Full muster of the ar Korkyra. these details, given by Thucydidês, of the triumphant promise which now issued from Peiræus, derive a painful interest from their contrast with the sad issue which will hereafter be unfolded. The fleet made straight for Korkyra, where the mament at contingents of the maritime allies, with the ships for burden and provisions, were found assembled. The armament thus complete was passed in review, and found to comprise 134 triremes with two Rhodian pentekonters; 5100 hoplites; 480 bowmen, 80 of them Kretan; 700 Rhodian slingers; and 120 Megarian exiles serving as light troops. Of vessels of burden, in attendance with provisions, muniments of war, bakers, masons and carpenters, &c., the number was not less than 500; besides which, there was a considerable number of private trading ships, following voluntarily for purposes of profit'. Three fast-sailing triremes were despatched in advance, to ascertain which of the cities in Italy and Sicily would welcome the arrival of the armament; and especially to give notice at Egesta that the succour solicited was now on its way, requiring at the same time that the money promised by the Egestæans should be produced. Having then distributed by lot the armament into three divisions, one under each of the generals, Nikias, Alkibiadês, and Lamachus-they crossed the Ionic Gulf from Korkyra to the Iapygian promontory. Progress to In their progress southward along the coast of cold recep- Italy to Rhegium, they met with a very cold reception from the various Grecian cities. None would receive them within their walls or even sell tion by the Italian cities. them provisions without. The utmost which they would grant was, the liberty of taking moorings and of watering; and even thus much was denied to them both at Tarentum and at the Epizephyrian Lokri. At Rhegium, immediately on the Sicilian strait, though the town gate was still kept shut, they were so far more hospitably treated, that a market of provisions was furnished to them and they were allowed to encamp in the sacred precinct of Artemis, not far from the walls. They here hauled their ships ashore and took repose until the return of the three scout ships from Egesta; while the generals entered into negotiation with the magistrates and people of Rhegium, endeavouring to induce them to aid the armament in re-establishing the dispossessed Leontines, who were of common Chalkidian origin with themselves. But the answer returned was discouraging. The Rhegines would promise nothing more than neutrality, and cooperation in any course of policy which it might suit the other Italian Greeks to adopt. Probably they, as well as the other Italian Greeks, were astonished and intimidated by the magnitude of the newly-arrived force, and desired to leave themselves open latitude of conduct for the future-not without mistrust of Athens and her affected forwardness for the restoration of the Leontines. To the Athenian generals, however, such a negative from Rhegium was an unwelcome disappointment; for that city had been the ally of Athens in the last war, and they had calculated on the operation of Chalkidic sympathies'. Thucyd. vi. 44-46. Feeling at Syracuse as to the approaching armament -disposi tion to un magnitude, question its intended coming. It was not until after the muster of the Athenians at Korkyra (about July 415 B.C.) that the Syracusans became thoroughly convinced both of their approach, and of the extent of their designs against dervalue its Sicily. Intimation had indeed reached Syracuse, and even to from several quarters, of the resolution taken by the Athenians in the preceding March to assist Egesta and Leontini, and of the preparations going on in consequence. There was however a prevailing indisposition to credit such tidings. Nothing in the state of Sicily held out any encouragement to Athenian ambition: the Leontines could give no aid, the Egestæans very little, and that little at the opposite corner of the island; while the Syracusans considered themselves fully able to cope with any force which Athens was likely to send. Some derided the intelligence as mere idle rumour; others anticipated, at most, nothing more serious than the expedition sent from Athens ten years before'. No one could imagine the new eagerness and obstinacy with which she had just thrown herself into the scheme of Sicilian conquest, nor the formidable armament presently about to start. Nevertheless, the Syracusan generals thought it their 1 Thucyd. vi. 32–35. Mr. Mitford observes—“ It is not specified by historians, but the account of Thucydidês makes it evident, that there had been a revolution in the government of Syracuse, or at least a great change in its administration, since the oligarchical Leontines were admitted to the rights of Syracusan citizens (ch. xviii. sect. iii. vol. iv. The democratical party now bore the sway," &c. p. 46). I cannot imagine upon what passage of Thucydidês Mr. Mitford founds this conjecture. He had spoken of the government as a democracy before; he continues to speak of it as a democracy now, in the same unaltered vituperative strain. duty to make preparations, and strengthen the military condition of the state'. exhorta Hermokra Hermokratês, however, whose information was Strenuous more complete, judged these preparations insuffi- tions of cient, and took advantage of a public assembly- tês, to be held seemingly about the time that the Athenians prepared. were starting from Peiræus-to impress such conviction on his countrymen, as well as to correct their incredulity. He pledged his own credit that the reports which had been circulated were not merely true, but even less than the full truth; that the Athenians were actually on their way, with an armament on the largest scale, and vast designs of conquering all Sicily. While he strenuously urged that the city should be put in immediate condition for repelling a most formidable invasion, he deprecated all alarm as to the result, and held out the firm est assurances of ultimate triumph. The very magnitude of the approaching force would intimidate the Sicilian cities and drive them into hearty defensive cooperation with Syracuse. Rarely indeed did any large or distant expedition ever succeed in its object, as might be seen from the failure of the Persians against Greece, by which failure Athens herself had so largely profited. Preparations, however, both effective and immediate, were indispensable; not merely at home, but by means of foreign missions, to the Sicilian and Italian Greeks to the Sikels-and to the Carthaginians, who had for some time been suspicious of the unmeasured aggressive designs of Athens, and whose immense wealth would now be especially service 1 Thucyd. vi. 41. τὰ δὲ καὶ ἐπιμεμελήμεθα ἤδη, &c. able-and to Lacedæmon and Corinth, for the purpose of soliciting aid in Sicily, as well as renewed invasion of Attica. So confident did he (Hermokratês) feel of their powers of defence, if properly organised, that he would even advise the Syracusans with their Sicilian' allies to put to sea at once, with all their naval force and two months' provisions, and to sail forthwith to the friendly harbour of Tarentum; from whence they would be able to meet the Athenian fleet and prevent it even from crossing the Ionic Gulf from Korkyra. They would thus show that they were not only determined on defence, but even forward in coming to blows; the only way of taking down the presumption of the Athenians, who now speculated upon Syracusan lukewarmness, because they had rendered no aid to Sparta when she solicited it at the beginning of the war. The Syracusans would probably be able to deter or obstruct the advance of the expedition until winter approached: in which case, Nikias, the ablest of the three generals, who was understood to have undertaken the scheme against his own consent, would probably avail himself of the pretext to return 2. 1 Thucyd. vi. 34. Ο δὲ μάλιστα ἐγώ τε νομίζω ἐπίκαιρον, ὑμεῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ξύνηθες ἥσυχον ἥκιστ ̓ ἂν ὀξέως πείθοισθε, ὅμως εἰρήσεται. That "habitual quiescence" which Hermokratês here predicates of his countrymen, forms a remarkable contrast with the restless activity, and intermeddling carried even to excess, which Periklês and Nikias deprecate in the Athenians (Thucyd. i. 144; vi. 7). Both of the governments however were democratical. This serves as a lesson of caution respecting general predications about all democracies; for it is certain that one democracy differed in many respects from another. It may be doubted however whether the attribute here ascribed by Hermokratês to his countrymen was really deserved, to the extent which his language implies. 2 Thucyd. vi. 33-36. |