It worked eminence before the eyes of Greece. so much the more powerfully because it was entirely the fruit of Lacedæmonian courage, with little aid from that peculiar skill and tactics, which was generally seen concomitant, but had in the present case been found comparatively wanting. The manœuvre of Agis, in itself not ill-conceived, for the purpose of extending his left wing, had failed through the disobedience of the two refractory polemarchs but in such a case the shame of failure falls more or less upon all parties concerned; nor could either general or soldiers be considered to have displayed at Mantineia any of that professional aptitude which caused the Lacedæmonians to be styled "artists in warlike affairs." So much the more conspicuously did Lacedæmonian courage stand out to view. After the left wing had been broken, and when the Argeian Thousand had penetrated into the vacant space between the left and centre, so that they might have taken the centre in flank, and ought to have done so had they been well-advised-the troops in the centre, instead of being daunted as most Grecian soldiers would have been, had marched forward against the enemies in their front, and gained a complete victory. The consequences of the battle were thus immense in re-establishing the reputation of the Lacedæmonians, and in exalting them again to their ancient dignity of chiefs of Peloponnesus'. We are not surprised to hear that the two polemarchs, Aristoklês and Hipponoidas, whose dis 1 Thucyd. v. 75. Καὶ τὴν ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων τοτε ἐπιφερομένην αἰτίαν ἔς τε μαλακίαν διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ νήσῳ ξυμφορὰν, καὶ ἐς τὴν ἄλλην ἀβουλίαν τε καὶ βραδυτῆτα, ἑνὶ ἔργῳ τούτῳ ἀπελύσαντο· τύχῃ μὲν, ὡς ἐδόκουν, κακιζόμενοι, γνώμῃ δὲ, οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεὶ ὄντες. Operations of Argeians, obedience had well-nigh caused the ruin of the army, were tried and condemned to banishment as cowards on their return to Sparta'. Looking at the battle from the point of view of the other side, we may remark, that the defeat was Epidaurus. greatly occasioned by the selfish caprice of the Eleians in withdrawing their 3000 men immediately before the battle, because the other allies, instead of marching against Lepreum, preferred to attempt the far more important town of Tegea: an additional illustration of the remark of Periklês at the beginning of the war, that numerous and equal allies could never be kept in harmonious co-operation2. Shortly after the defeat, the 3000 Eleians came back to the aid of Mantineia-probably regretting their previous untoward departure-together with a reinforcement of 1000 Athenians. Moreover, the Karneian month began-a season which the Lacedæmonians kept rigidly holy; even despatching messengers to countermand their extra-Peloponnesian allies, whom they had invoked prior to the late battle and remaining themselves within their own territory, so that the field was for the moment left clear for the operations of a defeated enemy. Accordingly, the Epidaurians, though they had made an inroad into the territory of Argos during the absence of the Argeian main force at the time of the late battle, and had gained a partial successnow found their own territory overrun by the united Eleians, Mantineians, and Athenians, who were bold enough even to commence a wall of circumvallation round the town of Epidaurus itself. The entire work was distributed between them to be Thucyd. v. 72. * Thucyd. i. 141. Thucyd. v. 75. 1 3 : accomplished but the superior activity and perseverance of the Athenians were here displayed in a conspicuous manner. For while the portion of work committed to them (the fortification of the cape on which the Heræum or temple of Hêrê was situated) was indefatigably prosecuted and speedily brought to completion-their allies, both Eleians and Mantineians, abandoned the tasks respectively allotted to them, in impatience and disgust. The idea of circumvallation being for this reason relinquished, a joint garrison was left in the new fort at Cape Heræum, after which the allies evacuated the Epidaurian territory1. So far the Lacedæmonians appeared to have derived little positive benefit from their late victory: but the fruits of it were soon manifested in the very centre of their enemy's force-at Argos. A material change had taken place since the battle in the political tendencies of that city. There had been within it always an opposition party-philo-Laconian and anti-democratical: and the effect of the defeat of Mantineia had been to strengthen this party as much as it depressed their opponents. The democratical leaders-who, in conjunction with Athens and Alkibiadês, had aspired to maintain an ascendency in Peloponnesus hostile and equal, if not superior, to Sparta-now found their calculations overthrown and exchanged for the discouraging necessities of self-defence against a victorious enemy. And while these leaders thus lost general influence by so complete a defeat of their foreign policy, the ordinary democratical soldiers 1 Thucyd. v. 75. Political change at of the arising out battle of Mantineia. of Argos brought back with them from the field of Mantineia, nothing but humiliation and terror of the Lacedæmonian arms. But the chosen Argeian Thousand-regiment returned with very different feelings. Victorious over the left wing of their enemies, they had not been seriously obstructed in their retreat even by the Lacedæmonian centre. They had thus reaped positive glory', and doubtless felt contempt for their beaten fellow-citizens. Now it has been already mentioned that these Thousand were men of rich families, and the best military age, set apart by the Argeian democracy to receive permanent training at the public expense, just at a time when the ambitious views of Argos first began to dawn, after the peace of Nikias. long as Argos was likely to become or continue the imperial state of Peloponnesus, these Thousand wealthy men would probably find their dignity sufficiently consulted in upholding her as such, and would thus acquiesce in the democratical governBut when the defeat of Mantineia reduced Argos to her own limits, and threw her upon the defensive, there was nothing to counterbalance their natural oligarchical sentiments, so that they became decided opponents of the democratical government in its distress. The oligarchical party in Argos, thus encouraged and reinforced, entered into a con ment. So 1 Aristotle (Politic. v. 4, 9) expressly notices the credit gained by the oligarchical force of Argos in the battle of Mantineia, as one main cause of the subsequent revolution-notwithstanding that the Argeians generally were beaten—Οἱ γνώριμοι εὐδοκιμήσαντες ἐν Μαντινείᾳ, &c. An example of contempt entertained by victorious troops over defeated fellow-countrymen, is mentioned by Xenophon in the Athenian army under Alkibiadês and Thrasyllus, in one of the later years of the Peloponnesian war: see Xenophon, Hellen. i. 2. 15-17. spiracy with the Lacedæmonians to bring the city into alliance with Sparta as well as to overthrow the democracy'. as cal conspiracy of the Thousand regiment at Argos, in concert with the Lacedæmo As the first step towards the execution of this Oligarchischeme, the Lacedæmonians, about the end of September, marched out their full forces as far Tegea, thus threatening invasion, and inspiring terror at Argos. From Tegea they sent forward as envoy Lichas, proxenus of the Argeians at Sparta, nians. with two alternative propositions: one for peace, which he was instructed to tender and prevail upon the Argeians to accept, if he could; another, in case they refused, of a menacing character. It was the scheme of the oligarchical faction first to bring the city into alliance with Lacedæmon and dissolve the connection with Athens, before they attempted any innovation in the government. The arrival of Lichas was the signal for them to manifest themselves by strenuously pressing the acceptance of his pacific proposition. But they had to contend against a strong resistance; since Alkibiadês, still in Argos, employed his utmost energy to defeat their views. Nothing but the presence of the Lacedæmonian army at Tegea, and the general despondency of the people, at length enabled them to carry their point, and to procure acceptance of the proposed treaty; which, being already adopted by the Ekklesia at Sparta, was sent ready prepared to Argos,-and there sanctioned without alteration. The conditions were substantially as follows: "The Argeians shall restore the boys whom they have received as hostages from Orchomenus, and 1 Thucyd. v. 76; Diodor. xii. 80. |