Page images
PDF
EPUB

peared at Sparta on special invitation and safeconduct from the Lacedæmonians; of whom he was at first vehemently afraid, in consequence of having raised against them that Peloponnesian combination which had given them so much trouble before the battle of Mantineia. He now appeared too, burning with hostility against his country, and eager to inflict upon her all the mischief in his power. Having been the chief evil genius to plunge her, mainly for selfish ends of his own, into this illstarred venture, he was now about to do his best to turn it into her irreparable ruin. His fiery stimulus, and unmeasured exaggerations, supplied what was wanting in Corinthian and Syracusan eloquence, and inflamed the tardy goodwill of the Spartan ephors into comparative decision and activity'. His harangue in the Spartan congress is given to us by Thucydidês-who may possibly have heard it, as he was then himself in exile. Like the earlier speech which he puts into the mouth of Alkibiadês at Athens, it is characteristic in a high degree; and interesting in another point of view as the latest composed speech of any length which we find in his history. I give here the substance, without professing to translate the words.

"First, I must address you, Lacedæmonians, respecting the prejudices current against me personally, before I can hope to find a fair hearing on first act of his hostility to Athens (the disappointing her of the acquisition of Messênê) was committed before he left Sicily. Moreover Thucydidês represents him as unwilling indeed to go to Sparta, but only unwilling because he was afraid of the Spartans; in fact waiting for a safe conduct and invitation from them. Thucydidês mentions nothing about his going to Argos (vi. 88).

1 Thucyd. vi. 88.

VOL. VII.

Y

[blocks in formation]

public matters. You know it was I, who renewed my public connection with Sparta, after my ancestors before me had quarreled with you and renounced it. Moreover, I assiduously cultivated your favour on all points, especially by attentions to your prisoners at Athens: but while I was showing all this zeal towards you, you took the opportunity of the peace which you made with Athens to employ my enemies as your agents-thus strengthening their hands, and dishonouring me. It was this conduct of yours which drove me to unite with the Argeians and Mantineians; nor ought you to be angry with me for mischief which you thus drew upon yourselves. Probably some of you hate me too, without any good reason, as a forward partisan of democracy. My family were always opposed to the Peisistratid despots; and as all opposition, to a ruling One or Few, takes the name of The People, so from that time forward we continued to act as leaders of the people'. Moreover our established constitution was a democracy, so that I had no choice but to obey: though I did my best to maintain a moderate line of political conduct in the midst of the reigning licence. It was not my family, but others, who in former times as well as now, led the people into the worst courses-those same men who sent me into exile. I always acted as leader,

1 Thucyd. vi. 89. Τοῖς γὰρ τυράννοις ἀεί ποτε διάφοροι ἔσμεν, πἂν δὲ τὸ ἐναντιούμενον τῷ δυναστεύοντι δῆμος ὠνόμασται· καὶ ἀπ ̓ ἐκείνου ξυμπαρέμεινεν ἡ προστασία ἡμῖν τοῦ πλήθους.

It is to be recollected that the Lacedæmonians had been always opposed to rúpavvo or despots, and had been particularly opposed to the Peisistratid rúpavvot, whom they in fact put down. In tracing his democratical tendencies, therefore, to this source, Alkibiadês took the best means of excusing them before a Lacedæmonian audience.

not of a party, but of the entire city; thinking it right to uphold that constitution in which Athens had enjoyed her grandeur and freedom, and which I found already existing'. For as to democracy, all we Athenians of common sense well knew its real character. Personally, I have better reason than any one else to rail against it-if one could say anything new about such confessed folly; but I did not think it safe to change the government, while you were standing by as enemies.

"So much as to myself personally: I shall now talk to you about the business of the meeting, and tell you something more than you yet know. Our purpose in sailing from Athens, was, first to conquer the Sicilian Greeks-next, the Italian Greeksafterwards, to make an attempt on the Carthaginian empire and on Carthage herself. If all or most of this succeeded, we were then to attack Peloponnesus. We intended to bring to this enterprise the entire power of the Sicilian and Italian Greeks, besides large numbers of Iberian and other warlike barbaric mercenaries, together with many new triremes built from the abundant forests of Italy, and large supplies both of treasure and provision. We could thus blockade Peloponnesus all round with our fleet, and at the same time assail it with our land-force; and we calculated, by taking some towns by storm and occupying others as permanent forti

