Effect of his despatch upon the Athenians. hopes of the most glowing character, and with a consciousness of extraordinary efforts about to be rewarded with commensurate triumphs. For some months, the despatches of the general disclose nothing but movements either abortive or inglorious; adorned indeed by one barren victory, but accompanied by an intimation that he must wait till the spring, and that reinforcements must be sent to him, before he can undertake the really serious enterprise. Though the disappointment occasioned by this news at Athens must have been mortifying, nevertheless his requisition is complied with; and the despatches of Nikias, during the spring and summer of 414 B.C., become cheering. The siege of Syracuse is described as proceeding successfully, and at length, about July or August, as being on the point of coming to a triumphant close-in spite of a Spartan adventurer named Gylippus, making his way across the Ionian sea with a force too contemptible to be noticed. Suddenly, without any intermediate step to smoothe the transition, comes a despatch announcing that this adventurer has marched into Syracuse at the head of a powerful army, and that the Athenians are thrown upon the defensive, without power of proceeding with the siege. This is followed, after a short time, by the gloomy and almost desperate communication above translated. When we thus look at the despatch, not merely as it stands singly, but as falling in series with its antecedents-the natural effect which we should suppose it likely to produce upon the Athenians would be, a vehement burst of wrath and displeasure against Nikias. Upon the most candid and impartial scrutiny, he deserved nothing less. And when we consider, farther, the character generally ascribed by historians of Greece to the Athenian people; that they are represented as fickle, ungrateful and irritable, by standing habit-as abandoning upon the most trifling grounds those whom they had once esteemed, forgetting all prior services, visiting upon innocent generals the unavoidable misfortunes of war, and impelled by nothing better than demagogic excitements-we naturally expect that the blame really deserved by Nikias would be exaggerated beyond all due measure, and break forth in a storm of violence and fury. Yet what is the actual resolution taken in consequence of his despatch, after the full and free debate of the Athenian assembly? Not a word of blame or displeasure is proclaimed. Doubtless there must have been individual speakers who criticised him as he deserved. To suppose the contrary, would be to think meanly indeed of the Athenian assembly. But the general vote was one not simply imputing no blame, but even pronouncing continued and unabated confidence. The people positively refuse to relieve him from the command, though he himself solicits it in a manner sincere and even touching. So great is the value which they set upon his services, and the esteem which they entertain for his character, that they will not avail themselves of the easy opportunity which he himself provides to get rid of him. It is not by way of compliment to the Athenians that I make these remarks on their present pro of Nikias by the Athenians. Treatment ceeding. Quite the contrary. The misplaced confidence of the Athenians in Nikias,-on more than one previous occasion, but especially on this,-betrays an incapacity of appreciating facts immediately before their eyes, and a blindness to decisive and multiplied evidences of incompetency, which is one of the least creditable manifestations of their political history. But we do learn from it a clear lesson, that the habitual defects of the Athenian character were very different from what historians commonly impute to them. Instead of being fickle, we find them tenacious in the extreme of confidence once bestowed, and of schemes once embarked upon : instead of ingratitude for services actually rendered, we find credit given for services which an officer ought to have rendered, but has not instead of angry captiousness, we discover an indulgence not merely generous but even culpable, in the midst of disappointment and humiliation instead of a public assembly, wherein, as it is commonly depicted, the criminative orators were omnipotent, and could bring to condemnation any unsuccessful general however meritorious,—we see that even grave and well-founded accusations make no impression upon the people in opposition to pre-established personal esteem; - and personal esteem for a man who not only was no demagogue, but in every respect the opposite of a demagogue; an oligarch by taste, sentiment, and position, who yielded to the democracy nothing more than sincere obedience, coupled with gentleness and munificence in his private bearing. If Kleon had committed but a small part of those capital blunders which discredit the military career of Nikias, he would have been irretrievably ruined. So much weaker was his hold upon his countrymen, by means of demagogic excellences, as compared with those causes which attracted confidence to Nikias-his great family and position, his wealth dexterously expended, his known incorruptibility against bribes, and even comparative absence of personal ambition, his personal courage combined with reputation for caution, his decorous private life and ultra-religious habits. All this assemblage of negative merits, and decencies of daily life, in a citizen whose station might have enabled him to act with the insolence of Alkibiadês, placed Nikias on a far firmer basis of public esteem than the mere power of accusatory speech in the public assembly or the dikastery could have done. It entitled him to have the most indulgent construction put upon all his shortcomings, and spread a fatal varnish over his glaring incompetence for all grave and responsible command. The incident now before us is one of the most instructive in all history, as an illustration of the usual sentiment, and strongest causes of error, prevalent among the Athenian democracy-and as a refutation of that exaggerated mischief which it is common to impute to the person called a Demagogue. Happy would it have been for Athens had she now had Kleon present, or any other demagogue of equal power, at that public assembly which took the melancholy resolution of sending fresh forces to Sicily and continuing Nikias in the command! The case was one in which the accu Capital mistake by the Athenians. satory eloquence of the demagogue was especially called for, to expose the real past mismanagement of Nikias-to break down that undeserved confidence in his ability and caution which had grown into a sentiment of faith or routine-to prove how much mischief he had already done, and how much more he would do if continued'. Unluckily for Athens, she had now no demagogue who could convince the assembly beforehand of this truth, and prevent them from taking the most unwise and destructive resolution ever passed in the Pnyx. What makes the resolution so peculiarly discrecommitted ditable, is, that it was adopted in defiance of clear and present evidence. To persist in the siege of Syracuse, under present circumstances, was sad misjudgement; to persist in it with Nikias as commander, was hardly less than insanity. The first expedition, though even that was rash and ill-conceived, nevertheless presented tempting hopes which explain, if they do not excuse, the too light estimate of impossibility of lasting possession. Moreover there was at that time a confusion,-between the narrow objects connected with Leontini and Egesta, and the larger acquisitions to be realised through the siege of Syracuse,-which prevented any clear and unanimous estimate of the undertaking in the Athenian mind. But now, the circumstances of Sicily were fully known: the mendacious promises 1 Plutarch (Nikias, c. 20) tells us that the Athenians had been disposed to send a second armament to Sicily, even before the despatch of Nikias reached them; but that they had been prevented by certain men who were envious (póv) of the glory and good fortune of Nikias. No judgement can be more inconsistent with the facts of the case than this-facts recounted in general terms even by Plutarch himself. |