parties in the Syra cusan as sembly. Though these opinions of Hermokratês were Temperand espoused farther by various other citizens in the assembly, the greater number of speakers held an opposite language, and placed little faith in his warnings. We have already noticed Hermokrates nine years before as envoy of Syracuse and chief adviser at the congress of Gela-then, as now, watchful to bar the door against Athenian interference in Sicily-then, as now, belonging to the oligarchical party, and of sentiments hostile to the existing democratical constitution; but brave as well as intelligent in foreign affairs. A warm and even angry debate arose upon his present speech'. Though there was nothing, in the words of Hermokratês himself, disparaging either to the democracy or to the existing magistrates, yet it would seem that his partisans who spoke after him must have taken up a more criminative tone, and must have exaggerated that, which he characterised as the "habitual quiescence" of the Syracusans, into contemptible remissness and disorganisation under those administrators and generals, characterised as worthless, whom the democracy preferred. Amidst the speakers, who in replying to Hermokratês and the others, indignantly repelled such insinuations and retorted upon their authors-a citizen named Athenagoras was the most distinguished. He was at this time the leading democratical politician, and the most popular orator, in Syracuse2. 1 Thucyd. vi. 32-35. τῶν δὲ Συρακοσίων ὁ δῆμος ἐν πολλῇ πρὸς ἀλλή λους ἔριδι ἦσαν, &c. 2 Thucyd. vi. 35. παρελθὼν δ ̓ αὐτοῖς ̓Αθηναγόρας, ὃς δήμου τε προστάτης ἦν καὶ ἐν τῷ παρόντι πιθανώτατος τοῖς πολλοῖς, ἔλεγε τοιάδε, &c. The position ascribed here to Athenagoras seems to be the same as Reply of pular ora tor. Every one', (said he) except only cowards and ras, the po- bad citizens, must wish that the Athenians would be fools enough to come here and put themselves into our power. The tales which you have just heard are nothing better than fabrications, got up to alarm you; and I wonder at the folly of these alarmists in fancying that their machinations are not detected2. You will be too wise to take measure of the future from their reports: you will rather judge from what able men such as the Athenians are likely to do. Be assured that they will never leave behind them the Peloponnesians in menacing attitude, to come hither and court a fresh war not less formidable: indeed I think they account themselves lucky that we with our powerful cities have never come across to attack them. if they should come, as it is pretended--they will find Sicily a more formidable foe than Peloponnesus: nay, our own city alone will be a match for twice the force which they can bring across. And The Athe that which is assigned to Kleon at Athens-ἀνὴρ δημαγωγὸς κατ ̓ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὢν καὶ τῷ πλήθει πιθανώτατος, &c. iv. 21). Neither δήμου προστάτης, nor δημαγωγός, denotes any express funetions, or titular office (see the note of Dr. Arnold)- at least in these places. It is possible that there may have been some Grecian town constitutions, in which there was an office bearing such title: but this is a point which cannot be affirmed. Nor would the words dýμov tpoστáτns always imply an equal degree of power: the person so designated might have more power in one town than in another. Thus in Megara (iv. 67) it seems that the oligarchical party had recently been banished: the leaders of the popular party had become the most influential men in the city. See also iii. 70-Peithias at Korkyra. 1 Thucyd. vi. 36-40. I give the substance of what is ascribed to Athenagoras by Thucydidês, without binding myself to the words. 2 Thucyd. vi. 36. τοὺς δ ̓ ἀγγέλλοντας τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ περιφόβους ὑμᾶς ποιοῦντας τῆς μὲν τόλμης οὐ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ ἀξυνεσίας, εἰ μὴ οἴονται ἔνδηλοι εἶναι. nians, knowing all this well enough, will mind their own business; in spite of all the fictions which men on this side of the water conjure up, and which they have already tried often before, sometimes even worse than on the present occasion, in order to terrify you and get themselves nominated to the chief posts'. One of these days, I fear they may even succeed, from our want of precautions beforehand. Such intrigues leave but short moments of tranquillity to our city: they condemn it to an intestine discord worse than foreign war, and have sometimes betrayed it even to despots and usurpers. However, if you will listen to me, I will try and prevent anything of this sort at present; by simple persuasion to you-by chastisement to these conspirators-and by watchful denunciation of the