ploy the diligence of a long life, without exhaustion or repetition. A course of lectures, therefore, which embraces them all, must necessarily treat them in a brief, summary, and imperfect manner. It must sug

gest matter for inquiry, rather than expound principles with copiousness. It must create, rather than satisfy curiosity. It must illustrate by examples, rather than exhaust by analysis. It must display the foundations, rather than the size or exact proportions of the edifice. It must, if I may venture upon such a metaphor, conduct the inquirer to the vestibule of the temple of jurisprudence; and leave to his future curiosity the survey of its magnificent halls, its decorated columns, its splendid porticos, its harmonized orders, its massive walls, its varied crypts, its lofty domes, its "ever-during gates, on golden hinges moving."

And first, the Law of Nature. This lies at the foundation of all other laws, and constitutes the first step in the science of jurisprudence. The law of nature is nothing more than those rules, which human reason deduces from the various relations of man; to form his character, and regulate his conduct, and thereby ensure his permanent happiness. It embraces a survey of his duties to God, his duties to himself, and his duties to his fellow men; deducing from those duties a corresponding obligation. It considers man, not merely in his private relations as a social being, but as a subject and magistrate, called upon to frame, administer, or obey laws, and owing allegiance to his country and government, and bound, from the protection he derives from the institutions of society, to uphold and protect them in return. It

is, therefore, in the largest sense, the philosophy of morals; what Justinian has defined justice to be, "constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi ;" or what may be denominated national jurisprudence, as expounded in the same authority; "divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, justi atque injusti scientia." With us, indeed, who form a part of the Christian community of nations, the law of nature has a higher sanction, as it stands supported and illustrated by revelation. Christianity, while with many minds it acquires authority from its coincidences with the law of nature, as deduced from reason, has added strength and dignity to the latter by its positive declarations. It goes farther. It unfolds our duties with far more clearness and perfection than had been known before its promulgation; and has given a commanding force to those of imperfect obligation. It relieves the mind from many harassing doubts and disquietudes, and imparts a blessed influence to the peaceful and benevolent virtues, to mercy, charity, humility, and gratitude. It seems to concentrate all morality in the simple precept of love to God and love to man. It points out the original equality of all mankind in the eyes of the Supreme Being, and brings down the monarch to the level of his subjects. It thus endeavours to check the arrogance of power, and the oppression of prerogative; and becomes the teacher, as well as the advocate of rational liberty. Above all, by unfolding in a more authoritative manner the doctrine of the immortality of the soul, it connects all the motives and actions of man in his present state with his future

interminable destiny. practice of virtue, by all, that can awaken hope, or secure happiness. It deters him from crimes by all, that can operate upon his fears, his sensibility, or his conscience. It teaches him, that the present life is but the dawn of being; and that in the endless progress of things the slightest movement here may communicate an impulse, which may be felt through eternity. Thus Christianity becomes, not merely an auxiliary, but a guide to the law of nature, establishing its conclusions, removing its doubts, and elevating its precepts.

It thus exhorts him to the

In this manner it is, that the law of nature involves a consideration of the nature, faculties, and responsibilities of man. From his intellectual powers, and the freedom of his will, it deduces his moral perceptions and accountability. From his love of happiness, as the end and aim of his being, it deduces the duty of preserving that happiness. From his dependence upon the Supreme Being, whose will has indissolubly connected virtue with happiness, it deduces the primary duty of obedience to that will. From these simple elements it proceeds to consider him in the various relations of life, in which he may be placed, and ascertains in each his obligations and duties. It considers him as a solitary being, as a member of a family, as a parent, and lastly as a member of the commonwealth.

The consideration of this last relation introduces us at once to the most interesting and important topics; the nature, objects, and end of government; the institution of marriage; the origin of the rights

of property; the nature and limits of social liberty; the structure of civil and political rights; the authority and policy of laws; and indeed all those institutions, which form the defence and the ornament of civilized society.*

Upon many of these topics, of which a very imperfect sketch can here be given, I shall speak with much brevity and reserve, for two reasons. In the first place, in the course of the academical instruction in this University already provided for, the subjects of ethics, natural law, and theology, are assigned to other professors. In the next place, in the elementary education, every where passed through, before entering upon juridical studies, they are usually taught with sufficient fulness and accuracy.

In the next place, the Law of Nations. By this we are to understand not merely that portion of public law, which is generally recognised among nations, as seems to have been the prevailing sense of the phrase in the Roman code; but that portion of public law, which regulates the intercourse, adjusts the rights, and forms the basis of the commercial and political relations of states with each other. Perhaps the most appropriate name would be, International Law, jus inter gentes. It has in this view been very correctly subdivided into three sorts; first, the natural or necessary law of nations, in which the principles of natural justice are applied to the inter

* Mr. Hoffman's Legal Outlines, of which the first volume only is yet published, contains some very interesting and valuable disquisitions upon several of the topics belonging to this branch of law. I trust the learned author will soon favour the public with the residue of his work.

course between states; secondly, the customary law of nations, which embodies those usages, which the continued habit of nations has sanctioned for their mutual interest and convenience; and, thirdly, the conventional or diplomatic law of nations, which embraces positive compacts by treaties and conventions between nations, and derives its sole obligation from the same sources as other contracts. Under this last head many regulations will now be found, which at first resulted from custom, or a general sense of justice, and are now made of positive obligation for the purpose of preventing national disputes and collisions.

Upon the general theory of the law of nations much has been written by authors of great ability and celebrity. At the head of the list stands that most extraordinary man, Grotius, whose treatise de Jure Belli et Pacis was the first great effort in modern times to reduce into any order the principles belonging to this branch of jurisprudence, by deducing them from the history and practice of nations, and the incidental opinions of philosophers, orators, and poets. His eulogy has been already pronounced in terms of high commendation, but so just and so true, that it were vain to follow, or add to his praise.* Puffendorf in a dry, didactic manner, has drawn out, in the language of the times, much to strengthen the conclusions of his master upon natural law; and the sagacity of Barbeyrac, in his luminous Commentaries, has cleared away many obscurities, and vindicated

* Sir James Mackintosh, in his Introductory Discourse.