Relative position of Athenagoras and other par. racuse. biassed by it. Let us rather take care, in reference to the reports just communicated, that we be one and all in a condition to repel the invader. And even should the necessity not arise, there is no harm in strengthening our public force with horses, arms, and the other muniments of war. We generals shall take upon ourselves the care and supervision of these matters, as well as of the missions to neighbouring cities, for procuring information and for other objects. We have indeed already busied ourselves for the purpose, and we shall keep you informed of what we learn." The language of Athenagoras, indicating much virulence of party-feeling, lets us somewhat into the real working of politics among the Syracusan ties at Sy- democracy. Athenagoras at Syracuse was like Kleon at Athens-the popular orator of the city. But he was by no means the most influential person, nor had he the principal direction of public affairs. Executive and magisterial functions belonged chiefly to Hermokratês and his partisans, the opponents of Athenagoras. Hermokratês has already appeared as taking the lead at the congress of Gela nine years before, and will be seen throughout the coming period almost constantly in the same position; while the political rank of Athenagoras is more analogous to that which we should call a leader of opposition-a function of course suspended under pressing danger, so that we hear of him no more. At Athens as at Syracuse, the men who got the real power, and handled the force and treasures of the state, were chiefly of the rich families-often of oligarchical sentiments, acquiescing in the democracy as an uncomfortable necessity, and continually open to be solicited by friends or kinsmen to conspire against it. Their proceedings were doubtless always liable to the scrutiny, and their persons to the animadversion, of the public assembly: hence arose the influence of the demagogue, such as Athenagoras and Kleon-the bad side of whose character is so constantly kept before the readers of Grecian history. By whatever disparaging epithets such character may be surrounded, it is in reality the distinguishing feature of a free government under all its forms -whether constitutional monarchy or democracy. By the side of the real political actors, who hold principal office and wield personal power, there are always abundant censors and critics-some better, others worse, in respect of honesty, candour, wisdom, or rhetoric-the most distinguished of whom acquires considerable importance, though holding a function essentially inferior to that of the authorised magistrate or general. positions of We observe here, that Athenagoras, far from Pacific disbeing inclined to push the city into war, is averse Athenagoto it even beyond reasonable limit; and denounces ras. it as the interested policy of the oligarchical party. This may show how little it was any constant interest or policy on the part of the persons called Demagogues, to involve their city in unnecessary war; a charge which has been frequently advanced against them, because it so happens, that Kleon, in the first half of the Peloponnesian war, discountenanced the propositions of peace between Athens and Sparta. We see by the ha VOL. VII. S rangue of Athenagoras that the oligarchical party were the usual promoters of war; a fact which we should naturally expect, seeing that the rich and great, in most communities, have accounted the pursuit of military glory more conformable to their dignity than any other career. At Syracuse, the ascendency of Hermokratês was much increased by the invasion of the Athenians-while Athenagoras does not again appear. The latter was egregiously mistaken in his anticipations respecting the conduct of Athens, though right in his judgment respecting her true political interest. But it is very unsafe to assume that nations will always pursue their true political interest, where present temptations of ambition or vanity intervene. Positive information was in this instance a surer guide than speculations à priori founded upon the probable policy of Athens. But that the imputations advanced by Athenagoras against the oligarchical youth, of promoting military organization with a view to their own separate interest, were not visionary-may be seen by the analogous case of Argos, two or three years before. His general The democracy of Argos, contemplating a more warlike and aggressive policy, had been persuaded against the to organize and train the select regiment of One youth were Thousand hoplites, chosen from the oligarchical youth within three years, this regiment subverted the democratical constitution'. Now the persons, respecting whose designs Athenagoras expresses so much apprehension, were exactly the class at Syracuse corresponding to the select Thousand at Argos. denuncia tions oligarchical well-found ed. 1 See above, in this volume, chap. lvi. The political views, proclaimed in this remarkable speech, are deserving of attention, though we cannot fully understand it without having before us those speeches to which it replies. Not only is democratical constitution forcibly contrasted with oligarchy, but the separate places which it assigns to wealth, intelligence, and multitude, are laid down with a distinctness not unworthy of Aristotle. Active pre- parations at the ap proach of the Athenian ment. Even before the debate here adverted to, the Syracusan generals had evidently acted upon views more nearly approaching to those of Hermokratês than to those of Athenagoras. Already alive to an armathe danger, and apprised by their scouts when the Athenian armament was passing from Korkyra to Rhegium, they pushed their preparations with the utmost activity; distributing garrisons and sending envoys among their Sikel dependencies, while the force within the city was mustered and placed under all the conditions of war1. The halt of the Athenians at Rhegium afforded increased leisure for such equipment. That halt was prolonged for more than one reason. In the first place, Nikias and his colleagues wished to negotiate with the Rhegines, as well as to haul ashore and clean their ships: next, they awaited the return of the three scout-ships from Egesta: lastly, they had as yet formed no plan of action in Sicily. ragement nians at The ships from Egesta returned with dishearten- Discouing news. Instead of the abundant wealth which of the Athehad been held forth as existing in that town, and Rhegium which the resolutions of the Athenians as to Sicilian operations had been mainly grounded-it upon on learning the truth respecting the poverty of Egesta. 1 Thucyd. vi. 45. The Athe nian gene rals discuss their plan of action opinion of Nikias. turned out that no more than thirty talents in all could be produced. What was yet worse, the elaborate fraud, whereby the Egestæans had duped the commissioners on their first visit, was now exposed; and these commissioners, on returning to Rhegium from their second visit, were condemned to the mortification of proclaiming their own credulity, under severe taunts and reproaches from the army. Disappointed in the source from whence they had calculated on obtaining money-for it appears that both Alkibiadês and Lamachus had sincerely relied on the pecuniary resources of Egesta, though Nikias was always mistrustful-the generals now discussed their plan of action. Nikias-availing himself of the fraudulent conduct on the part of the Egestæan allies, now become palpable-wished to circumscribe his range of operations within the rigorous letter of the vote which the Athenian assembly had passed. He proposed to sail at once against Selinus; then, formally to require the Egestæans to provide the means of maintaining the armament, or, at least, of maintaining those sixty triremes which they themselves had solicited. Since this requisition would not be realised, he would only tarry long enough to obtain from the Selinuntines some tolerable terms of accommodation with Egesta, and then return home; exhibiting, as they sailed along, to all the maritime cities, this great display of Athenian naval force. And while he would be ready to profit by any opportunity which accident might present for serving the Leontines or establishing new alliances, he strongly deprecated any prolonged stay in the |