corps, not then occupied by our troops, General Blair reported, would swell the number of their dead on his front to 2,000. The number of dead buried in front of the Fifteenth Corps at the time the report was made was 460, and the commanding officer reported at least as many more yet unburied. The number of dead buried in front of the Sixteenth Corps was 422. They also reported in the hands of the corps over 1,000 wounded. Accompanying this report is a sketch of the field of battle, showing the principal positions. During the night I re-enforced that portion of the Seventeenth Corps which occupied Bald Hill. Before morning the enemy withdrew from the small part of the field which they held on our left.

Al

General Cox's division, of the Twenty-third Corps, which was stationed on the Decatur road, was relieved in the morning. though the division was not engaged, I am under obligations to General Schofield for the promptness with which he responded to my request for re-enforcements. Subsequently, by order of General Sherman, the Augusta railroad, from Decatur to our picket-line, was thoroughly destroyed by the First Division of the Fifteenth Army Corps; a refused intrenched line was constructed by the pioneers of the Fifteenth Corps, extending from the left of the line, held by the Twenty-third Corps, and, in pursuance of orders from headquarters Military Division of the Mississippi, I withdrew the Army of the Tennessee the night of the 26th, and moved it along the rear of the center and right of the army to a position across Proctor's Creek. After putting the army in position that night I was relieved by Maj. Gen. Ŏ. O. Howard. I call your attention to the accompanying map* of the field of battle, and the consolidated report of casualties.

I have the honor to remain, your obedient servant, JOHN A. LOGAN, Major-General, Comdg. Dept. and Army of the Tennessee. Capt. L. M. DAYTON,

Aide-de-Camp.

Recapitulation of casualties occurring in the Army of the Tennessee July 22, 1864, by divisions.

No. 439.

Reports of Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, U. S. Army, commanding Army of the Tennessee.

HDQRS. DEPARTMENT AND ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, East Point, Ga., September 17, 1864. CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit to you the following report of the operations of the Army of the Tennessee during the present campaign:

On the 1st of May the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Corps, of this army, were guarding the railroad from Nashville to Huntsville and from Huntsville to Stevenson, covering also the fords and bridges across the Tennessee River, which occupy the approaches to that section of country. One brigade of the Sixteenth Corps was located as an outpost at Decatur, Ala. That portion of the Seventeenth Corps which the commander of the department designated to take part in the campaign was organizing at Cairo, Ill. The latter command was somewhat scattered at this date. Major-General McPherson, commanding the department, applied himself to the task of concentrating a column, from 20,000 to 25,000 strong, at Chattanooga. The Fifteenth Corps, Major-General Logan, arrived at Chattanooga on the 4th of May, with an effective force of 12,441. One division of this corps, Brig. Gen. John E. Smith commanding, was left to guard the Huntsville railroad. The Left Wing, Sixteenth Corps, Brigadier-General Dodge commanding, excepting the brigade at Decatur, arrived at Chattanooga May 5, with an effective force of 11,649. The aggregate strength of the portions of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Corps present was 24,090, viz: 22,437 infantry, 1,404 artillery, and 249 cavalry. May 6, in accordance with Special Field Orders, No. 1, headquarters Department of the Tennessee, the command, as above constituted, marched to Gordon's Mills. At this date the Army of the Cumberland was in the vicinity of Ringgold and Catoosa Springs, and the Army of the Ohio at Red Clay. By examining these positions it will be seen that the three armies occupied a relative position, generally preserved throughout the campaign-that is, the Army of the Cumberland in the center and the other two upon the flanks. The rebel army, under Johnston, was in the vicinity of Dalton. The plan of campaign contemplated that this army should turn the enemy's left flank at Dalton, while the other armies pushed more directly upon that place; whereupon, May 7, General McPherson moved his column toward Villanow, and halted for the night at a point west of Gordon's Springs Gap. May 8, Major-General Logan marched through this gap, whilst the rest of the command moved south as far as Villanow, and formed a junction with a brigade of cavalry, under General Kilpatrick; encamped with the advance within seven miles of Resaca, near Snake Creek Gap. In field orders from this camp, General McPherson uses these words: "The object being to make a bold and rapid movement on the enemy's flank, or line of communication, all wagons and baggage of every kind will be left behind," &c. With such a purpose the movement of the following day was ordered, "the command to pass through Snake Creek Gap in the direction of Resaca." May 9, the column moved, General Dodge leading, at 5 a. m., preceded by a portion of General Kilpatrick's cavalry. The enemy's cavalry pickets were encountered on debouching from the gap at the eastern *Dodge says (p. 375) that his mounted advance consisted of the Ninth Illinois Mounted Infantry, of his own command, not Kilpatrick's,

