Increase of confidence and preparations at Syracuse, arising from

of Nikias.

money than the thirty talents which had been before announced on the second visit of the commissioners. He then restored the prisoners from Hykkara to their Sikanian countrymen, receiving a ransom of 120 talents', and conducted the Athenian land-force across the centre of the island, through the territory of the friendly Sikels to Katana; making an attack in his way upon the hostile Sikel town of Hybla, in which he was repulsed. At Katana he was rejoined by his naval force.

It was now seemingly about the middle of October, and three months had elapsed since the arrival of the Athenian armament at Rhegium; during the delays which period they had achieved nothing beyond the acquisition of Naxus and Katana as allies, except the insignificant capture of Hykkara. But Naxus and Katana, as Chalkidic cities, had been counted upon beforehand even by Nikias; together with Rhegium, which had been found reluctant, to his great disappointment. What is still worse in reference to the character of the general, not only nothing serious had been achieved, but nothing serious had been attempted. The precious moment pointed out by Lamachus for action, when the terrific menace of the untried armament was at its maximum, and preparation as well as con

1 Diodor. xiii. 6; Thucyd. vi. 62. Καὶ τἀνδράποδα ἀπέδοσαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο ἐξ αὐτῶν εἴκοσι καὶ ἑκατὸν τάλαντα. The word ἀπέδοσαν seems to mean that the prisoners were handed over to their fellow-countrymen, the natural persons to negotiate for their release, upon private contract of a definite sum. Had Thucydidês said dñédovтo, it would have meant that they were put up to auction for what they would fetch. This distinction is at least possible-and (in my judgment) more admissible than that proposed in the note of Dr. Arnold.

fidence was wanting at Syracuse, had been irreparably wasted. Every day the preparations of the Syracusans improved and their fears diminished. The invader, whom they had looked upon as so formidable, turned out both hesitating and timorous', and when he disappeared out of their sight to Hykkara and Egesta-still more when he assailed in vain the insignificant Sikel post of Hybla-their minds underwent a reaction from dismay to extreme confidence. The mass of Syracusan citizens, now reinforced by allies from Selinus and other cities, called upon their generals to lead them to the attack of the Athenian position at Katana, since the Athenians did not dare to approach Syracuse; while Syracusan horsemen even went so far as to insult the Athenians in their camp, riding up to ask if they were come to settle as peaceable citizens in the island, instead of restoring the Leontines. Such unexpected humiliation, acting probably on the feelings of the soldiers, at length shamed Nikias out of his inaction, and compelled him to strike a blow for the maintenance of his own reputation. He devised a stratagem for approaching Syracuse in such a manner as to elude the opposition of the Syracusan cavalry-informing himself as to the ground near the city through some exiles serving along with him2.

He despatched to Syracuse a Katanæan citizen in his heart attached to Athens, yet apparently neutral and on good terms with the other side, as bearer of a pretended message and proposition from the friends of Syracuse at Katana. Many of the Athenian

1

Thucyd. vi. 63; vii. 42.

2

Thucyd. vi. 63; Diodor. xiii. 6.

of Nikias

from Katana-he lands his forces in the Great

Manoeuvre soldiers (so the message ran) were in the habit of passing the night within the walls apart from their camp and arms. It would be easy for the Syracusans by a vigorous attack at daybreak, to surprise Harbour of them thus unprepared and dispersed; while the Syracuse. philo-Syracusan party at Katana promised to aid, by closing the gates, assailing the Athenians within and setting fire to the ships. A numerous body of Katanæans (they added) were eager to co-operate in the plan now proposed.

This communication, reaching the Syracusan generals at a moment when they were themselves elate and disposed to an aggressive movement, found such incautious credence, that they sent back the messenger to Katana with cordial assent and agreement for a precise day. Accordingly, a day or two before, the entire Syracusan force was marched out towards Katana, and encamped for the night on the river Symæthus, in the Leontine territory, within about eight miles of Katana. But Nikias, with whom the whole proceeding originated, choosing this same day to put on shipboard his army, together with his Sikel allies present, sailed by night southward along the coast, rounding the island of Ortygia, into the Great Harbour of Syracuse. Arrived thither by break of day, he disembarked his troops unopposed south of the mouth of the Anâpus, in the interior of the Great Harbour, near the hamlet which stretched towards the temple of Zeus Olympius. Having broken down the neighbouring bridge, where the Helôrine road crossed the Anâpus, he took up a position protected by various embarrassing obstacles -houses, walls, trees, and standing water-besides

the steep ground of the Olympieion itself on his left wing: so that he could choose his own time for fighting, and was out of the attack of the Syracusan horse. For the protection of his ships on the shore, he provided a palisade work by cutting down the neighbouring trees; and even took precautions for his rear by throwing up a hasty fence of wood and stones touching the shore at the inner bay called Daskon. He had full leisure for such defensive works, since the enemy within the walls made no attempt to disturb him, while the Syracusan horse only discovered his manœuvre on arriving before the lines at Katana; and though they lost no time in returning, the march back was a long one'. Such was the confidence of the Syracusans, however, that even after so long a march, they offered battle forthwith: but as Nikias did not quit his position, they retreated to take up their nightstation on the other side of the Helôrine road— probably a road bordered on each side by walls.

the Syracusan army

from Ka

tana to the

Great Har

bour-pre

for fighting

On the next morning, Nikias marched out of his Return of position and formed his troops in order of battle, in two divisions, each eight deep. His front division was intended to attack; his rear division (in hollow square with the baggage in the middle) was held in parations reserve near the camp to lend aid where aid might Nikias. be wanted: cavalry there was none. The Syracusan hoplites, seemingly far more numerous than his, presented the levy in mass of the city, without any selection; they were ranged in the deeper order

1 Thucyd. vi. 65, 66; Diodor. xiii. 6; Plutarch, Nikias, c. 13. To understand the position of Nikias, as well as it can be made out from the description of Thucydidês, the reader will consult the plan of Syracuse and its neighbourhood at the end of the present volume.

Feelings of the ancient

Harangue

of Nikias.

of sixteen, alongside of their Selinuntine allies. On the right wing were posted their horsemen, the best part of their force, not less than 1200 in number; together with 200 horsemen from Gela, 20 from Kamarina, about 50 bowmen, and a company of darters. The hoplites, though full of courage, had little training; and their array, never precisely kept, was on this occasion farther disturbed by the immediate vicinity of the city. Some had gone in to see their families-others, hurrying out to join, found the battle already begun, and took rank wherever they could'.

Thucydidês, in describing this battle, gives us, soldier. according to his practice, a statement of the motives and feelings which animated the combatants on both sides, and which furnished a theme for the brief harangue of Nikias. This appears surprising to one accustomed to modern warfare, where the soldier is under the influence simply of professional honour and disgrace, without any thought of the cause for which he is fighting. In ancient times, such a motive was only one among many others, which, according to the circumstances of the case, contributed to elevate or depress the soldier's mind at the eve of action. Nikias adverted to the recognised military pre-eminence of chosen Argeians, Mantineians, and Athenians-as compared to the Syracusan levy in mass, who were full of belief in their own superiority, (this is a striking confession of the deplorable change which had been wrought by his own delay,) but who would come short in actual conflict, from want of discipline. More

1 Thucyd. vi. 67-69.

2 Thucyd. vi. 68, 69. ἄλλως δὲ καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρας πανδημεί τε ἀμυνομέ