THE PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSE OF

COMMONS.

IF

F the House of Commons, under the new constitution which is about to be given to the country, is to realize the expectation very generally entertained that it will do more efficient work than it has recently been able to perform-nay, if it is even to maintain the estimation in which it is at present held-some changes in the mode of conducting its debates and in its rules of procedure must unquestionably be made. Of late it has shown year by year less and less power to control its business, or to carry into effect the undoubted will of the majority of its members. The present Session of Parliament may no doubt be quoted against this assertion, and the Redistribution of Seats Bill may be adduced as an example of the power of the House to make satisfactory progress with a measure of the greatest magnitude and importance. But it must be remembered that this has been effected in pursuance of an agreement arrived at with the leaders of the Opposition in order to avert a serious danger which threatened the House of Lords. Though compacts such as this may in exceptional cases safely be made, they cannot be considered to be a satisfactory or constitutional mode of conducting the ordinary business of the legislature; and being as a rule founded upon an abandonment of principle by one or other of the contracting parties they could not fail, if often resorted to, to weaken the confidence of the public at large in the principle and honesty of public men. During the debates in committee on the Seats Bill the violence done to the feelings of many members of the Opposition by the adoption of the agreement between the leaders of the Government and those of the Opposition, by which alone the progress of the measure was secured, was on several occasions shown in a marked manner. Not only did they abstain from voting, but

they voted in opposition to their own leader when he was loyally carrying out the bargain by which he and, so far as party allegiance was concerned, his followers were bound. Upon one occasion indeed nearly all his usual followers who were present when the division was taken either left the House or voted against him, leaving him to walk into the Government lobby accompanied by only two faithful supporters. It was doubtless conduct such as this, and the open discontent manifested by numerous members of the Conservative party at a meeting at the Carlton Club, that called forth the somewhat bitter remark said to have been made by Lord Salisbury, that his malcontent followers "appeared to have short memories." Experience therefore seems to show that it is not only unsafe and unconstitutional to have frequent resort to such compromises for the conduct of public business, but it is also impracticable to do so, and this being the case, the very serious question now has to be dealt with-how, in presence of a more or less scrupulous English opposition and an extremely unscrupulous Irish opposition, is the business of the House of Commons to be carried on?

The causes which chiefly operate in preventing the due conduct of the business of the House may be said to be twofold-namely, disorderly and obstructive conduct on the part of members, and certain rules of the House which appear to be unsatisfactory.

In the Session of 1882 the disorderly conduct of certain members had become so intolerable, and the obstruction to the progress of business so determined and systematic, bringing the legislative work of the country almost to a standstill, that the House of Commons. adopted certain new rules, which, with some others passed in the two preceding years, would, it was hoped, check these abuses. The authority of the Speaker over the members of the House was strengthened and emphasized; a power of bringing debates to a close was taken; and some changes in the forms of procedure were made.

In some small degree these changes have been successful, but by no means to such an extent as to have answered the expectations of their framers. Further alterations are obviously still necessary in order to enable the House to carry on its work with the same regard to progress and to the conduct of debates as is insisted on in courts of justice, meetings of public companies, and all other public assemblies in the country, by what I may call the common law of meetings.

I speak of the new rules as having confirmed and emphasized the authority of the Speaker over members for the enforcement of order, rather than as having increased it; because, though in some respects they did increase it, yet the great and somewhat arbitrary power of the Speaker for this purpose had been previously recognized and

confirmed by divers special resolutions, and the new rules served rather to remind him of his responsibility for order and of his powers for maintaining it, and to assure him of the support of the House, than to invest him with any novel and distinct authority.

To show that this was the case, numerous instances might be adduced. I shall, however, only mention two.

In Hatsell's "Precedents," in the section treating of the duty of the Speaker in keeping order in the House, we find that on the 14th of April, 1604, it was held "that if any man speak impertinently, or beside the question in hand, it stands with the order of the House for the Speaker to interrupt him, and to know the pleasure of the House whether they will further hear him." Also, "on the 17th of April, 1604, agreed for a general rule, if any superfluous motion or tedious speech be offered in the House, the party is to be directed and ordered by Mr. Speaker." And again, on the 19th of April in the same year, it was "agreed for a rule of the House, qui digreditur a materia ad personam, the Speaker ought to suppress." Thus, by what I have called the common law of public meetings, and by express resolutions of the House, it would appear that the Speaker already possessed sufficient authority to enable him to repress disorderly conduct on the part of members. But whether such authority was sufficient or not, the new rules emphatically confirmed and added to it, especially in respect of the restraint of members disregarding his authority; and it may be confidently expected that under the able and vigorous administration of the present occupant of the chair the disorders which have of late years been so much on the increase will be kept within bounds. Should this expectation not be realized, however, some further measures will doubtless have to be adopted, probably by distinctly investing the Speaker with still more arbitrary power than he now has, and by visiting disorderly conduct on the part of members more promptly and severely than is now done.

