Complete ultimate victory of the Lacedæmonians.

their Lochi on the extreme right of the line, to move to the rear and take post on the right of the Brasideians, so as again to close up the line. But these two polemarchs, who had the safest and most victorious place in the line, chose to keep it, disobeying his express orders: so that Agis, when he saw that they did not move, was forced to send a second order countermanding the flank movement of the Skiritæ, and directing them to fall in upon the centre, back into their former place. But it had now become too late to execute this second command before the hostile armies closed: and the Skiritæ and Brasideians were thus assailed while in disorder and cut off from their own centre. The Mantineians, finding them in this condition, defeated and drove them back; while the chosen Thousand of Argos, breaking in by the vacant space between the Brasideians and the Lacedæmonian centre, took them on the right flank and completed their discomfiture. They were routed and pursued even to the Lacedæmonian baggage-waggons in the rear; some of the elder troops who guarded the waggons being slain, and the whole Lacedæmonian left wing altogether dispersed.

But the victorious Mantineians and their comrades, thinking only of what was immediately before them, wasted thus a precious time when their aid was urgently needed elsewhere. Matters passed very differently on the Lacedæmonian centre and right; where Agis, with his body-guard of 300 chosen youths called Hippeis, and with the Spartan Lochi, found himself in front conflict with the centre and left of the enemy ;-with the Argeians, their

elderly troops and the so-called Five Lochi-with the Kleonæans and Orneates, dependent allies of Argos-and with the Athenians. Over all these troops they were completely victorious, after a short resistance-indeed on some points with no resistance at all. So formidable was the aspect and name of the Lacedæmonians, that the opposing troops gave way without crossing spears, and even with a panic so headlong, that they trod down each other in anxiety to escape'. While thus defeated in front,

1 Thucyd. v. 72. (Οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι τοὺς ̓Αργείους) Ετρεψαν, οὐδὲ ἐς χεῖρας τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑπομείναντας, ἀλλ ̓, ὡς ἐπῄεσαν οἱ Λακεδαιμόνιοι, εὐθὺς ἐνδόντας, καὶ ἐστὶν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας, τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατάληψιν.

The last words of this sentence present a difficulty which has perplexed all the commentators, and which none of them have yet satisfactorily cleared up.

They all admit that the expressions, Toû, тoù μǹ, preceding the infinitive mood as here, signify design or purpose; čveka being understood. But none of them can construe the sentence satisfactorily with this meaning accordingly they here ascribe to the words a different and exceptional meaning. See the notes of Poppo, Göller, and Dr. Arnold, in which notes the views of other critics are cited and discussed.

Some say that τοῦ μὴ in this place means the same as ὥστε μή : others affirm, that it is identical with διὰ τὸ μὴ or with τῷ μή. Formula TOU, TOU μ (say Bauer and Göller), plerumque consilium significat: interdum effectum (i. e. ☎ore μý); hic causam indicat (i. e. dià тò μǹ, or Tμý).” But I agree with Dr. Arnold in thinking that the last of these three alleged meanings is wholly unauthorised; while the second (which is adopted by Dr. Arnold himself) is sustained only by feeble and dubious evidence for the passage of Thucydidês (ii. 4. Toû μǹ éкþeúуew) may be as well construed (as Poppo's note thereupon suggests) without any such supposed exceptional sense of the words.

Now it seems to me quite possible to construe the words roû μǹ φθῆναι here in their regular and legitimate sense of ἕνεκα τοῦ or consilium. But first an error must be cleared up which pervades the view of most of the commentators. They supposed that those Argeians, who are here affirmed to have been "trodden under foot," were so trodden down by the Lacedæmonians in their advance. But this is in every way improbable. The Lacedæmonians were particularly slow in their motions, regular in their ranks, and backward as to pursuit-qualities which are dwelt upon by Thucydidês in regard to this very battle. They were not all likely to overtake such terrified men as were only anxious to

they were taken in flank by the Tegeans and Lacedæmonians on the right of Agis's army, and the

run away: moreover, if they did overtake them, they would spear them, not trample them under foot.

To be trampled under foot, though possible enough from the numerous Persian cavalry (Herodot. vii. 173; Xenoph. Hellen. iii. 4, 12), is not the treatment which defeated soldiers meet with from victorious hostile infantry in the field, especially Lacedæmonian infantry. But it is precisely the treatment which they meet with, if they be in one of the hinder ranks, from their own panic-stricken comrades in the front rank, who find the enemy closing upon them, and rush back madly to get away from him. Of course it was the Argeians in the front rank who were seized with the most violent panic, and who thus fell back upon their own comrades in the rear ranks, overthrowing and treading them down to secure their own escape. It seems quite plain that it was the Argeians in front (not the Lacedæmonians) who trod down their comrades in the rear (there were probably six or eight men in every file) in order to escape themselves before the Lacedæmonians should be upon them: compare Xenophon, Hellenic. iv. 4, 11; Economic, viii. 5.

