war- THE Syracusan war now no longer stands apart, as an event by itself, but becomes absorbed in the general war rekindling throughout Greece. Never was any winter so actively and extensively employed in military preparations, as the winter of 414-413 B.C., the months immediately preceding that which Thucydidês terms the nineteenth spring of the Peloponnesian war, but which other historians call the beginning of the Dekeleian war'. While Eurymedon went with his ten triremes to Syracuse even in midwinter, Demosthenês exerted himself all the winter to get together the second armament for early spring. Twenty other Athenian triremes were farther sent round Peloponnesus to the station of Naupaktus-to prevent any Corinthian reinforcements from sailing out of the Corinthian Gulf. Against these latter, the Corinthians on their side prepared twenty-five fresh triremes, to serve as a convoy to the transports carrying their hoplites 2. In Corinth, Sikyon, and Boeotia, as well as at Lacedæmon, levies of hoplites were going on for the armament to Syracuse-at the same time that everything was getting ready for the occupation of Dekeleia. Lastly, Gylippus was engaged with not * Thucyd. vii. 17. 1 Diodor. xiii. 8. less activity in stirring up all Sicily to take a more decisive part in the coming year's struggle. From Cape Tænarus in Laconia, at the earliest B.C. 413. moment of spring, embarked a force of 600 Lacedæmonian hoplites (Helots and Neodamodes) under the Spartan Ekkritus-and 300 Boeotian hoplites under the Thebans Xenon and Nikon, with the Thespian Hegesandrus. They were directed to cross the sea southward to Kyrênê in Libya, and from thence to make their way along the African coast to Sicily. At the same time a body of 700 hoplites under Alexarchus-partly Corinthians, partly hired Arcadians, partly Sikyonians, under constraint from their powerful neighbours-departed from the north-west of Peloponnesus and the mouth of the Corinthian Gulf of Sicily-the Corinthian triremes watching them until they were past the Athenian squadron at Naupaktus. Invasion of Attica by ponnesian tification of These were proceedings of importance: but the most important of all was the re-invasion of Attica at the same time by the great force of the Pelopon- the Pelonesian alliance, under the Spartan king Agis, son of force-forArchidamus. Twelve years had elapsed since Attica Dekeleia. last felt the hand of the destroyer, a little before the siege of Sphakteria. The plain in the neighbourhood of Athens was now first laid waste, after which the invaders proceeded to their special purpose of erecting a fortified post for occupation at Dekeleia. The work, apportioned among the allies present, who had come prepared with the means of executing it, was completed during the present summer, and a garrison was established there com 1 Thucyd. vii. 19-58. Σικυώνιοι ἀναγκαστοὶ στρατεύοντες. |