extremity. The command pushed on, the cavalry in advance, till within about three miles and a half of the town, when Kilpatrick encountered considerable infantry force, in charging which he was wounded and obliged to leave the field.* Up to this point, from the time of a junction with him, his conduct for boldness and activity in scouting and clearing away the enemy's outposts is most highly commended. As will be seen subsequently, as soon as his wound was healed he returned to the field and participated with the same column in one of the most important operations of the war. Immediately upon the charge of Kilpatrick, General Dodge deployed his skirmishers, under charge of Col. Patrick E. Burke, Sixty-sixth Illinois, who, with very little delay, gallantly drove back the rebel, advance to the works around Resaca, and developed an artillery fire from his guns in position in the forts. In view of the enemy's works at several points, General McPherson deployed the Fifteenth Corps upon the right, and the Sixteenth Corps upon the left, of the Resaca road, after which he pushed forward a division of General Dodge, with instructions to drive back the enemy and break the railroad. The best idea of his operations may be gained from General McPherson's letter of May 9, 10.30 p. m., to General Sherman. He says: General Dodge's command moved up and skirmished with the enemy at Resaca this afternoon. While that was going on one company of mounted infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips' regiment, succeeded in reaching the railroad near Tilton Station, but was forced to leave without damaging the track. They tore down a portion of the telegraph wire. The enemy have a strong position at Resaca naturally, and, as far as we could see, have it pretty well fortified. They displayed considerable force, and opened on us with artillery. After skirmishing till nearly dark, and finding that I could not succeed in cutting the railroad before dark, or getting to it, I decided to withdraw the command and take up a position for the night between Sugar Valley and the entrance to the gap.

Here follow the reasons for retiring: first, the exposed position; second, General Dodge's command without rations. The general thought that if he had had a division of good cavalry he could have broken the railroad at some point. General Garrard had just arrived at La Fayette, with horses fatigued and short of forage, and wished to remain there until his forage train came up from Chattanooga. The losses during the skirmish were 6 men killed and 30 wounded, with a greater damage inflicted upon the enemy. We captured 25 prisoners. Not having succeeded in getting upon the railroad, the command fell back to the intersection of the Dalton and Rome and Resaca roads, in Sugar Valley, taking up a strong position. Though the railroad had not been reached, still the mountain ridge, which Johnston regarded as so complete a barrier, was passed. It seems that the rebel general had dispatched a brigade of cavalry at 10 p. m. of the night before, with orders to take possession of and hold Snake Creek Gap. He was a little too late. May 10 and 11, a new position, nearer the gap and naturally stronger, was selected and occupied. On the 12th and 13th the lines were moved forward on the Resaca road to the cross-roads, two miles from the town. As soon as the lines were formed, Major-General Logan pushed forward a strong skirmish line, driving the enemy before him. The enemy's skirmish fire was kept up, but he made no considerable stand till the advanced line had reached an open field. Beyond these fields, 700 or 800 yards distant, a ridge appeared, running nearly in a north and south direction. The enemy had taken position on this ridge, having artillery and infantry and slight

*Kilpatrick was wounded May 13. Lieutenant-Colonel Phillips, commanding Dodge's advance May 9, was wounded that day.

barricades. General Logan placed some batteries of his command in position, and quickly silenced the enemy's guns. Immediately the main lines were moved forward and the ridge carried. As soon as the Fifteenth Corps had been formed, with the right across the Resaca road, one division of General Dodge's was brought up and deployed farther to the right. In this position the army intrenched; artillery was located bearing upon Resaca and the railroad bridge. When these guns opened in front of Generals Logan and Dodge the effect upon the enemy was perceptible, and interruption of the railroad trains occasioned. This position, thus commanding the enemy's principal line of communication, rendered his stay at Resaca impossible unless he succeeded in dislodging our army.

During the 14th several demonstrations and feints were made by the command to keep the enemy from re-enforcing his right, where there was evidently a battle going on. General Logan says:

General Osterhaus took advantage of the feint to attack the enemy's skirmishers in the heavily wooded valley near the road. This was done in the most gallant manner. The bridge over Camp Creek was carried, and the Twelfth Missouri Infantry thrown forward into the woods previously occupied by the enemy, thus forming a living têtê-de-pont, which in the ensuing movement proved of great value.

