THE ESSENTIAL IDEA OF SACRIFICE 313 Action rather than words, it is argued, is what is to be expected of primitive life; and this act was sacrifice. So, e.g., F. D. Maurice. See his Theological Essays and his Doctrine of Sacrifice deduced from the Scriptures. This view differs not very greatly from another one, that sacrifice or offering was of the nature of a gift to please the deity, and so obtain from him what was desired, whether it was the pacification of his anger and the cessation of calamities, or success in the struggle with enemies, or, in a higher stage of thought, the joy of fellowship with him, and the sense of being pleasing in his sight. These views all move more or less on ethical lines. Quite a different view has been advocated by Professors Robertson Smith and Wellhausen.1 In the view of these scholars the essential idea of sacrifice is to be observed in the sacrificial meal-the communion of the deity and man in a common sacramental food. The god and the tribe were one; or, if the god was estranged, it was only a temporary estrangement. The idea that a common partaking of food united in a bond of friendship or covenant those who so partook, was a usual one. The idea was transferred to the sphere of Divine and human relations. The common sacrificial meal, as it cemented the union of men with men, cemented also the union of the deity and men; or if the union had been partially or temporarily strained, -it could never be more, for the god was one with the tribe, it restored it. The participants on the human side, by eating food in common, confirmed their union one with another; and by giving the god part of the sacrifice, e.g. smearing the blood on stones which he inhabited, and which more lately developed into an altar, they allowed him also to participate, and so cemented his union with them. He was thus one with them, their help and stay in all the vicissitudes of their life. As thought advanced, this action carried moral meaning with it; although originally the idea was more that of a physical union, 1 See the Skizzen und Vorarbeiten of the latter, and The Religion of the Semites of the former.-ED. the common material food binding all who partook of it into one physical body. A fragment of this primitive theory is supposed still to be seen in the Hebrew sacrificial meal after offering to the God. It is doubtful if this construction of the meaning of the sacrificial meal anywhere appears in the Old Testament; but it is common for a usage to maintain itself long after the original idea which it expressed has ceased to be connected with it. Those who maintain this theory have considerable difficulty in explaining how this primitive idea gradually ramified into the conceptions connected with sacrifice which we find prevailing from the beginning of the historical period among the Hebrews. If sacrifice was a common sacramental meal between men and the god, how did such a sacrifice as the or by arise, the whole burnt-offering, which was wholly given to the deity, and of which men did not partake at all? The explanation is connected with the advance in social conditions, which suggested new ideas. In the earliest times, it was the tribe that had existence and owned property, it and the god in common. All sacrifices were tribal, cementing the union of the tribe and the rod. The individual had no property, no separate being or place. This was the condition in a nomad state. But when the people passed into an agricultural life he had something really his own, his land, his cattle. If he owed them to the god, still they were his in the sense that they did not belong to the tribe or the people. in personal relation to the deity. He was, so to speak, sacramental meal still prevailed, he could present his offering for himself. But naturally the idea would arise in his mind that he could now present a gift to his god, it might be out of thankfulness and in return for much that he had received, or it might be to placate the god's anger if he seemed estranged, or it might be for other reason. Sacrifice began to express the idea of a gift to God with the view of pleasing Him. DISTINCTIONS OF SINS 315 Whatever the historical evolution of the idea of sacrifice, or whatever its primary idea, it seems certain that this idea of a gift or offering to God is the prevailing idea in the Hebrew religion from the earliest. The sacrifices of Cain If there is dissidence and diversity of opinion between prophets and people, it is not on the general idea that an offering or service is pleasing to the Deity, but on what is the offering that is pleasing, these material offerings of flesh, or the service of the mind in obedience and righteousness. 