1 Thucyd. vi. 89. ἡμεῖς δὲ τοῦ ξύμπαντος προέστημεν, δικαιοῦντες, ἐν ᾧ σχήματι μεγίστη ἡ πόλις ἔτυχε καὶ ἐλευθερωτάτη οὖσα, καὶ ὅπερ ἐδέξατό τις, τοῦτο ξυνδιασώζειν· ἐπεὶ δημοκρατίαν γε καὶ ἐγιγνώσκομεν οἱ φρονοῦντές τι, καὶ αὐτὸς οὐδενὸς ἂν χεῖρον, ὅσῳ καὶ λοιδορήσαιμι· ἀλλὰ περὶ ὁμολο γουμένης ἀνοίας οὐδὲν ἂν καινὸν λέγοιτο· καὶ τὸ μεθιστάναι αὐτὴν οὐκ ἐδόκει ἡμῖν ἀσφαλὲς εἶναι, ὑμῶν πολεμίων προσκαθημένων.

fied positions, that we should easily conquer the whole peninsula, and then become undisputed masters of Greece. You thus hear the whole scheme of our expedition from the man who knows it best; and you may depend on it that the remaining generals will execute all this, if they can. Nothing but your intervention can hinder them. If indeed the Sicilian Greeks were all united, they might hold out; but the Syracusans standing alone cannotbeaten as they already have been in a general action, and blocked up as they are by sea. If Syracuse falls into the hands of the Athenians, all Sicily and all Italy will share the same fate; and the danger which I have described will be soon upon you.

"It is not therefore simply for the safety of Sicily-it is for the safety of Peloponnesus-that I now urge you to send across, forthwith, a fleet with an army of hoplites as rowers; and what I consider still more important than an army-a Spartan general to take the supreme command. Moreover you must also carry on declared and vigorous war against Athens here, that the Syracusans may be encouraged to hold out, and that Athens may be in no condition to send additional reinforcements thither. You must farther fortify and permanently garrison Dekeleia in Attica': that is the contingency which the Athenians have always been most afraid of, and which therefore you may know to be your best policy. You will thus get into your own hands the live and dead stock of Attica, in

1 The establishment and permanent occupation of a fortified post in Attica, had been contemplated by the Corinthians even before the beginning of the war (Thucyd. i. 122).

terrupt the working of the silver mines at Laureion, deprive the Athenians of their profits from judicial fines' as well as of their landed revenue, and dispose the subject-allies to withhold their tribute.

"None of you ought to think the worse of me because I make this vigorous onset upon my country in conjunction with her enemies-I who once passed for a lover of my country2. Nor ought you to mistrust my assurances as coming from the reckless passion of an exile. The worst enemies of Athens are not those who make open war like you, but those who drive her best friends into hostility. I loved my country while I was secure as a citizen-I love her no more, now that I am wronged. In fact, I do not conceive myself to be assailing a country still mine: I am rather trying to win back a country now lost to me. The real patriot is not he, who having unjustly lost his country, acquiesces in patience-but he whose ardour makes him try every means to regain her.

"Employ me without fear, Lacedæmonians, in any service of danger or suffering: the more harm I did you formerly as an enemy, the more good I

1 The occupation of Dekeleia made it necessary for the larger number of Athenians to be almost incessantly under arms. Instead of a city, Athens became a guard-post, says Thucydidês (vii. 28). There was therefore seldom leisure for the convocation of that numerous body of citizens who formed a Dikastery.

* Thucyd. vi. 92. Καὶ χείρων οὐδενὶ ἀξιῶ δοκεῖν ὑμῶν εἶναι, εἰ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ μετὰ τῶν πολεμιωτάτων, φιλόπολίς ποτε δοκῶν εἶναι, νῦν ἐγκρατῶς ἐπέρχομαι.

3. Thucyd. vi. 92. Τό τε φιλόπολι οὐκ ἐν ᾧ ἀδικοῦμαι ἔχω, ἀλλ' ἐν ᾧ ασφαλῶς ἐπολιτεύθην. Οὐδ ̓ ἐπὶ πατρίδα οὖσαν ἔτι ἡγοῦμαι νῦν ἰέναι, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον τὴν οὐκ οὖσαν ἀνακτᾶσθαι. Καὶ φιλόπολις οὗτος ὀρθῶς, οὐχ ὃς ἂν τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀδίκως ἀπολέσας μὴ ἐπίῃ, ἀλλ ̓ ὃς ἂν ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν πειραθῇ αὐτὴν ἀναλαβεῖν.

« PreviousContinue »