This movement referred to, was an assault made by General Logan's troops, aided by a division of General Dodge, between 5 and 6 p. m. of the same day, on an advanced position held by the enemy and within close musket-range of his lines. The description of the assault by General Logan is graphic and of great interest. The brigades of his corps specially engaged were commanded by Brig. Gens. Charles R. Woods and G. A. Smith. After gaining the position, exposed to a galling infantry and artillery fire, the troops were disposed so as to hold the ground. Pioneers and intrenching tools were brought into play as usual. About 7.30 p. m. the enemy made a vigorous assault upon the new line, and was handsomely repulsed. A renewal of the attack was anticipated, and lest the enemy's lines should outflank the troops then in position, General Lightburn was sent with his brigade to the right of General G. A. Smith, and some portion of the Sixteenth Corps was sent by General McPherson to the support of General Woods. These troops participated to some extent in the closing up of the action, and General Lightburn is highly complimented for his promptitude. Nearly 100 prisoners were captured. Loss of the enemy, some 1,500 killed and wounded. During the day General McPherson sent the division of General Sweeny, of the Sixteenth Corps, to Lay's Ferry, with instructions to effect a lodgment on the opposite bank of the Oostenaula and cover the laying of a pontoon bridge, under direction of Capt. C. B. Reese, chief engineer of the department. He moved to Lay's Ferry as directed, pushed across one brigade, which, in conjunction with the artillery in position on the west side of the river, promptly dislodged the enemy from the opposite bank, but hearing a rumor that the enemy was attempting a crossing above him to cut him off from the main army, the division commander withdrew everything to the west side and retired half a mile to a less exposed position. The next morning he moved back to the river, and this time threw over his division, constructed a bridge-head, and laid a pontoon bridge, under the direct supervision of Colonel Buell. Not having received a report from Generals Sweeny or Dodge, I am unable to give a specific account of the engagement that succeeded

this crossing. It appears, however, in collateral reports that the enemy attempted to drive back a part of this division, but failed, and was defeated in the action. Rebel casualties were estimated at 250 in killed and wounded. In part of the other divisions of the Army of the Tennessee there was hot skirmishing and much artillery firing, which was kept up on our part during the night. It was this night (the 15th) that Johnston retreated from Resaca, giving up a secondstronghold.

FROM THE CROSSING OF THE OOSTENAULA TO THE CROSSING OF THE ETOWAH.

In accordance with written instructions from General Sherman, dated May 16, the army was put in motion on the Rome road, crossing the river at Lay's Ferry; General Dodge had the advance.. When between two and three miles from the river the advance met a check, coming upon the enemy in some force. A division of the Fifteenth Corps was pushed up to General Dodge's assistance as rapidly as possible. The enemy, however, made but a slight stand, and then retired. In this action the Second Brigade, Second Division, Sixteenth Corps, was engaged. The casualties amounted to 52 killed, wounded, and missing. Its commander, Colonel Burke, Sixty-sixth Illinois, was mortally wounded and died next day, giving the sacrifice of a valuable life to his country. At this place the command went into position. May 17, the command marched to McGuire's Cross-Roads. On the morning of the 18th, in obedience to instructions from General Sherman in his letter from Adairsville, May 17, the command formed a junction with the Army of the Cumberland at that point and marched thence to Woodland. Took up position for the night on the Kingston and Rome road. The 19th the command marched to Kingston. Considerable cannonading was heard in that direction before commencing the march; no opposition, however, was encountered. At this place, with the other troops of the Military Division of the Mississippi, the Army of the Tennessee rested till the morning of the 23d, making preparations for the march upon Dallas, in obedience to General Sherman's Special Field Orders, No. 9. While at this point the army received the thanks of the President of the United States, through the Secretary of War, for the vigor and success of its operations thus far.

FROM THE CROSSING OF THE ETOWAH TO THE CROSSING OF THE

CHATTAHOOCHEE.

Special Field Orders, No. 11, of General Sherman, required Major-General Blair to march the part of the Seventeenth Corps with him from Decatur to Rome and Kingston, and to garrison Rome with a force of 2,000 men. Major-General Blair had assumed command of the Seventeenth Corps, with headquarters at Cairo, on the 4th of May, and had concentrated by the 23d two divisions at Huntsville, Ala., but as General Sherman desired to garrison Rome meanwhile, before the possible arrival of General Blair, a brigade and battery of the Sixteenth Corps were detached and ordered to Rome, to relieve the division of General J. C. Davis, then at that place. The rest of the command, pursuant to the above field order, marched, on the 23d, across the Etowah, by the Van Wert road, and encamped at night on Euharlee Creek, making a distance of eighteen miles.

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