not far westward of the junction of Ortygia with the main land. Or he might have landed in the Great Harbour, and executed the same wall, beginning from the opposite end. Or he might have preferred to construct two blockading walls, one for each city separately: a short wall would have sufficed in front of the isthmus joining Ortygia, while a separate wall might have been carried to shut up the outer city, across the unfortified space constituting the Nekropolis, so as to end not in the Great Harbour, but in the coast of the Nekropolis opposite to Ortygia. Such were the possibilities of the case at the time when Nikias first reached Rhegium. But during the many months of inaction which he had allowed, the Syracusans had barred out both these possibilities, and had greatly augmented the difficulties of his intended enterprise. They had constructed a new wall, covering both their inner and their outer city-stretching across the whole front which faced the slope of Epipolæ, from the Great Harbour to the opposite sea near Santa Bonagia-and expanding westward so as to include within it the statue and consecrated ground of Apollo Temenitês, with the cliff near adjoining to it known by the name of the Temenite Cliff. This was done for the express purpose of lengthening the line indispensable for the besiegers to make their wall a good blockade'. After it was finished, Nikias could not begin his blockade from the side

1 Thucyd. vi. 75. Ἐτείχιζον δὲ καὶ οἱ Συρακόσιοι ἐν τῷ χειμῶνι τούτῳ πρός τε τῇ πόλει, τὸν Τεμενίτην ἐντὸς ποιησάμενοι, τεῖχος παρὰ πᾶν τὸ πρὸς τὰς Επιπολὰς ὁρῶν, ὅπως μὴ δι ̓ ἐλάσσονος εὐαποτείχιστοι ὦσιν, ἢν ἄρα σφάλλωνται, &c.

In Plan I., the letters G, H, I represent this additional or advanced fortification.

of the Great Harbour, since he would have been obstructed by the precipitous southern cliff of Epipolæ. He was under the necessity of beginning his wall from a portion of the higher ground of Epipolæ, and of carrying it both along a greater space and higher up on the slope, until he touched the Great Harbour at a point farther removed from Ortygia.

Nikias,

importance

ground of

Intention

of

cusans to

Occupy the

Epipolæ.

Syracuse having thus become assailable only from Increased the side of Epipolæ, the necessity so created for of the upper carrying on operations much higher up on the slope Epipola. gave to the summit of that eminence a greater the Syraimportance than it had before possessed. doubtless furnished with good local information by summit of the exiles, seems to have made this discovery earlier than the Syracusan generals, who (having been occupied in augmenting their defences on another point where they were yet more vulnerable) did not make it until immediately before the opening of the spring campaign. It was at that critical moment that they proclaimed a full muster, for break of day, in the low mead on the left bank of the Anapus. After an inspection of arms, and probably final distribution of forces for the approaching struggle, a chosen regiment of 600 hoplites was placed under the orders of an Andrian exile named Diomilus, in order to act as garrison of Epipolæ, as well as to be in constant readiness wherever they might be wanted'. These men were intended to occupy the strong ground on the summit of the hill, and thus obstruct all the various approaches to it, seemingly not many in number, and all narrow.

But before they had yet left their muster, to

is surprised

by the Athenians.

The summit march to the summit, intelligence reached them that the Athenians were already in possession of it. Nikias and Lamachus, putting their troops on board at Katana, had sailed during the preceding night to a landing-place not far from a place called Leon or the Lion, which was only six or seven furlongs from Epipolæ, and seems to have lain between Megara and the peninsula of Thapsus. They here landed their hoplites, and placed their fleet in safety under cover of a palisade across the narrow isthmus of Thapsus, before day and before the Syracusans had any intimation of their arrival. Their hoplites immediately moved forward with rapid step to ascend Epipolæ, mounting seemingly from the north-east, by the side towards Megara and farthest removed from Syracuse; so that they first reached the summit called Euryâlus, near the apex of the triangle above described. From hence they commanded the slope of Epipolæ beneath them and the town of Syracuse to the eastward. They were presently attacked by the Syracusans, who broke up their muster in the mead as soon as they heard the news. But as the road by which they had to march, approaching Euryâlus from the south-west, was circuitous, and hardly less than three English miles in length-they had the mortification of seeing that the Athenians were already masters of the position; and when they hastened up to retake it, the rapid pace had so disordered their ranks, that the Athenians attacked them at great advantage, besides having the higher ground. The Syracusans were driven back to their city with loss, Diomilus with half his regiment being slain; while

the Athenians remained masters of the high ground of Euryâlus, as well as of the upper portion of the slope of Epipola1.

of this sur

essential to

prosecution

This was a most important advantage-indeed The success seemingly essential to the successful prosecution prise was of the siege. It was gained by a plan both well the effectlaid and well executed, grounded upon the omis- ive future sion of the Syracusans to occupy a post of which of the siege. they did not at first perceive the importance— and which in fact only acquired its pre-eminent importance from the new enlargement made by the Syracusans in their fortifications. To that extent, therefore, it depended upon a favourable accident which could not have been reasonably expected to occur. The capture of Syracuse was certain, upon the supposition that the attack and siege of the city had been commenced on the first arrival of the Athenians in the island, without giving time for any improvement in its defensibility. But the moment such delay was allowed, success ceased to be certain, depending more or less upon this favourable turn of accident. The Syracusans actually did a great deal to create additional difficulty to the besiegers, and might have done more, especially in regard to the occupation of the high ground above Epipola. Had they taken this precaution, the effective prosecution of the siege would have been rendered extremely difficult-if not completely frustrated.

On the next morning, Nikias and Lamachus marched their army down the slope of Epipolæ near to the Syracusan walls, and offered battle, 1 Thucyd. vi. 97.

First opera- which the enemy did not accept.

tions of

Central

on Epipolæ, called the Circle.

They then with

the siege drew the Athenian troops; after which their first work of the operation was to construct a fort on the high ground Athenians called Labdalum, near the western end of the upper northern cliffs bordering Epipolæ, on the brink of the cliff, and looking northward towards Megara. This was intended as a place of security wherein both treasures and stores might be deposited, so as to leave the army unencumbered in its motions. The Athenian cavalry being now completed by the new arrivals from Egesta, Nikias descended from Labdalum to a new position called Sykê, lower down on Epipolæ, seemingly about midway between the northern and southern cliffs. He here constructed, with as much rapidity as possible, a walled enclosure, called the Circle, intended as a centre from whence the projected wall of circumvallation was to start northward towards the sea at Trogilus, southward towards the Great Harbour. This Circle appears to have covered a considerable space, and was farther protected by an outwork, the front of which measured one thousand feet'. Astounded at the rapidity with which the Athenians executed this construction2, the Syracusans marched their forces out, and prepared to give battle in order to interrupt it. But when the Athenians, relinquishing the work, drew up on their side in battle

1 Thucyd. vi. 97. ἐχώρουν πρὸς τὴν Συκῆν οἱ ̓Αθηναῖοι, ἵναπερ καθεζό μενοι ἐτείχισαν τὸν κύκλον διὰ τάχους.

The probable position of this Athenian Kúkλos or Circle will be found on both the Plans in the Appendix, marked by the letter K.

2 The Athenians seem to have surpassed all other Greeks in the diligence and skill with which they executed fortifications: see some examples, Thucyd. v. 75-82; Xenoph. Hellen. iv. 4, 18.