niences of

rium as a

station

sues to the

naval

as well as for ships of burthen. Though the situa- Inconvetion was found convenient for all naval operations, Plemmyit entailed also serious disadvantages; being desti- maritime tute of any spring of water, such as the memorable mischief fountain of Arethusa on the opposite island of Or- which entygia. So that for supplies of water, and of wood Athenian also, the crews of the ships had to range a consider- strength. able distance, exposed to surprise from the numerous Syracusan cavalry placed in garrison at the temple of Zeus Olympius. Day after day, losses were sustained in this manner, besides the increased facilities given for desertion, which soon fatally diminished the efficiency of each ship's crew. As the Athenian hopes of success now declined, both the slaves, and the numerous foreigners who served in their navy, became disposed to steal away. And though the ships of war, down to this time, had been scarcely at all engaged in actual warfare, yet they had been for many months continually at sea and on the watch, without any opportunity of hauling ashore to refit. Hence the naval force, now about to be called into action as the chief hope of the Athenians, was found lamentably degenerated from that ostentatious perfection in which it had set sail fifteen months before, from the harbour of Peiræus.

in the field -his de

feat.

The erection of the new forts at Plemmyrium, Operations while by withdrawing the Athenian forces it left of Gylippus Gylippus unopposed in the prosecution of his counter-wall, at the same time emboldened him by the manifest decline of hope which it implied. Day after day he brought out his Syracusans in battlearray, planting them near the Athenian lines; but the Athenians showed no disposition to attack. At

His decisive

victory

nians are shut up

lines. The

length he took advantage of what he thought a favourable opportunity to make the attack himself; but the ground was so hemmed in by various walls -the Athenian fortified lines on one side, the Syracusan front or Temenitic fortification on another, and the counter-wall now in course of construction on a third-that his cavalry and darters had no space to act. Accordingly, the Syracusan hoplites, having to fight without these auxiliaries, were beaten and driven back with loss, the Corinthian Gongylus being among the slain'. On the next day, Gylippus had the prudence to take the blame of this defeat upon himself. It was a consequence of his own mistake, (he publicly confessed) in having made choice of a confined space wherein neither cavalry nor darters could avail. He would presently give them another opportunity, in a fairer field, and he exhorted them to show their inbred superiority as Dorians and Peloponnesians, by chasing these Ionians with their rabble of islanders out of Sicily. Accordingly, after no long time, he again brought them up in order of battle; taking care, however, to keep in the open space, beyond the extremity of the walls and fortifications.

On this occasion, Nikias did not decline the comthe Athe- bat, but marched out into the open space to meet him. He probably felt encouraged by the result of within their the recent action; but there was a farther and more Syracusan pressing motive. The counter-wall of intersection, which the Syracusans were constructing, was on the point of cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation-so that it was essential for Nikias to attack 1 Thucyd, vii. 5; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 19.

counter

wall is carried on

so far as to cut the Athenian

line of blockade.

without delay, unless he formally abnegated all farther hope of successful siege. Nor could the army endure, in spite of altered fortune, irrevocably to shut themselves out from such hope, without one struggle more. Both armies were therefore ranged in battle order on the open space beyond the walls, higher up the slope of Epipolæ ; Gylippus placing his cavalry and darters to the right of his line, on the highest and most open ground. In the midst of the action between the hoplites on both sides, these troops on the right charged the left flank of the Athenians with such vigour, that they completely broke it. The whole Athenian army underwent a thorough defeat, and only found shelter within its fortified lines. And in the course of the very next night, the Syracusan counter-wall was pushed so far as to traverse and get beyond the projected line of Athenian blockade, reaching presently as far as the edge of the northern cliff: so that Syracuse was now safe, unless the enemy should not only recover their superiority in the field, but also become strong enough to storm and carry the new-built wall1.

Farther defence was also obtained by the safe arrival of the Corinthian, Ambrakiotic, and Leukadian fleet of twelve triremes under Erasinidês, which Nikias had vainly endeavoured to intercept. He had sent twenty sail to the southern coast of Italy; but the new-comers were fortunate enough to escape them.

Erasinidês and his division lent their hands to the execution of a work which completed the scheme Thucyd. vii. 5, 6.

fences provided by Gylippus,

joining the higher part

of Epipolæ with the city-wall.

Farther de- of defence for the city. Gylippus took the precaution of constructing a fort or redoubt on the high ground of Epipolæ, so as to command the approach to Syracuse from the high ground of Euryâlus; a step which Hermokrates had not thought of until too late, and which Nikias had never thought of at all, during his period of triumph and mastery. He erected a new fort' on a suitable point of the high ground, backed by three fortified positions or encampments at proper distances in the rear of it, intended for bodies of troops to support the advanced post in case it was attacked. A continuous wall was then carried from this advanced post down the slope of Epipolæ, so as to reach and join the counter-wall recently constructed; whereby this counter-wall, already traversing and cutting the Athenian line of circumvallation, became in fact prolonged up the whole slope of Epipolæ, and barred all direct access from the Athenians in their existing lines up to the summit of that eminence, as well as up to the northern cliff. The Syracusans had now one continuous and uninterrupted line of defence; a long single wall, resting at one extremity on the new-built fort upon the high ground of Epipolæ at the other extremity, upon the city-wall. This wall was only single; but it was defended along its whole length by the permanent detachments occupying the three several fortified positions or encampments just mentioned. One of these positions was occupied by native Syracusans; a second by Sicilian Greeks; a third by other allies.

1 This new upper fort is marked on Plan II. by the letter V. The three fortified encampments are marked XXX.

Such was the improved and systematic scheme of defence which the genius of Gylippus first projected, and which he brought to execution at the present moment': a scheme, the full value of which will be appreciated when we come to describe the proceedings of the second Athenian armament under Demosthenês.

-aggres

sive plans

against the

even on the

sea.

Not content with having placed the Syracusans Confidence of Gylippus out of the reach of danger, Gylippus took ad- and the vantage of their renewed confidence to infuse into Syracusans them projects of retaliation against the enemy who had brought them so near to ruin. They began to Athenians, equip their ships in the harbour, and to put their seamen under training, in hopes of qualifying themselves to contend with the Athenians even on their own element; while Gylippus himself quitted the city to visit the various cities of the island, and to get together farther reinforcements, naval as well as military. And as it was foreseen that Nikias on his part would probably demand aid from Athensenvoys, Syracusan as well as Corinthian, were despatched to Peloponnesus, to urge the necessity of

1 Thucyd. vii. 7. Μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο, αἵ τε τῶν Κορινθίων νῆες καὶ ̓Αμπρακιωτῶν καὶ Λευκαδίων ἐσέπλευσαν αἱ ὑπόλοιποι δώδεκα (ἦρχε δὲ αὐτῶν Ερασινίδης Κορίνθιος), καὶ ξυνετείχισαν τὸ λοιπὸν τοῖς Συρακουσίοις μέχρι τοῦ ἐγκαρσίου τείχους. The new wall of junction thus constructed is marked on Plan II. by the letters V, W, T.

These words of Thucydides are very obscure, and have been explained by different commentators in different ways. The explanation which I here give does not (so far as I know) coincide with any of them; yet I venture to think that it is the most plausible, and the only one satisfactory. Compare the Memoir of Dr. Arnold on his Map of Syracuse (Arn. Thuc. vol. iii. p. 273), and the notes of Poppo and Göller. Dr. Arnold is indeed so little satisfied with any explanation which had suggested itself to him, that he thinks some words must have dropped out. The reader will find a defence of my views in the Appendix annexed to the Plan of Syracuse in this Volume.