one fort or other, provided only a fit object for defire be fuggefted. This is remarkably the cafe of emotions raised by human actions and qualities. A virtuous action raiseth in every fpectator a pleasant emotion, which is generally attended with a defire to do good to the author of the action. A vicious action, on the other hand, produceth a painful emotion; and of confequence a defire to have the author punished. Even things inanimate often raise defire. The goods of fortune are objects of defire almost univerfally; and the defire, when more than commonly vigorous, obtains the name of avarice. The pleasant emotion produced in a spectator by a capital picture in the poffeffion of a prince, feldom raifeth defire. But if fuch a picture be expofed to fale, defire of having or poffeffing is the natural confequence of the emotion.

If now an emotion be fometimes productive of defire, fomtimes not, it comes to be a material inquiry, in what respect a paffion differs from an emotion. Is paffion in its nature or feeling diftinguishable from emotion? I have been apt to think that

there

there must be a diftinction, when the emotion feems in all cafes to precede the paffion, and to be the cause or occafion of it. But after the ftricteft examination, I cannot perceive any fuch distinction betwixt emotion and paffion. What is love to a mistress, for example, but a pleasant emotion raised by a fight or idea of the person beloved, joined with defire of enjoyment? In what else confifts the paffion of refentment, but in a painful emotion occafioned by the injury, accompanied with defire to chastise the author of the injury? In general, as to every fort of paffion, we find no more in the compofition, but the particulars now mentioned, an emotion pleasant or painful accompanied with defire. What then shall we say upon this fubject? Are passion and emotion fynonymous terms? This cannot be averred. No feeling nor agitation of the mind void of defire, is termed a paffion; and we have difcovered that there are many emotions which pafs away without raifing defire of any kind. How is the difficulty to be folved? There appears to me but one folution, which I relifh the more,

as

as it renders the doctrine of the paffions and emotions fimple and perfpicuous. The folution follows. An internal motion or agitation of the mind, when it passeth away without raifing defire, is denominated an emotion: when defire is raised, the motion or agitation is denominated a paffion. A fine face, for example, raifeth in me a pleasant feeling. If this feeling vanish without producing any effect, it is in proper language an emotion. But if fuch feeling, by reiterated views of the object, become fufficiently strong to raise defire, it is no longer termed an emotion, but a paffion. The fame holds in all the other paffions. The painful feeling raised in a spectator by a flight injury done to a stranger, being accompanied with no defire of revenge, is termed an emotion. But this injury raiseth in the ftranger a ftronger emotion, which being accompanied with defire of revenge, is a paffion. Again, external expreffions of diftrefs, produce in the fpectator a painful feeling. This feeling is fometimes fo flight as to pass away without any effect, in which cafe it is an emotion. But if the

feeling

feeling be so strong as to prompt defire of affording relief, it is a paffion, and is termed pity. Envy is emulation in excess. If the exaltation of a competitor be barely difagreeable, the painful feeling is reckoned an emotion. If it produce defire to depress him, it is reckoned a paffion.

To prevent mistakes, it must be observed, that defire here is taken in its proper fenfe, viz. that internal impulse which makes us proceed to action. Defire in a lax fense respects also actions and events that depend not on us, as when I defire that my friend may have a fon to represent him, or that my country may flourish in arts and sciences. But fuch internal act is more properly termed a wish than a defire.

Having distinguished paffion from emotion, we proceed to confider paffion more at large, with refpect especially to its power of producing action.

We have daily and conftant experience for our authority, that no man ever proceeds to action but through the impulse of fome antecedent defire. So well established is this obfervation, and fo deeply rooted in

the

the mind, that we can scarce imagine a different fyftem of action. Even a child. will fay familiarly, What should make me do this or that when I have no inclination to it? Taking it then for granted, that the existence of action depends on antecedent defire; it follows, that where there is no defire there can be no action. This opens another fhining diftinction betwixt emotions and paffions. The former, being without defire, are in their nature quiefcent: the latter, involving defire, have a tendency to action, and always produce action where they meet with no obftruction.

Hence it follows, that every paffion must have an object, viz. that being or thing to which our defire is directed, and with a view to which every action prompted by that defire is performed. The object of every paffion is that being or thing which produced it. This will be evident from induction. A fine woman, by her beauty, caufes in me the paffion of love, which is directed upon her as its object. A man by injuring me, raises my refentment; and becomes thereby the object of

my refent

ment.