many natives might be excused for imagining that the knell of England in the East had sounded. On the other hand some of their troops were eminently loyal, and rendered service which, if not very effective in the field, was yet potent in the moral effect produced on native opinion throughout the country. Like the rest of their countrymen, they feel always a veneration, and often an affection, for their indigenous sovereigns. Thus a strong influence is brought to bear upon them, tending to keep them in the path of rectitude and to withdraw them from revolutionary temptations.

Ever since that time, on various occasions, some of these forces have volunteered, or their services have been proffered by the Native States to the British Government, for duty in the field. Several contingents were thus employed on the Trans-Indus frontier during the last Afghan War. Had it been desired, some of them would have been found ready to form part of the expedition which was despatched to Malta in 1878. The other day some of them volunteered to serve in Egypt. They are sure to volunteer if any operations are undertaken on the Afghan frontier. In no case has the Government asked for any of them, or even given the least hint to that effect. The truth is that the Native States like the distinction of serving the Empire; they justly consider that such service consolidates their position politically. Many of their men enjoy the prospect of seeing new things and fresh faces, and a cheery sentiment is diffused among them. The spirit thus arising spreads to British districts, and tends to raise the spirits of the people in the whole Indian Empire.

It will be said, no doubt, by those who contemplate the high figures shown above for the strength of these forces in the Native States, that this strength is much too high, that it even constitutes. a danger to the Empire. Indeed this apprehension has long been entertained by several Anglo-Indian statesmen. Manifestly the subject is a delicate one. On the one hand the British Government keeps a watchful eye on the strength of these troops of its allies and feudatories, and steadily strives to prevent their augmentation. Although here and there some increase may have occurred, there may have been counterbalancing decreases. On the whole, it may be said that while the present strength is too high, still it is not higher now than it has been even since the establishment of the Indian Empire, say since 1825. What, then, could the British Government do judiciously in this matter? approach the Native States with proposals for a reduction of their forces; such a measure would provoke very inconvenient misapprehensions, and no Anglo-Indian statesman or diplomatist would be found to recommend it. The Government can and does instruct its representatives at the Native Courts to press upon their respective

It could hardly

States the expediency of moderation in warlike armament and in military expenditure. In some cases also there are conventions limiting and specifying the armaments to be maintained by the Native States; and care is taken that these engagements are carried into effect. Possibly, as the Native States improve their administration, they may gradually and quietly dispense with the least organized of their forces, or rather convert these nominal soldiers into police or other civil establishments. Or perhaps they may limit recruiting; or, again, as they grow in prosperity, they may find the same difficulty which the British Government has found in obtaining men at the wage they can afford to give. But even if they wished to effect any reduction by discharging soldiers, they would hardly dare to attempt it. However familiar the term "discharge" may be to us British people, it is not only unfamiliar with natives but very unpopular. It is opposed to their ideas and traditions. The British Government has indeed discharged native soldiers and disbanded regiments repeatedly; but it never lulled itself into the belief that this occasionally necessary measure was popular; besides the British Government is systematic and resolute, which Native States are not. Indeed these States will never willingly essay anything like discharge or disbandment, and it might be dangerous for them to do so; for this might bring about some internal trouble with which they are not quite competent to cope. All this, though unavoidable, is to be regretted politically and economically; for the Native States do not actually need anything like all the forces they maintain, and the cost is a needless drain upon their finances. Though they have elements of internal trouble, still they are protected against all external danger by the aegis of the British Government.

On the whole, then, it would not be within the scope of practical politics to expect that any considerable diminution can at present take place in the military forces of the Native States. Having got them, we should, instead of vainly lamenting, endeavour to make the best of them. A little consideration will show that something advantageous may be made of them, and that they may in some degree be rendered valuable.

There can be no doubt that in the event of any serious complication in Central Asia, or Egypt, or the Levant, or elsewhere, we should be very short of Native Indian troops, if we wished to despatch any considerable number of them beyond the limits of British India. It has been seen above that any rapid augmentation of the regular Native army might be troublesome or inconvenient. But among the forces of the Native States, as just described, we have good and abundant material ready to hand. If it were desired to take over enough of them to make up a full army corps,-from

35,000 to 40,000 men, why that could be managed at once; and, according to the Asiatic type of troops, they would be capital men too. They would serve us with alacrity, while fully preserving their dutiful allegiance to their respective States. The measure would be popular in the Native States also. Such troops might either take part of the duty of the Native army in India-relieving that army so far, and releasing it for foreign service-or else might be sent abroad together with the British army; it would be best that they should see a little of both kinds of service. To employ 35,000 to 40,000 of these men would be a moderate step, and would amount to a real accession of strength. Doubtless, if another 35,000 men or more were needed, making up the total to 70,000 or 80,000 men, such a contingent could be obtained from the Native States. But then other considerations would at once enter into our calculations. The necessary proportion of European troops must be remembered. For to go on augmenting the native armaments without preserving the due proportion of European troops would be dangerous. Of all precautions needed for Imperial safety, none is so important as the preservation of this proportion.

