without fo much as the appearance of regu larity; and a chain of mountains still more agreeable, without being arranged in any order. But these facts confidered in a proper light, afford not an objection. Regularity, order, and uniformity, are intimately connected with beauty; and in this view only, have I treated them. Every regular object, for example, muft in respect of its regularity be beautiful. But I have not faid, that regularity, order, and uniformity, are effential to beauty, fo as that it cannot exist without them. The contrary appears in the beauty of colour. Far lefs have I faid, that an object cannot be agreeable in any refpect independent of thefe qualities. Grandeur, as diftinguished from beauty, requires very little regularity. This will appear more fully when that article is handled. In the mean time, to fhow the difference betwixt beauty and grandeur with respect to regularity, I fhall give a few examples. Imagine a small body, let it be a globe, in a continual flux of figure, from the most perfect regularity till there remain no appearance of that quality. The beauty of this globe, depending

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depending on its regular figure, will gra dually wear away with its regularity; and when it is no longer regular, it no longer will appear beautiful. The next example fhall be of the fame globe, gradually enlar ging its fize, but retaining its figure, In this body, we at first perceive the beauty of regularity only. But fo foon as it begins to fwell into a great fize, it appears agreeable by its greatness, which joins with the beau ty of regularity to make it a delightful object. In the laft place, let it be imagined, that the figure as well as the quantity of matter are in a continual flux ; and that the body, while it increases in fize, becomes lefs and lefs regular, till it lofe altogether the appear ance of that quality. In this cafe, the beauty of regularity wearing off gradually, gives place to an agreeablenefs of a different fort, viz. that of greatnefs: and at laft the emotion arifing from greatnefs will be in perfection, when the beauty of regularity is gone. Hence it is, that in a large object the want of regularity is not much regarded by the spectator who is ftruck with its grandeur. Afwelling eminence is agreeable, though not strictly

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regular. A towering hill is delightful, if it have but any diftant refemblance of a cone. A fmall furface ought to be smooth; but in a wide-extended plain, confiderable inequalities are overlooked. This obfervation holds equally in works of art. The flighteft irregularity in a house of a moderate fize hurts the eye; while the mind, ftruck with the grandeur of a fuperb edifice, which occupies it totally, cannot bear to defcend to its irregularities unless extremely grofs. In a large volume we pardon many defects that would make an epigram intolerable. In fhort, the observation holds in general, that beauty is connected with regularity in great objects as well as in fmall; but with a remarkable difference, that in paffing from fmall to great, regularity is lefs and lefs required.

The distinction betwixt primary and fecondary qualities in matter, seems now fully established. Heat and cold, though seeming to exift in bodies, are difcovered to be effects caused by thele bodies in a fenfitive being. Colour, which the eye reprefents as fpread upon a fubftance, has no exKk 2 istence

istence but in the mind of the fpectator. Perceptions of this kind, which, by a delufion of fenfe, are attributed to external fubjects, are termed fecondary qualities, in contradistinction to figure, extension, folidity, which are primary qualities, and which are not feparable, even in imagination, from the subjects they belong to. This fuggefts a curious inquiry, Whether beauty be a primary or only a fecondary quality of objects? The queftion is easily determined with respect to the beauty of colour; for if colour be a fecondary quality existing no where but in the mind of the fpectator, its beauty must be of the fame kind. This conclufion must also hold with refpect to the beauty of utility, which is plainly a conception of the mind, arifing not merely from fight, but from reflecting that the thing is fitted for fome good end or purpose. The question is more intricate with respect to the beauty of regularity. If regularity be a primary quality, why not alfo its beauty? That this is not a good confequence, will appear from confidering, that beauty, in its very conception, refers to a percipient; for

an

an object is faid to be beautiful, for no other reason but that it appears fo to a fpectator. The fame piece of matter which to man appears beautiful, may poffibly to another being appear ugly. Beauty therefore, which for its exiftence depends upon the percipient as much as upon the object perceived, cannot be an inherent property of either. What elfe then can it be, but a perception in the mind occafioned by certain objects ? The fame reasoning is applicable to the beauty of order, of uniformity, of grandeur. Accordingly, it may be pronounced in general, that beauty in no cafe whatever is a real quality of matter. And hence it is wittily obferved by the poet, that beauty is not in the countenance, but in the lover's eye. This reafoning is undoubtedly folid: and the only cause of doubt or hesitation is, that we are taught a different leffon by fenfe. By a fingular determination of nature, we perceive both beauty and colour as belonging to the object; and, like figure or extenfion, as inherent properties. This mechanism is uncommon; and when nature, to fulfil her intention, chuseth any fingular