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while her military force was just now farther strengthened by a step of very considerable importance. She had recently set apart a body of a thousand select hoplites, composed of young men of wealth and station, to receive constant military training at the public expense, and to be enrolled as a separate regiment by themselves, apart from the other citizens'. To a democratical government like Argos such an institution was internally dangerous, and pregnant with mischief, which will be hereafter described. But at the present moment the democratical leaders of Argos seem to have thought only of the foreign relations of their city, now that her truce with Sparta was expiring, and that the disorganized state of the Spartan confederacy opened new chances to her ambition of regaining something like headship in Peloponnesus.
The discontent of the recusant Peloponnesian allies was now inducing them to turn their attention towards Argos as a new chief. They had mis
the war between Athens and Sparta. This passage, as well as the whole tenor of the play, affords ground for affirming that the Pax was represented during the winter immediately preceding the peace of Nikias— about four or five months after the battle of Amphipolis and the death of Kleon and Brasidas; not two years later, as Mr. Clinton would place it, on the authority of a date in the play itself upon which he lays too great stress.
! Thucyd. v. 67. ̓Αργείων οἱ Χίλιοι λογάδες, οἷς ἡ πόλις ἐκ πολλοῦ ἄσκησιν τῶν ἐς τὸν πόλεμον δημοσίᾳ παρεῖχε.
Diodorus (xii. 75) represents the first formation of this Thousandregiment at Argos as having taken place just about this time, and I think he is here worthy of credit, so that I do not regard the expression of Thucydidês é Toλλoû as indicating a time more than two years prior to the battle of Mantineia. For Grecian military training, two years of constant practice would be a long time. It is not to be imagined that the Argeian democracy would have incurred the expense and danger of keeping up this select regiment, during all the period of their long peace, just now coming to an end.
trusted Sparta, even before the peace, well knowing that she had separate interests from the confederacy, arising from desire to get back her captives. In the terms of peace, it seemed as if Sparta and Athens alone were regarded, the interests of the remaining allies, especially those in Thrace, being put out of sight. Moreover that article in the treaty of peace whereby it was provided that Athens and Sparta might by mutual consent add or strike out any article that they chose, without consulting the allies, excited general alarm, as if Sparta were meditating some treason in conjunction with Athens against the confederacy'. And the alarm, once roused, was still farther aggravated by the separate treaty of alliance between Sparta and Athens, which followed so closely afterwards, as well as by the restoration of the Spartan captives.
Such general displeasure among the Peloponne. sian states at the unexpected combination of Athenians and Lacedæmonians, strengthened in the case of each particular state by private interests of its own, first manifested itself openly through the Corinthians. On retiring from the conferences at Sparta-where the recent alliance between the Athenians and Spartans had just been made known, and where the latter had vainly endeavoured to prevail upon their allies to accept the peace-the Corinthians went straight to Argos to communicate what had passed, and to solicit interference. They suggested to the leading men in that city, that it was now the duty of Argos to step forward as sa
1 Thucyd. v. 29. μὴ μετὰ ̓Αθηναίων σφᾶς βούλωνται Λακεδαιμόνιοι dovλwσaodai: compare Diodorus, xii. 75.
head of a
of Tegea and Mantineia.
Meanwhile the Corinthians, though they had Peloponne been the first to set the Argeians in motion, nevertheless thought it right, before enrolling themselves
the Man- publicly in the new alliance, to invite a congress of
Peloponnesian malcontents to Corinth. It was the Mantineians who made the first application to Argos under the notice just issued. And here we are admitted to a partial view of the relations among the secondary and interior states of Peloponnesus. Man1 Thucyd. v. 28.