oligarchical party generally. Let me ask, indeed, what is it that you younger nobles covet? To get into command at your early age? The law forbids you, because you are yet incompetent. Or do you wish not to be under equal laws with the many? But how can you pretend that citizens of the same city should not have the same rights? Some one will tell me that democracy is neither intelligent 1 Thucyd. vi. 38. ̓Αλλὰ ταῦτα, ὥσπερ ἐγὼ λέγω, οἵ τε ̓Αθηναῖοι για γνώσκοντες, τὰ σφετερὰ αὐτῶν, εὖ οἶδ' ὅτι, σώζουσι, καὶ ἐνθένδε ἄνδρες οὔτε ὄντα, οὔτε ἂν γενόμενα, λογοποιοῦσιν. Οὓς ἐγὼ οὐ νῦν πρῶτον, ἀλλ ̓ ἀεὶ ἐπίσταμαι, ἤτοι λόγοις γε τοιοῖσδε, καὶ ἔτι τούτων κακουργοτέροις, ἢ ἔργοις, βουλομένους καταπλήξαντας τὸ ὑμέτερον πλῆθος αὐτοὺς τῆς πό λεως ἄρχειν. Καὶ δέδοικα μέντοι μήποτε πολλὰ πειρῶντες καὶ κατορθώσωσιν, &c. 2 Thucyd. vi. 39. φήσει τις δημοκρατίαν οὔτε ξυνετὸν οὔτ ̓ ἴσον εἶναι, τοὺς δ ̓ ἔχοντας τὰ χρήματα καὶ ἄρχειν ἄριστα βελτίστους. Ἐγὼ δέ φημι, πρῶτα μὲν, δῆμον ξύμπαν ὠνομάσθαι, ὀλιγαρχίαν δὲ μέρος· ἔπειτα, φύλακαι μὲν ἀρίστους εἶναι χρημάτων τοὺς πλουσίους, βουλεῦσαι δ ̓ ἂν nor just, and that the rich are the persons best fitted to command. But I affirm, first, that the people are the sum total, and the oligarchy merely a fraction; next, that rich men are the best trustees of the aggregate wealth existing in the community -intelligent men, the best counsellors-and the multitude, the best qualified for hearing and deciding after such advice. In a democracy, these functions, one and all, find their proper place. But oligarchy, though imposing on the multitude a full participation in all hazards, is not content even βέλτιστα τοὺς ξυνετοὺς, κρῖναι δ ̓ ἂν ἀκούσαντας ἄριστα τοὺς πολλούς· καὶ ταῦτα ὁμοίως καὶ κατὰ μέρη καὶ ξύμπαντα ἐν δημοκρατίᾳ ἰσομοιρεῖν. Dr. Arnold translates φύλακας χρημάτων—“ having the care of the public purseas if it were φύλακας τῶν δημοσίων χρημάτων. But it seems to me that the words carry a larger sense, and refer to the private property of these rich men, not to their functions as keepers of what was collected from taxation or tribute. Looking at a rich man from the point of view of the public, he is guardian of his own property until the necessities of the state require that he should spend more or less of it for the public defence or benefit: in the interim, he enjoys it as he pleases, but he will for his own interest take care that the property does not perish (compare vi. 9). This is the service which he renders, quatenus rich man, to the state: he may also serve it in other ways, but that would be by means of his personal qualities: thus he may, for example, be intelligent as well as rich (§uveròs as well as λovσios), and then he may serve the state as counsellor—the second of the two categories named by Athenagoras. What that orator is here negativing is, the better title and superior fitness of the rich to exercise commandwhich was the claim put forward in their behalf. And he goes on to indicate what is their real position and service in a democracy; that they are to enjoy the revenue, and preserve the capital, of their wealth, subject to demands for public purposes when necessary-but not to expect command, unless they are personally competent. Properly speaking, that which he here affirms is true of the small lots of property taken in the mass, as well as of the large, and is one of the grounds of defence of private property against communism. But the rich man's property is an appreciable item to the state, individually taken: moreover, he is perpetually raising unjust pretensions to political power, so that it becomes necessary to define how much he is really entitled to. A passage in the financial oration of Demosthenes-περὶ Συμμοριών with an exorbitant share in the public advan- Immediately after this vehement speech from Athenagoras, one of the Stratêgi who presided in the assembly interposed; permitting no one else to speak, and abruptly closing the assembly, with these few words :-" We generals deprecate this interchange of personal vituperation, and trust that the hearers present will not suffer themselves to be (p. 185. c. 8) will illustrate what has been here said—▲eî roívvv vμâs τἄλλα παρασκευάσασθαι· τὰ δὲ χρήματα νῦν μὲν ἐᾷν τοὺς κεκτημένους ἔχειν οὐδαμοῦ γὰρ ἂν ἐν καλλίονι σώζοιντο τῇ πόλει—ἐὰν δέ ποθ ̓ ὁ καιρὸς οὗτος ἔλθῃ, τότε ἑκόντων εἰσφερόντων αὐτῶν λαμβάνειν. 1 Thucyd. vi. 39. Ολιγαρχία δὲ τῶν μὲν κινδύνων τοῖς πολλοῖς μεταδίδωσι, τῶν δ ̓ ὠφελίμων οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ξύμπαν ἀφελομένη ἔχει· ὁ ὑμῶν οἵ τε δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ νέοι προθυμοῦνται, ἀδύνατα ἐν μεγάλη πόλει κατασχεῖν. Interposi tion of the Strategi to moderate the violence of the debate. |