many positions. Wolfius, who is better known among us in his elegant abridger, Vattel, has more elaborately discussed the theory, with the improved lights of modern days. And Ward, in his unpretending, but exact Inquiry into the Foundation and History of the Law of Nations in Europe from the time of the Greeks and Romans to the age of Grotius, has afforded ample materials for illustration and profound reflection. Bynkershoeck is a writer of a very different cast; and in a clear, bold, and uncompromising manner, lays down his principles, as practical results, with a brevity and vigour, which give them almost the authority of a text-book. He is not, however, a mere apologist, or collector of usages; but he insists with an animated vehemence, that reason is the very soul of the law of nations. "Ratio ipsa (inquam) ratio juris gentium est anima."*

But I know not, if there be in existence any treatise on this subject, which in point of fulness and accuracy of principles, or copiousness of detail, is adapted to the exigencies of modern society, or is calculated in any moderate degree to satisfy the expectations of a scholar or a publicist. There is yet living a man, whose character as a philosophical moralist, enlightened statesman, and liberal jurist, commands universal respect, who taught us in his

*Bynker. Quest. Pub. Jur. ch. 2. Mr. Du Ponceau's Translation of this work is a most valuable present to the profession. Indeed, when one considers the liberal and acute spirit, which pervades all the juridical publications of Mr. Du Ponceau, it is matter of universal regret, that he has not exclusively devoted his life to the exposition of law, and particularly of the civil law.

+ Sir James Mackintosh.

early performances, that to his genius we might thereafter owe such an invaluable donation. But the lapse of thirty years, and the seductive influence of other studies lead us now to fear, that our hopes will end in disappointment. Such a treatise should embrace, among other things, a general view of the sovereignty, equality, and independence of nations; the rights of public domain, and territorial jurisdiction in rivers, bays, lakes, and streams, and the ocean; the intercourse of nations in times of peace, in respect to commerce and navigation; the immunities, and liabilities, and privileges of foreigners; the rights and duties of ambassadors and other ministers; the grounds of just war; the rights and duties of belligerents and neutrals, and the limits of just hostilities; the rights of conquest; the nature of piracy; the nature and effect of alliances, armistices, passports, and safe-conducts; and the negotiation, interpretation, and obligation of treaties of peace and other treaties. My object will be, in the discussion of these topics, to expound the general theory with as much conciseness, as the nature of the case will admit; and to devote my principal labour to the developement of those practical results, which are of perpetual application in the common business of life, and regulate the daily concerns of individuals and nations in peace and in war. For this For this purpose, I shall adventure far more, than has been usual with publicists, into an examination of those general principles of jurisprudence, which affect the contracts, govern the titles, and limit the remedies of the subjects of independent powers, who acquire rights, or

contract obligations, or succeed to property, or are in any measure subjected to the municipal law in a foreign country. This will include a variety of delicate and interesting topics belonging to the operation of foreign jurisprudence, or, as it is sometimes called, the lex fori et lex loci. Among these are the law of foreign domicil and expatriation; of foreign marriages, divorces, and crimes; of foreign testaments and successions ab intestato; of foreign grants and agreements; of foreign prescriptions, limitations, presumptions, discharges, and judgments; of foreign asylum to deserters and fugitives; and as incidental, the nature and extent of the jurisdiction exercised by courts of law in enforcing rights between foreigners, or giving effect to the municipal prohibitions of foreign countries. I shall also adventure upon an ample discussion of the law of prize, including therein the law of captures, and recaptures, and reprisal, the law of postliminy, and the law of contraband, and blockade, and illegal trade. And as a fit conclusion of such a discussion, I shall give a summary view of the practice and jurisprudence of those tribunals, emphatically called courts of the law of nations, which in every country are ordained to administer this important branch of public law. In England and America, this jurisdiction is vested in the courts of Admiralty. In this part of my labours I shall freely use the materials, which have been furnished by those distinguished civilians, who have from time to time adorned the English and American courts of Admiralty. And, above all, I shall endeavour to avail myself of those masterly judgments, full of wisdom, and learning, and captivating eloquence, which have

been pronounced within the last thirty years by a man,* to whom, in my deliberate opinion, the world is more indebted for a practical exposition of the law of nations, upon the eternal principles of justice and reason, than to all the jurists of all former ages.

In the next place, Equity Jurisprudence. . This is a very comprehensive head of our municipal law, and in its actual administration, probably embraces as great a variety and extent of learning, as the aggregate of all those, which now fall within the jurisdiction of the courts of common law, in the strict sense the terms. The jurisdiction in equity is sometimes concurrent with courts of common law, as in matters of account, partition, and dower; and sometimes it is exclusive and paramount. Its exclusive jurisdiction covers an immense mass of doctrines, relative to truths, frauds, mistakes, and accidents, and other cases, which the remedial justice of the common law courts cannot reach. It is a common, but groundless notion, that equity consists in the administration of a sort of discretionary justice; and is not, like the common law, built upon exact principles and settled rules; that it is a transcendental power, acting above the law, and superseding and annulling its operations, and resting in an undefined and arbitrary judgment, at best the arbitrium boni viri, rather than boni jurisconsulti. There is, therefore, among those, who have not cultivated it, as a science, a spectral dread of it, as if some unquiet spirit walked abroad to disturb the repose of titles, and revive forgotten and dormant claims. It is strange, that such a delusion should find countenance, even within the pale of the profes

* Lord Stowell (late Sir William Scott).

sion itself. There is not, at the present moment, a single department of the law, which is more completely fenced in by principle, or that is better limited by considerations of public convenience, both in doctrine and discipline, than equity. It is an intricate, but an exquisitely finished system, wrought up with infinite care, and almost uniformly rational and just in its conclusions. Indeed, that portion of the common law, which is now most admired for its sound policy, derives its principal attraction from its being founded in a large and liberal equity, and therefore is assumed as a rule equally at Paris and at London, at Rome and at Washington. If it would not occupy too much space in an introductory discourse, I might vindicate these assertions against every objection. But this is not the time, or the occasion.

In the next place, Commercial and Maritime Law. By commercial law, we are accustomed to understand those branches of jurisprudence, which regulate the operations of trade at home and abroad; and by maritime law, those, which concern navigation, shipments, commerce, and other transactions on the sea. In truth they are perpetually running into each other, as the streams of many rivers flow into the ocean, and form a part of its mass of waters, and are almost incapable of an absolute separation. There can be little need to descant upon the value and importance of this part of our jurisprudence. It is the golden chain, which connects the nations of the earth, and binds them together in the closest union. It comes home to every man's business and bosom, and is as captivating by the philosophy of its doctrines, as it is commendable for its sound morals, its flexible adap