The more arbitrary exercise of authority by the Speaker is objected to by many persons on the ground that it might possibly be attended with danger to freedom of debate; but though there is doubtless a possibility of such a result, it appears to be so remote as to be almost visionary, and to be of little moment as compared with that which is constantly caused to free, full and calm discussion by unchecked disorder, personal disputes and obstructive tactics. Those who have attended closely to the proceedings of Parliament will, I am sure, have observed that so far from being disposed arbitrarily to exercise their authority, the tendency of Speakers of the House of Commons is rather in the direction of hesitating avoidance than of arbitrary interference in cases in which the conduct of members is

concerned; and of late years especially there have been frequent instances where the want of a severe check on wanton interruption and deliberate insolence on the part of certain members has been generally felt and acknowledged.

The danger to the free and full discussion of measures does not, I think, so much arise from the possible interference of the Speaker in the maintenance of order as from their postponement by the various modes of obstruction from the early or middle part of the Session, when alone there is a possibility of their receiving full consideration, to the last few days or weeks of the Session, when they are either abandoned or passed after little or no consideration or debate, and often almost without notice. It is true that the abandonment of most of the Bills brought before Parliament is of little consequence, though some even of the most doubtful might with advantage have been submitted to the judgment of the House. But it generally happens that a few of these delayed measures, either from some urgent necessity or from a general demand, have to be passed before the prorogation of Parliament, and, like the rest, they have been put off from time to time; but now they must be pressed forward. The majority of members have left town; those who remain are eager to bring the Session to a close, and give but little attention to the details of the measures submitted to them; compromises of questionable clauses are arranged in the lobbies instead of after discussion in the House, and the Bills become law without that full consideration which, but for obstruction at the earlier period of the Session, they would certainly have received; and only too frequently they have to be reconsidered in some early succeeding Session of Parliament in the form of Amendment Bills.

One of the rules adopted by the House in 1882 which gave rise to the greatest opposition was that commonly known as the "Clôture," which, under certain circumstances and subject to certain extremely guarded conditions, gives to the House the power of peremptorily bringing debates to an end. That some such power might be necessary had been practically admitted by the House in the preceding year, when the then Speaker, now Lord Hampden, on his own authority assumed and exercised it. In this case on Monday, the 31st of January, 1881, the House met at its usual hour in the afternoon, and its sitting was continued without intermission till nine o'clock on the morning of Wednesday, the 2nd of February. The subject under discussion was "The Protection of Life and Property (Ireland) Bill," and long before the close it had become obvious to the House that the prolongation of the sitting, for it could hardly be termed a debate, could throw no new light on the question. The Speaker then interposed, and without allowing further debate, peremptorily called

a division, which was taken, and the sitting terminated. For his

action on this occasion the Speaker received the almost universal approval of the House and country.

When, however, the formal adoption of the "Clôture" was in the next year proposed as one of the new rules, it met with strenuous and determined opposition from the Conservative party, who denounced it as a serious constitutional innovation, and predicted that it would destroy or seriously imperil the freedom of debate. After long discussion it was carried by a majority of 46 in a House of 573 members. So far these predictions have failed, and though many occasions have since arisen when the general feeling of the House has undoubtedly been in favour of bringing debates which had become wearisome, and in which argument appeared to have been exhausted, to a peremptory close, there has been up to the present time only one attempt to enforce the rule. This was upon the 24th of February in the present year, when a proposal having been made by the Prime Minister that the notices of motion should be postponed till after the order of the day for resuming the adjourned debate on Egypt and the Soudan-a motion censuring the conduct of Government, which had been brought on by Sir Stafford Northcote-it was moved as an amendment by Mr. Arthur O'Connor to insert after the word "motions" the words except the motion relating to the Royal Irish Constabulary (District Inspector Murphy)." After debate upon the amendment Mr. Speaker informed the House that it appeared to him that the subject (Mr. O'Connor's amendment) had been adequately discussed, and that it was the evident sense of the House that the original question should be then put, and it was accordingly submitted to the House, and on division carried by 207 to 46. Had, however, four more members voted with the "Noes," raising the minority to 50, the motion would have been lost, and the time of the House taken up by the continuance of a discussion in which little or no general interest was felt. It would thus appear that the existing safeguards against the frequent or necessary application of the "Clôture" rule are so stringent as to render it very difficult to put in force, and that the rule is of but little practical value as a means of bringing unnecessary or unduly protracted debates to a conclusion. In the case above quoted the House was undoubtedly desirous of forthwith proceeding with the discussion of the vote of censure; the arguments for first proceeding with the question about Inspector Murphy had been exhausted; the Government, its supporters, the leader of the Opposition, and the greater part of his followers then present, voted for the enforcement of the rule enabling this to be done; but certain members of the Conservative party, including some members of the front Opposition bench, joined the extreme Irish party in opposing it, and, as has been shown, nearly succeeded in their object.