THE URGENT NEEDS OF THE

VOLUNTEER FORCE.

IF

F no other national advantage comes from the recent sound "of the blast of war in our ears," public attention must now at least

be aroused to the urgent needs of the Volunteer Force.

Effort upon effort has been made to drive them home upon statesmen. But the bulwark of pettifogging economy-that policy of penny wise and pound foolish which is the curse of party government-has always been proof against every representation. Once alone, under the administration of Lord Beaconsfield, was it penetrated by the unanimous opinion of the whole Force. But although the requirements of the service were fully proved, dread of financial criticism prevented much being done of a solid character. Some half-dozen hardly earned and tardily conceded honorary distinctions were bestowed. The civil element, which was productive of much disorder, was brought within closer limits. A model set of rules was promulgated, and Volunteer corps were permitted to purchase their uniforms of the Army Clothing Department. But here ended the reforms.

It is true that of late closer affinity has been established between the Regular Army and the Reserve Forces. It is true that hearty encouragement has taken the place of official obstruction and professional ridicule. But how much is still wanting before the Army of the Nation is in a thoroughly efficient state has of late been conclusively demonstrated by General Sir Edward Hamley. The matter must not again be allowed to drop, and all true patriots will, in Parliament and out of Parliament, by speech and writing, insist that the Volunteer Force shall once for all be properly recognized, and rendered capable of discharging its self-imposed duty.

Has it no claim upon the gratitude of the country? There surely is no one so prejudiced who does not recognize in the face of the

armed millions of Europe, before which we now stand alone, that had it not been for this Force, conceived in threats of practicable invasion, born in patriotism, and grown in self-denying public service, the country would ere this have had to submit to a compulsory military system-call it conscription, or what you will.

Nor can we tell how far its moral effect-and it is great in the military councils of some nations-has kept us free from attack up to the present time. Its efficiency, moreover, is not rendered the less important by the rise of foreign navies, and the maritime development of neighbouring States.

Sir Edward Hamley tells us, and his authority is beyond dispute, that the southern coast is studded with wide spaces of beach, where large forces might be landed at once, and be readily supplied and reinforced from French, Belgian, and Dutch ports, distant but a few hours' steaming. Does the fireside critic exclaim that there is no fear from Belgium and Holland? It may be so to-day. But let me tell him that he little studies the movements which are going on against us in Europe and elsewhere. Sixty thousand men, if aided by a chain of forts, would, in the opinion of competent officers, be sufficient for the protection of London, at least from a coup de main. To-day neither the sixty thousand men are there, nor the forts, nor the guns. Great Britain has 214,000 Volunteers, besides 120,000 Militia; but its Government has no plan, nor indeed any idea, how it might be possible to employ them in a national emergency. Of what stuff the Volunteers are made, Egypt and the Soudan can speak. The extensive volunteering of whole regiments for any service the country may require, bears witness to the fact, that there are tens of thousands ready to follow the example of the Post Office and the North Country Engineer corps, even in a deadly climate and an inglorious cause.

Is there any one who, in the face of facts which are patent to the most ordinary observer, still asks in supercilious accents, of what use the Volunteers will be in time of danger? I will not attempt to argue with such a one; but let him be assured that from the 214,000 Volunteers of Great Britain, and the three-quarters of a million men still living who have passed through its ranks, an army, 200,000 strong, would be formed when the bugle sounded, which would know no equal in the annals of the world. This computation allows an ample, nay a vastly excessive, margin for rejection on the grounds of professional disability, physical unfitness, over-age, family responsibilities, and the calls of the several spheres of domestic life.

It is sometimes alleged that the Volunteers could never be really relied upon, because, if called out, the work of the country would stand still. It is necessary, however, to remember that if the Volunteers were absolutely required to repel a foreign foe, the paralysis of

all industry would come in the foremost van of an invasion, and there would be no difficulty in sparing any number of the men formerly employed at the then empty desk and in the then silent factory. Again, it is more than doubtful whether the mobilization of regiments, as they at present exist, would be at all possible or desirable. Their varying strength, the differing local conditions, the capacity of the officers, and the necessities of the hour, would all have to be considered. It is probable that the Volunteer Field Army would be composed of administrative battalions made up from various corps, and placed under very carefully selected officers. These administrative battalions work perfectly well at Aldershot and other camps, year after year, and no one who has served with them and seen the extraordinary rapidity with which the men adapt themselves to habits of rigid discipline and all the exigencies of military life, can ever doubt for an instant how sterling are the qualities of the majority of Volunteers, or what an unparalleled engine for defence they form.

Nor are their claims upon public recognition confined alone to freedom from the galling yoke of obligatory service which presses so hard upon the necks of the young men of every foreign nation, at the critical time when, launching forth on their career, they stand most in need of liberty. It extends even beyond the patriotic service they are rendering, and will render, whenever the occasion arises. It will be freely admitted that the Volunteer movement is far from being the least powerful of the factors in that moral development of the country in recent times which is evidenced by the extraordinary decrease of crime within the quarter of a century during which it has existed. Its influence upon individual industry and manly bearing is shown better than by words in the fact that such firms as Broadwoods, Shoolbreds, Trollopes, and Lamberts, and many others, not only go to great expense in promoting volunteering among their employés, but almost require all in their service to pass through the prescribed course of three years. They are no doubt largely actuated by patriotic motives, but as practical men of business they do not lose sight of the advantages a youth derives from training in habits of order and discipline, from change of work and scene, and from having before his eyes a worthy ambition exalting his whole nature. The feeling is shared by every father in the country who likes to know that his son is engaged in healthy exercise with fitting companions, instead of in the often vain struggle with the temptations of a great city, blighting the present and ruining the future.

