Beyond PhysicalismUnlike standard attempts to address the so-called 'hard problem' of consciousness, which assume our understanding of consciousness is unproblematic, this book begins by focusing on phenomenology and is devoted to clarifying the relations between intentionality, propositional content and experience. In particular, it argues that the subjectivity of experience cannot be understood in representationalist terms. This is important, for it is because many philosophers fail to come to terms with subjectivity that they are at a loss to provide a convincing solution to the mind-body problem. In this light the metaphysical problem is revealed to be a product of the misguided attempt to incorporate consciousness within an object-based schema, inspired by physicalism. A similar problem arises in the interpretation of quantum mechanics and this gives us further reason to look beyond physicalism, in matters metaphysical. Thus the virtues of absolute idealism are re-examined, as are the wider consequences of adopting its understanding of truth within the philosophy of science.This book complements the arguments and investigations of "The Presence of Mind," which it partners. (Series A) |
Contents
INTRODUCTION | 1 |
CHAPTER ONE Nonconceptual Experience | 12 |
CHAPTER TWO From a Sensational Point of View | 47 |
CHAPTER THREE The Failure of Explanatory Physicalism | 72 |
CHAPTER FOUR Intelligibility and Conceptual Limits | 110 |
CHAPTER FIVE Pluralistic Naturalism and Absolute Idealism | 138 |
CHAPTER SIX Defending Absolute Idealism | 164 |
CHAPTER SEVEN Truth and the Whole Truth | 187 |
Notes | 218 |
References | 238 |
Index | 267 |
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Common terms and phrases
absolute idealism abstract analytic philosophy appear argued behaviour biosemantic Blackwell Bradley Bradley's brain Cambridge University Press causal Chalmers chapter characterised Churchland claim Cognitive Science colour concepts concerned conscious experience Davidson Dennett Descartes Donald Davidson Dretske dualism endorse entities example explain explanatory F.H. Bradley fact Flanagan functional functionalists Hutto idea identity theory images informational sensitivity interpretation judgements kind Kitcher language logical Lycan Mander McGinn McHenry mental metaphysical metaphysical problem Mind multiple realisability naturalistic nature non-reductive nonconceptual experience notion object-based schema objects ontological Papineau perception phenomena philosophy of mind Philosophy of Science physical physicalist possible properties psychological psychophysical psychophysical identity Putnam qualia quantum question realism reality reason recognise reduction relations representational Rorty scientific Scientific Realism Searle sense simply simulation substance dualism Supervenience talk theory of consciousness thesis things thought true truth understanding Wittgenstein writes zombies
