1 commanding the division, of date July 8, 1864, in reference to the capture and destruction of a train on the evening of the 5th instant, and the conduct of the commanding officer at Tilton in connection therewith, I have the honor to report that I have thoroughly investigated the case, and find that about 6 or 6.30 p. m. of the 5th instant a party of the enemy, estimated at from 200 to 300 dismounted cavalrymen, attacked and captured a loaded train, going to the front, at a point on the Western and Atlantic Railroad, about six miles north of Tilton, Ga. After firing one or two rounds the enemy set fire to the train. None of my command being on the ground, the above facts are obtained from a report made to Col. C. R. Wever, at Tilton, by the engineer in charge of the train. No firing was heard at Tilton. The first information at Tilton of the capture of the train was the light from the burning mass, which was supposed by some to be northern lights. Soon after the light became visible the patrol from Tilton, north, returned to that place, and reported that a train had been captured and was being burnt. Four companies of the Seventeenth Iowa were immediately sent to the scene of disaster, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Archer. He arrived about 9 p. m.; found no person with the train, which was still burning. As no means were at hand to extinguish the fire and save the property not already consumed, Colonel Archer made a reconnaissance on each side of the railroad for a considerable distance without discovering the enemy. He then moved north about one mile to the water-tank, where he found a detachment of the Seventh Illinois Infantry Volunteers, numbering about ninety men, encamped. He then learned that fifty men had been sent to the scene of disaster from the Seventh Illinois detachment, on the train following the one which was captured; that they encountered the enemy, about twenty-five strong, in possession of twelve cars, which had become detached and which were burning. The enemy being fired upon, withdrew to the woods, and the detachment of the Seventh Illinois returned to the water-tank. Lieutenant-Colonel Archer left his command at the tank in charge of Captain Hicks, Seventeenth Iowa Volunteers, and went to Dalton, where a construction train was obtained, with which he returned the next morning, and with his command reached Tilton early on the day of the 6th instant. It is difficult for me to estimate the loss, which was complete. The train consisted of a locomotive, tender, and 16 cars, loaded with commissary stores. The enemy must have had possession of the railroad about one hour and a half. I express it as my opinion that Col. C. R. Wever, commanding at Tilton, sent troops to the relief of the train as soon as he had any definite information of the disaster, and that the capture and destruction of the train is not chargeable to any neglect on his part. At 10 p. m. of the 5th instant I received a dispatch from him informing me of the disaster and the steps he had taken to assist the train. The report "that no steps were taken by him to disturb the depredators or to arrest the further destruction of the road and property, and secure the safety of the other trains then due until ordered to do so on the following morning," is entirely untrue. I have the honor to be, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, GREEN B. RAUM, Colonel, Commanding Brigade. Capt. C. L. WHITE, Assistant Adjutant-General. HDQRS. SECOND BRIG., THIRD DIV., FIFTEENTH CORPS, Resaca, Ga., September 2, 1864. CAPTAIN: In compliance with the order referring a communication from the headquarters of the District of the Etowah to the general commanding the division, of date August 25, 1864, and herewith returned, I have the honor of submitting the following report: On the evening of the 14th ultimo, having received reliable information of the strength and movements of Wheeler's cavalry I directed Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, commanding Seventeenth Iowa Volunteers, to concentrate his command, directing that Captain Snodgrass, commanding the detachment two miles south of Dalton, report to Colonel Laiboldt at that place. Captain Snodgrass was posted fourteen miles north of these headquarters. There being no telegraph office at Tilton, he was communicated with by courier, not, however, before the enemy had attacked Dalton. Being directed to go to that place, and it being impracticable for him to do so, he concluded to remain at, and defend himself in, a stockade erected for the protection of a water-tank. During the night the stockade was surrounded by the enemy and some shots were exchanged. The next morning, from the best information I can obtain, a pretty steady fire was kept up from the stockade until about 8 o'clock, the men firing about twenty rounds each. The enemy by this time brought into position two pieces of artillery, and under a flag of truce demanded a surrender of the stockade and the captain and his men as prisoners of war, which command was complied with. The stockade was of sufficient strength to resist musketry, but would afford no protection against artillery. The captain surrendered his command without suffering any loss, upon the well-grounded belief that, with the use of artillery, 'the enemy would be able to annihilate his force. He could not hope for assistance, Dalton being invested and Tilton being seven miles distant, that being the nearest point from which troops could be sent. I would add that Captain Snodgrass has been in several engagements and has ever acted with coolness and courage. I herewith inclose a copy of a report, I caused him to make.