Having thus set forth the position of the Volunteer Force in the body national, let me briefly enumerate its more pressing needs. I have studied them for over ten years, and while in command of two metropolitan regiments, the one composed principally of mechanics,

and the other mainly of business men and clerks. In 1878, I succeeded in bringing together a conference of officers from all parts of the country, which resulted in the committee before alluded to. The subject was considered fully in all its aspects; and if I adopt now the same plan, dividing it into distinct heads, it will be at once seen how much remains still to be done.

The principal defects are :

(1.) The absence of cavalry and field artillery.

(2.) The non-provision of great-coats and proper equipment.

(3.) The insufficiency of funds.

(4.) The difficulty of finding officers.

(5.) The absence of any civil advantages to a Volunteer.

(6.) The scarcity of drill-sheds.

(7.) The difficulty of finding space to drill.

(8.) The want of accessible ranges.

(1.) The absence of cavalry and field artillery.-In the whole Volunteer Force there are less than three hundred mounted men. It is true that there are about 8,000 Yeomanry, and it is probable that in any emergency an enormous number of horsemen would be forthcoming. But it is sufficiently serious to have all the 100,000 Militia and 160,000 Volunteer Infantry, accompanied by only so small a proportion of the mounted arm. The great difficulty in the way of establishing troops of mounted infantry in connection with existing regiments is the expense of horses, and it would no doubt be difficult to overcome it in a wholly satisfactory manner within moderate means. But at the same time some encouragement might well be given on this head in great centres like London, where there would be considerable facilities for training in riding schools and elsewhere. The same observation is applicable to the entire absence of field artillery, and considerable though the difficulties are, it appears desirable that they should not be accepted passively.

(2.) The non-provision of great-coats and proper equipment admits of no such excuse. Very few regiments at the present time are provided therewith, and even in their case the personal liability of the commanding officer has been severely taxed. It is absolutely wicked to take men away from sedentary employments, and expose them to the rigours of an early spring, without proper protection from the cold; and need it be said how absolutely impossible it would be for them to take the field under such conditions and unprovided with valises or knapsacks? Apologists have often averred that when the occasion arose the want could be readily supplied from the Government factories, but this has not been found practicable, even amid the exigencies of the Soudan campaign, which bear no proportion to those under which the country would suffer if invasion were probable.

(3.) The insufficiency of funds is only too painfully apparent to

any one having practical knowledge of Volunteer administration. The capitation grant of 30s. per annum for every efficient is barely sufficient to cover the expense of the Volunteer's review outfit—that is, his head-dress, tunic, belts, trousers, and leggings-provided he serves out the three years' agreement he usually enters into with the commanding officer, and becomes efficient in each of the years, or pays to the corps the amount lost by his laches. To the credit, however, of the Volunteer Force be it said that fully 97 per cent. either earn the grant, or forfeit the indemnity without recourse being had to legal proceedings. There is, however, some inevitable loss on the tailor's account alone. But money has to be found for the rent of headquarters and of ranges, for payments to permanent staff to supplement the insufficient Government allowance, for regimental transit expenses to reviews, the payment of musicians, and the provision of prizes of encouragement. The extra allowance of 50s. for proficient officers and sergeants goes a very small way towards the amount required, and the balance has to be provided by the corps.

(4.) It is not to be wondered at that with such a state of things there is great difficulty in finding officers, for not only have they to put their hands deep into their pockets, but they enjoy no reciprocal advantage. Even the titular rank to which they are entitled quite as much as officers of the Regular Army and Militia, their commissions being couched in precisely similar terms, is often unassumed from motives of delicacy, and equally often grudgingly withheld by military officers and the public. The deficiency of officers in the Volunteer Force is now becoming a more serious matter than ever, and there are few regiments, whose composition does not enable them to promote from the ranks, which have not many vacancies.

I have no doubt, however, that if the Government grant were raised to such an amount as would prevent the heavy calls on an often much strained purse, many retired officers and other very capable men would gladly give their services, which I cannot refrain from adding are of no light character, or confined to mere parade duties once a week, if real interest be taken in the welfare of regiments and companies. Indeed, I have long held the opinion that with the present eight candidates for every commission in the Army, an absolute condition might be made of Reserve service in some portion of the British Empire, whether England, Scotland, Canada, or India, if retirement from the Army ensued before the expiration of ten years.

(5.) It is strange to find that even America, the State perhaps most disposed to neglect naval and military preparations in the rush of her mercantile pursuits, her isolation from European troubles, and the varied tastes of her heterogeneous people, has distanced Great Britain in recognizing that those who voluntarily give up their time