viour of Peloponnesus, which the Lacedæmonians were openly betraying to the common enemy-and to invite for that purpose, into alliance for reciprocal defence, every autonomous Hellenic state which would bind itself to give and receive amicable satisfaction in all points of difference. They affirmed that many cities, from hatred of Sparta, would gladly comply with such invitation; especially if a board of commissioners in small number were named, with full powers to admit all suitable applicants; so that, in case of rejection, there might at least be no exposure before the public assembly in the Argeian democracy. This suggestion—privately made by the Corinthians, who returned home immediately afterwards-was eagerly adopted both by leaders and people at Argos, as promising to realise their long-cherished pretensions to headship. Twelve commissioners were accordingly appointed, with power to admit any new allies whom they might think eligible, except Athens and Sparta. With either of those two cities, no treaty was allowed without the formal sanction of the public assembly1.
tineia and Tegea, being conterminous as well as the two most considerable states in Arcadia, were in perpetual rivalry, which had shown itself, only a year and a half before, in a bloody, but indecisive battle'. Tegea, situated on the frontiers of Laconia and oligarchically governed, was tenaciously attached to Sparta; while for that very reason, as well as from the democratical character of her government, Mantineia was less so-though she was still enrolled in, and acted as a member of, the Peloponnesian confederacy. She had recently conquered for herself a little empire in her own neighbourhood, composed of village districts in Arcadia, reckoned as her subject allies, and comrades in her ranks at the last battle with Tegea. This conquest had been made even during the continuance of the war with Athens-a period when the lesser states of Peloponnesus generally, and even subject-states as against their own imperial states, were under the guarantee of the confederacy, to which they were required to render their unpaid service against the common enemy--so that she was apprehensive of Lacedæmonian interference at the request and for the emancipation of these subjects, who lay more. over near to the borders of Laconia. Such interference would probably have been invoked earlier; only that Sparta had been under pressing embar
1 Thucyd. iv. 134.
2 Thucyd. v. 29. Τοῖς γὰρ Μαντινεῦσι μέρος τι τῆς ̓Αρκαδίας κατέστραπτο ὑπήκοον, ἔτι τοῦ πρὸς ̓Αθηναίους πολέμου ὄντος, καὶ ἐνόμιζον οὐ περιόψεσθαι σφᾶς τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἄρχειν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ σχολὴν ἦγον.
As to the way in which the agreement of the members of the confederacy modified the relations between subordinate and imperial states, see farther on, pages 25 and 26, in the case of Elis and Lepreum.
rassments and farther, had assembled no general muster of the confederacy against Athens-ever since the disaster in Sphakteria. But now she had her hands free, together with a good pretext as well as motive for interference.
To maintain the autonomy of all the little states, and prevent any of them from being mediatised or grouped into aggregations under the ascendency of the greater, had been the general policy of Sparta, -especially since her own influence as general leader was increased by ensuring to every lesser state a substantive vote at the meetings of the confederacy'. Moreover the rivalry of Tegea would probably operate here as an auxiliary motive against Mantineia. Under such apprehensions, the Mantineians hastened to court the alliance and protection of Argos, with whom they enjoyed the additional sympathy of a common democracy. Such revolt from Sparta (for so it was considered) excited great sensation throughout Peloponnesus, together with considerable disposition, amidst the discontent then prevalent, to follow the example.
In particular, it contributed much to enhance the importance of the congress at Corinth; whither the monian en- Lacedæmonians thought it necessary to send special
Remonstrances of Lacedæ
voys at the
congress at Corinthre-defence of the Co
envoys to counteract the intrigues going on against them. Their envoy addressed to the Corinthians rinthians strenuous remonstrance, and even reproach, for the
pretence of religious scruple.
leading part which they had taken in stirring up
1 Thucyd. i. 125.
2 Thucyd. v. 29. ̓Αποστάντων δὲ τῶν Μαντινέων, καὶ ἡ ἄλλη Πελοπόννησος ἐς θροῦν καθίστατο ὡς καὶ σφίσι ποιητέον τοῦτο, νομίζοντες πλέον τέ τι εἰδότας μεταστῆναι αὐτοὺς, καὶ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἅμα δι ̓ ὀργῆς ἔχοντες, &c.