3. Atonement and Forgiveness We may notice here a few points, particularly some distinctions, which it is useful to keep in mind, and which are helpful to the understanding of the Old Testament view on these subjects. (1) A distinction is drawn in the Old Testament, as we have seen, between sins of ignorance or inadvertence and sins done with a high hand or of purpose. The former are called chiefly, the latter are said to be done. The former class embraced more than mere involuntary or inadvertent sins. The class comprehended all sins done not in a spirit of rebellion against the law or ordinance of Jehovah-sins committed through human imperfection, or human ignorance, or human passion; sins done when the mind was directed to some end connected with human weakness or selfishness, but not formally opposed to the authority of the Lawgiver. The distinction. was thus primarily a distinction in regard to the state of mind of the transgressor. In point of fact, however, it was convenient to specify in general the offences that belonged to the class of sins done with a high hand, and upon the whole they were the sins forbidden by the moral law. No doubt, in certain circumstances even these sins, if committed involuntarily, were treated as sins of error, and the penalty due to them was averted by certain extraordinary arrangements; as for example, when a murder was committed by misadventure, the manslayer was allowed to flee to a city of refuge. Otherwise the consequence of his deed would overtake him in the ordinary penalty attached to such an offence, which was death. (2) Corresponding to this distinction among offences was another. Only sins of ignorance, as we have said, were capable of being atoned for by sacrifice. The class of offences said to be done with a high hand were capital, and followed by excision from the community. The sins of error or ignorance could be removed by sacrifice and offering. In other words, the Old Testament sacrificial system was a system of atonement only for the so-called sins of inadvertency. (3) This distinction may be put in other terms-in terms of the covenant. The sins done with a high hand threw those committing them outside the covenant relation. They were an infraction of the fundamental conditions of the covenant union. Such a sin as idolatry, homage to another deity than Jehovah, infringed the first principle of the covenant relation, the basis of which was that Jehovah was God of Israel. The sinner who had committed such an offence had withdrawn himself from the sphere within which Jehovah was gracious; there stood nothing between him and the anger of Jehovah for his sins, and especially for this the greatest possible sin. The sins of ignorance, on the other hand, were sins of human frailty, offences not amounting to an infraction of the very conditions of the covenant; but though disturbing to the relations between a God of holiness and His people, offences that were not immediately destructive of these relations, and permitting the relations to continue, provided they were removed by the means appointed by Jehovah for that purpose, and not voluntarily persevered in or neglected. And the sacrificial or Levitical ritual system was the means appointed for obviating the consequences of these inevitable offences. The sacrifices were thus offered to a God already in relations of grace with His people. They were not offered UNCLEANNESS AND ITS REMOVAL 317 in order to attain His grace, but to retain it-or to prevent the communion existing between Him and His people being disturbed or broken by the still inevitable imperfections of His people, whether as individuals or as a whole. It is argued by some that such a conception as this of a people in communion with their God, a communion only liable to be disturbed now by such mere offences of frailty, points to a period in the people's history posterior to the prophetic age, when idolatry and the gross offences assailed by the prophets no longer existed. It must be admitted at once that at no period of the people's history prior to the return from exile did the condition of the people and this idea embodied in the sacrificial system correspond in fact. But that would not at once entitle us to infer that the ideal itself was not of much greater antiquity. At all events the Old Testament sacrificial system belonged to the worship of the people of God, conceived as truly His people, believing in Him and in fellowship with Him. And it was a means of maintaining this fellowship, of equating and removing the disturbances which human frailties occasioned to this communion. Hence the prevailing conception of Jehovah in all the ordinances of the system is that of holiness-a purity as of light which human imperfections disturb, and which when disturbed reacts and becomes a fire that consumes. It cannot be denied that this idea of the Divine holiness in the law draws up into it not merely moral holiness, that is, freedom from and reaction against all moral evil, but also a considerable æsthetic element. The Divine holiness re-acts against much that is on man's side merely an uncleanness, and requires its removal by washings, before the fellowship can be maintained or renewed. A deeper study of these points, such as the uncleanness arising from touching the dead, the woman's uncleanness from childbirth, and much more, might reveal to us some moral conception underlying the ordinance. If the ritual system be late, this supposition would become more probable; if it were very early, we might even |