* I have been unable to learn what loss the enemy suffered in the affair, but it is believed they lost 3 killed and several wounded. They, however, denied any loss. I inclose a copy of a report made by Lieutenant-Colonel Archer touching the part taken by him in resisting the attack made by the enemy on the railroad south of Tilton. At 10 a. m. of the 15th ultimo I received notice that the enemy had attacked the railroad south of Tilton. I immediately sent the Eightieth Ohio, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Metham, and eighty cavalry, under Captain Robinson, to attack the enemy. These troops although moving with great rapidity, did not reach the point until after the enemy had withdrawn. Hoping the foregoing will be sufficiently explicit, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Capt. S. M. BUDLONG, GREEN B. RAUM, Colonel, Commanding Brigade. Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Div., 15th Army Corps. * See p. 276. No. 489. Reports of Col. Adam B. Gorgas, Thirteenth Illinois Infantry, of affair (May 17) at Madison Station, Ala. HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY, Madison, Ala., May 17, 1864-12 noon. LIEUTENANT: We were attacked this morning at 8 o'clock by a cavalry force, under Patterson, numbering about 1,000, with four pieces artillery. We were obliged to fall back, after a severe fight; and, being completely surrounded, we cut our way through their lines, and fell back to the bridge and water-tank, about three miles east. We formed and returned to this place, and, after skirmishing, drove them from the town. They captured several of our men, what number we are not now able to say. Our camp and garrison equipage, together with all the regimental and company papers, are either destroyed or carried off. The depot buildings are burned, together with about 50 bales of cotton. The railroad is all right; telegraph lines cut. We are left here without rations, and but little ammunition. Our transportation is all gone. They retreated in the way of Triana. We have sent a small squad of mounted men to find out where they have gone. Rebel prisoners captured say the force crossed the river last night between Triana and Whitesburg. I am, very respectfully, yours, &c., Lieut. C. L. WHITE, A. B. GORGAS, Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Div., 15th Army Corps. HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ILLINOIS INFANTRY, Madison Station, May 19, 1864. CAPTAIN: I would respectfully submit the following report of the attack made on this post by a force of the enemy, under command of Colonel Patterson, consisting of two regiments of mounted infantry and a battery of four 12-pounder howitzers, the entire force numbering about 1,000 men : The attack was made at 8.30 a. m. on the Triana road, on which two of their field pieces were placed in position, the remaining two pieces having crossed the railroad, together with a portion of the enemy's command. They, however, did not get into position, as the attack was precipitated by the enemy's being discovered by a forage train, which was just starting out. As soon as discovered the enemy opened fire from their two pieces on the Triana road, having previously sent detachments to each one of my picket posts, five in number, guided by some citizens who seemed to know the exact locality of each, encircling them and capturing them entire. On the first alarm my command was quickly formed in line, excepting three companies, who occupied the stockade in the rear of the depot building and behind some cotton bales. Two companies were thrown out as skirmishers, but the enemy appearing in such a large force in their front, I ordered them to fall back to the main column. In the mean time the stockade was rendered untenable by the rapid fire from the artillery, so that the three companies were compelled to fall back behind the railroad embankment, where I at length formed my entire command, being satisfied that we were outnumbered nearly four to one, and, having nothing to resist their artillery, it would be impossible to hold the town; my command the entire time keeping up a rapid and incessant fire, killing 3 and wounding 15 of the enemy. At this time the rebel force appeared on both flanks and in my rear, which made it necessary to fall back still farther, which I did, in the direction of the water-tank toward Huntsville, dispersing the enemy in my rear by a few well-directed volleys, the artillery and nearly their entire force following on either side of the railroad, but the timber was so thick that they could do no damage. On arriving at within a half mile of the water-tank I reformed my line, and, after a short rest, again advanced toward Madison Station with a strong