If these auxiliary forces were engaged temporarily in the British service, there are several ways in which they might be employed. They might take the garrison duty at some of the stations in British India, especially at those stations where a part of the garrison is European. They might perform part of the watch and ward work on the Trans-Indus frontier and other frontiers. Particularly they might guard the long lines of our communications in the field or on a campaign, and this guardianship is a laborious but most essential operation, the value of which will be appreciated by all who have had to do with military transport. It would not be well, however, that they should be employed entirely in work which, though essential, is in some sense subsidiary. A part of them should proceed in company with the European troops to the very front of warfare. Let any one contemplate the contingency of our having to place a considerable European army in the field anywhere amidst Asiatic or North African regions, and say how convenient it would be to have an additional force of 35,000 or 70,000 Native troops, beside our own Native army, immediately available.

Here, then, is one military resource in India on which we have indeed a right to reckon, but on which we have not perhaps reckoned sufficiently. It remains to advert more particularly to the forces of some of the Native States. The troops of Sindhia are limited in number, but very well drilled and of fairly good material. Their discipline and organization would entitle them to be among the first selected for British employ. The troops of the Protected Sikh States are well drilled also and are of capital material; besides, they

have glorious memories of fighting side by side with the British in 1857. The troops of Jammu-Cashmir are not quite equal to those last mentioned, either in discipline or material, but they are passably good, and have also honourable traditions of co-operating with us in the war of the mutiny. From the Rajputana States some troops might be drawn, which though neither well drilled nor highly organized, are full of mettle and spirit. From the Nizam's Deccan, too, some troops of the best Indian Muhammadan stamp could be obtained. In the Deccan, again, there are Arab troops, as fighting men first-rate; whether under all the circumstances they could be advantageously employed may be a question; but if they were thus employed, and if they made up their minds to serve us, then all the world knows how admirably they would acquit themselves. It should be added that in point of national spirit and "high stomach" the Nepalese troops are remarkable, and in effective power the army of Nepal is superior to the forces of any Native State. That little army is composed partly of Gorkhas, and without disparagement of any other element among the Indian armies, it may fairly be said that, all things taken together, the Gorkhas are the best Native troops that have yet been seen in India. The employment of Nepalese troops in our service would depend on political considerations which cannot conveniently be discussed.

RICHARD TEMPLE.

ON LEAVES.

MR.

R. RUSKIN, in one of his most exquisite passages, has told us that "Flowers seem intended for the solace of ordinary humanity: children love them; tender, contented, ordinary people love them. They are the cottager's treasure; and in the crowded town mark, as with a little broken fragment of rainbow, the windows of the workers in whose heart rests the covenant of peace." I should be ungrateful indeed did I not fully feel the force of this truth; but yet it must be confessed that the beauty of our woods and fields is due at least as much to foliage as to flowers.

In the words of the same author, "The leaves of the herbage at our feet take all kinds of strange shapes, as if to invite us to examine them. Star-shaped, heart-shaped, spear-shaped, arrow-shaped, fretted, fringed, cleft, furrowed, serrated, sinuated, in whorls, in tufts, in spires, in wreaths, endlessly expressive, deceptive, fantastic, never the same from footstalk to blossom, they seem perpetually to tempt our watchfulness and take delight in outstripping our wonder."

Now, why is this marvellous variety, this inexhaustible treasury of beautiful forms? Does it result from some innate tendency of each species? Is it intentionally designed to delight the eye of man? or has the form, and size, and texture some reference to the structure and organization, the habits and requirements, of the whole plant?

I do not propose now to discuss any of the more unusual and abnormal forms of leaves: the pitchers of Nepenthes or Cephalotus, the pitfalls of Sarracenia or Darlingtonia, the spring-trap leaves of Dionæa, the scarcely less effective though less striking contrivances in our own Drosera or Pinguicula, nor the remarkable power of movement which many leaves present, whether in response to an external stimulus, as in certain Mimosas, Oxalises, &c., or as a spontaneous