The southof the wall ern portion combined with the death of Lamachus in the field on that same day—it would have greatly brightened the prospects of the Syracusans, and might even have arrested the farther progress of the siege, from the want of an authorised commander. But in spite of such imminent hazard, the actual result of the day left the Athenians completely victorious, and the Syracusans more discouraged than ever. What materially contributed to their discouragement, was, the recent entrance of the Athenian fleet into the Great Harbour, wherein it was henceforward permanently established, in co-operation with the army, in a station near the left bank of the Anapus. Both army and fleet now began to occupy themselves seriously with the construction of the southernmost part of the wall of circumvallation; beginning immediately below the Athenian fortified the Great point of descent from the southern cliff of Epipolæ prosecuted and stretching across the lower marshy ground to and nearly the Great Harbour. The distance between these two extreme points was about eight stadia or nearly an English mile: the wall was double, with gates, and probably towers, at suitable intervals-inclosing a space of considerable breadth, doubtless roofed over in part, since it served afterwards, with the help of the adjoining citadel on the cliff, as shelter and defence of the whole Athenian army'. The Syracusans could not interrupt this process, nor could they undertake a new counter-wall up 1 The southern part of the Athenian line of circumvallation is marked both on Plans I. and II. by the letters K, L, M. In the first Plan, it appears as intended and unfinished; in the second Plan, it appears as completed. of blockade, marsh to Harbour, is finished. The Syracusans offer no farther obstruction ency at closeness of the siege. the mid-slope of Epipolæ, without coming out to fight a general battle, which they did not feel competent to do. Of course the Circle had now been put into condition to defy a second surprise. But not only were they thus compelled to look on without hindering the blockading wall towards -despond the Harbour.-It was now, for the first time, that Syracuse they began to taste the real restraints and privaincreasing tions of a siege'. Down to this moment, their communication with the Anapus and the country beyond, as well as with all sides of the Great Harbour, had been open and unimpeded; whereas now, the arrival of the Athenian fleet and the change of position of the Athenian army, had cut them off from both, so that little or no fresh supplies of provision could reach them except at the hazard of capture from the hostile ships. On the side of Thapsus, where the northern cliff of Epipolæ affords only two or three practicable passages of ascent, they had before been blocked up by the Athenian army and fleet; and a portion of the fleet seems still to have been left at Thapsus. Nothing now remained open, except a portion, especially the northern portion, of the slope of Epipolæ. Of this outlet the besieged, especially their numerous cavalry, doubtless availed themselves, for the purpose of excursions and of bringing in supplies. But 1 Thucyd. vi. 103. οἷα δὲ εἰκὸς ἀνθρώπων ἀπορούντων καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ πρὶν πολιορκουμένων, &c. 2 Diodorus however is wrong in stating (xiii. 7) that the Athenians occupied the temple of Zeus Olympius and the Polichnê or hamlet surrounding it, on the right bank of the Anapus. These posts remained always occupied by the Syracusans, throughout the whole war (Thucyd. vii. 4, 37). it was both longer and more circuitous for such purposes than the plain near the Great Harbour and the Helôrine road: moreover, it had to pass by the high and narrow pass of Euryâlus, and might thus be rendered unavailable to the besieged, whenever Nikias thought fit to occupy and fortify that position. Unfortunately for himself and his army, he omitted this easy, but capital precaution, even at the moment when he must have known Gylippus to be approaching. . Order of ging opera the besie tions suc undertaken In regard to the works actually undertaken, the order followed by Nikias and Lamachus can be satisfactorily explained. Having established their cessively fortified post on the centre of the slope of Epipolæ, by the they were in condition to combat opposition and Athenians. attack any counter-wall on whichever side the enemy might erect it. Commencing in the first place the execution of the northern portion of the blockading line, they soon desist from this, and turn their attention to the southern portion, because it was here that the Syracusans constructed their two first counter-works. In attacking the second counter-work of the Syracusans, across the marsh to the Anapus, they chose a suitable moment for bringing the main fleet round from Thapsus into the Great Harbour, with a view to its co-operation. After clearing the lower ground, they probably deemed it advisable, in order to establish a safe and easy communication with their fleet, that the double wall across the marsh, from Epipolæ to the Harbour, should stand next for execution; for which there was this farther reason that they thereby blocked up the most convenient exit and channel of supply for Syracuse. VOL. VII. 2 A Trium spects of the Athenians. Dis position among the Italian Greeks to favour them. There are thus plausible reasons assignable why the northern portion of the line of blockade, from the Athenian camp on Epipolæ to the sea at Trogilus, was left to the last, and was found open-at least the greater part of it-by Gylippus. While the Syracusans thus began to despair of their situation, the prospects of the Athenians were better than ever; promising certain and not very distant triumph. The reports circulating through Sikels and the neighbouring cities all represented them as in the full tide of success, so that many Sikel tribes, hitherto wavering, came in to tender their alliance, while three armed pentekonters also arrived from the Tyrrhenian coast. Moreover abundant supplies were furnished from the Italian Greeks generally. Nikias, now sole commander since the death of Lamachus, had even the glory of receiving and discussing proposals from Syracuse for capitulation -a necessity which was openly and abundantly canvassed within the city itself. The ill-success of Hermokrates and his colleagues had caused them to be recently displaced from their functions as generals, to which Herakleidês, Euklês, and Tellias were appointed. But this change did not inspire the Syracusans with confidence to hazard a fresh battle, while the temper of the city, during such period of forced inaction, was melancholy in the extreme. Though several propositions for surrender, perhaps unofficial, yet seemingly sincere, were made to Nikias, nothing definitive could be agreed upon as to the terms'. Had the Syracusan 1 Thucyd. vi. 103. πολλὰ ἐλέγετο πρός τε ἐκεῖνον καὶ πλείω ἔτι κατὰ τὴν πόλιν. government been oligarchical, the present distress would have exhibited a large body of malcontents upon whom he could have worked with advantage; but the democratical character of the government maintained union at home in this trying emergency1. Nikias-his ents in the interior of Syracuse. We must take particular note of these proposi- Conduct of tions in order to understand the conduct of Nikias correspondduring the present critical interval. He had been from the beginning in secret correspondence with a party in Syracuse2; who, though neither numerous nor powerful in themselves, were now doubtless both more active and more influential than ever they had been before. From them he received constant and not unreasonable assurances that the city was on the point of surrendering and could not possibly hold out. And as the tone of opinion without, as well as within, conspired to raise such an impression in his mind, so he suffered himself to be betrayed into a fatal languor and security as to the farther prosecution of the besieging operations. The injurious consequences of the death of Lamachus now became evident. From the time of the Confidence departure from Katana down to the battle in which that gallant officer perished (a period seemingly of about three months, from about March to June 414 B.C.), the operations of the siege had been conducted with great vigour as well as unremitting perseverance; while the building-work, especially, had been so rapidly executed as to fill the Syracusans with amazement. But so soon as Nikias is left sole commander, this vigorous march disap1 Thucyd. vii. 55. 2 Thucyd. vii. 49-86. of Nikiascompara tive languor of his ope rations. |