There are therefore in the whole scene which Thucydidês describes, three distinct subjects-1. The Lacedaemonians. 2. The Argeian soldiers who were trodden down. 3. Other Argeian soldiers who trod them down in order to get away themselves.-Out of these three he only specifies the first two; but the third is present to his mind, and is implied in his narrative just as much as if he had written καταπατηθέντας ὑπ' ἄλλων, οι ὑπ' ἀλλήλων, as in Xenoph. Hellen, iv. 4, 11.

Now it is to this third subject, implied in the narrative but not formally specified (i. e. those Argeians who trod down their comrades in order to get away themselves)—or rather to the second and third conjointly and confusedly-that the design or purpose (consilium) in the words τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι refers.

Farther, the commentators all construe τοῦ μὴ φθῆναι τὴν ἐγκατά ληψιν, as if the last word were an accusative case coming after φθῆναι and governed by it. But there is also another construction, equally good Greek, and much better for the sense. In my judgment, T ἐγκατάληψιν is here the accusative case coming before φθῆναι and forming the subject of it. The words will thus read (éveka) toû tǹv éykaráληψιν μὴ φθῆναι (ἐπελθοῦσαν αὐτοῖς) in order that the actual grasp of the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in coming upon them" -"might not come upon them too soon," i. e. "sooner than they could get away." And since the word eykarádnyis is an abstract active substantive, so, in order to get at the real meaning here, we may substitute the concrete words with which it correlates-i. e, τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους éуKaraλaßóvTas-subject as well as attribute-for the active participle is here essentially involved.

The sentence would then read, supposing the ellipsis filled up and the

Athenians here incurred serious hazard of being all cut to pieces, had they not been effectively aided by their own cavalry close at hand. Moreover Agis, having decidedly beaten and driven them back, was less anxious to pursue them than to return to the rescue of his own defeated left wing; so that even the Athenians, who were exposed both in flank and front, were enabled to effect their retreat in safety. The Mantineians and the Argeian Thousand, though victorious on their part of the line, yet seeing the remainder of their army in disorderly flight, had little disposition to renew the combat against Agis and the conquering Lacedæmonians. They sought only to effect their retreat, which however could not be done without severe loss, especially on the part of the Mantineians— and which Agis might have prevented altogether, had not the Lacedæmonian system, enforced on this occasion by the counsels of an ancient Spartan named Pharax, enjoined abstinence from prolonged pursuit against a defeated enemy'.

meaning expressed in full and concrete words-ἔστιν οὓς καὶ καταπατηθέντας ὑπ' ἀλλήλων φευγόντων (or βιαζομένων), ἕνεκα τοῦ τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους μὴ φθῆναι ἐγκαταλαβόντας αὐτοὺς τοὺς φεύγοντας) : “ As soon as the Lacedæmonians approached near, the Argeians gave way at once, without staying for hand-combat; and some were even trodden down by each other, or by their own comrades running away in order that the Lacedæmonians might not be beforehand in catching them sooner than they could escape."

Construing in this way the sentence as it now stands, we have Toû nova used in its regular and legitimate sense of purpose or consilium. We have moreover a plain and natural state of facts, in full keeping with the general narrative. Nor is there any violence put upon the words. Nothing more is done than to expand a very elliptical sentence, and to fill up that entire sentence which was present to the writer's own mind. To do this properly is the chief duty, as well as the chief difficulty, of an expositor of Thucydidês.

1 1 Thucyd. v. 73; Diodor. xii. 79.

Great effects of

There fell in this battle 700 men of the Argeians, Kleonæans, and Orneates; 200 Athenians, together with both the generals Lachês and Nikostratus ; and 200 Mantineians. The loss of the Lacedæmonians, though never certainly known, from the habitual secrecy of their public proceedings, was estimated at about 300 men. They stripped the enemy's dead, spreading out to view the arms thus acquired, and selecting some for a trophy; then picked up their own dead and carried them away for burial at Tegea, granting the customary burial-truce to the defeated enemy. Pleistoanax, the other Spartan king, had advanced as far as Tegea with a reinforcement composed of the elder and younger citizens; but on hearing of the victory, he returned home'. Such was the important battle of Mantineia, the victory fought in the month of June 418 B.C. Its effect in re-esta throughout Greece was prodigious. The numbers engaged on both sides were very considerable for a Grecian army of that day, though seemingly not so large as at the battle of Delium five years before : the number and grandeur of the states whose troops were engaged was however greater than at Delium. But what gave peculiar value to the battle was, that it wiped off at once the pre-existing stain upon the honour of Sparta. The disaster in Sphakteria, disappointing all previous expectation, had drawn upon her the imputation of something like cowardice; and there were other proceedings which, with far better reason, caused her to be stigmatised as stupid and backward. But the victory of Mantineia silenced all such disparaging criticism, and replaced Sparta in her old position of military pre1 1 Thucyd. v. 73.

blishing the

reputation

of Sparta.