line of skirmishers, well extended on either side of the railroad. The skirmishers drove the rear guard of the enemy from town, the main force having departed after burning the depot buildings and about 70 bales of cotton. My camp equipage was also burned, it, however, consisting of only a small number of tents, which were scarcely serviceable. The men, also, have lost all of their extra clothing and blankets. The damage to the railroad was slight and readily repaired. As soon as the attack was made the wagon train, consisting of eight 6-mule teams and three 2-horse ambulances, were ordered on the Huntsville road, but were intercepted and captured, together with a small train_guard and the teamsters. At about 12 m. re-enforcements arrived, consisting of the Fifth Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Heath, 120 men, and the Fifty-ninth Indiana Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Scott, 220 men. These, together with 100 men from my regiment, moved after the enemy as rapidly as possible in a driving rain. Colonel Heath's cavalry came up with the rear guard of the enemy early in the afternoon, and kept up a constant harassing fire, but his force was too small to make a forcible attack. The infantry came up just before sundown, the Fifty-ninth Indiana deploying as skirmishers and driving the enemy before them to the bank of the river, but night coming on and finding that the transportation and prisoners were all across the river, our men fatigued, and ammunition almost exhausted, it was considered best by the commanding officers to withdraw our forces. They were consequently marched back to Madison, a distance of twelve miles from Fletcher's Ferry. From reliable sources I learn that the enemy's loss at the ferry was 15 killed and 40 wounded. This estimate, I am positive, is not placed too high, which would make their entire loss 18 killed and 55 wounded. Of the number of prisoners from my regiment I have not been able to learn how many were wounded. The loss of the Fifty-ninth is 2 wounded, and the Fifth Iowa Infantry 1 killed. I have but 1 man wounded with the regiment. Inclosed I send a list of the prisoners from my regiment.* I am, captain, very respectfully, your obedient servant, Lieut. C. L. WHITE, Actg. Asst. Adjt. Gen., Third Div., 15th Army Corps. * Nominal list (omitted) shows 1 officer and 65 men. No. 490. Report of Col. Clark R. Wever, Seventeenth Iowa Infantry, of capture of train (July 5) near Tilton, Ga. HDQRS. SEVENTEENTH IOWA VET. VOL. INFANTRY, Tilton, Ga., July 12, 1864. LIEUTENANT: In compliance with orders from your headquarters, of date Resaca, Ga., July 11, 1864, I herewith submit the following statement in relation to the capture of the train on the evening of July 5, together with a copy of Lieut. Col. Archer's report of same (inclosed): Soon after sunset on the evening above mentioned, a light was discovered in the direction of Dalton. My attention was called to it. I was unable to determine whether it was a fire, or, as my officers supposed, "northern lights." Just at this time the patrol, which had been sent out at the usual hour, returned and reported that the rebels had captured and were burning a train. I immediately dispatched four companies, under command of LieutenantColonel Archer, to whose report I call your attention for further information. In reply to your questions I would state: First, that the train was captured about six miles north of Tilton, just before sunset. Second, I can form no idea of the loss sustained; was informed by the engineer that there were 16 cars, loaded with coffee and flour. The train was completely destroyed. Third, I have no means of estimating the amount of firing done. The engineer and his comrade (who was wounded) reported that as soon as the locomotive ran off the track the train was surrounded by from 200 to 300 men, who fired a volley or two into the train. My opinion is they were too badly scared to be able to tell whether there were 25 or 300 men in the band. The rebs. wore spurs. Fourth, it was fully two hours after the train was captured before my troops reached that point. The enemy, very likely, had possession all that time. Fifth, no firing was heard at Tilton. A detachment of Seventh Illinois Veteran Volunteers were stationed at a water-tank about one mile above where the train was captured. They were taken down by the train following. Sixth, I received information of the disaster shortly after sunset, and immediately sent four companies, under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, to the spot. Very respectfully, C. R. WEVER, Colonel Seventeenth Iowa Vet. Vol. Infty., Comdg. Post. Lieut. M. NICHELSON, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General, Second Brigade. No. 491. Reports of Lieut. Col. Samson M. Archer, Seventeenth Iowa Infantry, of capture of train (July 5) and affair (August 15) near Tilton, Ga. TILTON, GA., July 11, 1864. COLONEL: I herewith submit the following report in relation to the disaster on the railroad on the evening of July 5, 1864: In accordance with your orders, at 7.30 p. m. of July 5, I took Companies C, H, I, and K and marched up the railroad, reaching 18 R R--VOL XXXVIII, PT III |