HDQRS. FIRST DIVISION, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, In the Field, East Point, Ga., September 10, 1864. COLONEL: On the 15th day of August I resumed command of this division (having been temporarily absent on account of sickness), which was at the time intrenched in three lines, some hundred yards to the right and in front of Ezra Chapel, the scene of combat on July 28, on which Brig. Gen. C. R. Woods, then commanding the division, has reported. The opposing lines had been pushed so close together that operations had come to a stand-still, with the exception of a farther advance on August 22. I availed myself of a demonstration made in our front to dislodge the rebel sharpshooters from a belt of woods in my immediate front, whence they had kept up a very annoying fire on us. The move was successful and caused the enemy to fall back on his main line, while we were enabled to advance our front line and two batteries (ten guns) within very destructive proximity to the enemy's line. Leaving that position on August 26, we marched during the night, by way of Utoy Creek, to Parker's place, about four miles west of Fairburn, on the Atlanta and Montgomery Railroad, where we arrived early on the 27th. After the necessary reconnaissances of the approaches to said railroad, we advanced at 8 a. m. on the 28th and struck the railroad at noon near Shadna Church, two miles north of Fairburn. The enemy did not oppose our advance, and we found only a very small picket on the road; our march was, however, considerably delayed by the necessity of cutting a road for two miles and a half through the timber. On arriving at the point indicated the division was at once deployed and intrenchments thrown up; rebel cavalry was in our immediate front. The night and next day, August 29, was spent in destroying the track of the railroad, which was done most effectually. The order of march for August 30 toward Jonesborough, on the Atlanta and Macon Railroad, placed the First Division in rear of the Fifteenth Corps, and I had, consequently, no part in the skirmishes with the rebel troops who contested our advance, without success, however. The rear of my command crossed Flint River after 11 p. m., and the whole division took position as fast as the troops came in, with orders to intrench at once, as it was evident that the enemy meant to defend Jonesborough Station. My division formed the second line, Second and Fourth Divisions being in front, except the Twenty-fifth Regiment Iowa Infantry, of my Second Brigade, who were posted on the right on an elevated open field. This point was of the greatest importance, as it secured our front position against any attack on the right flank, which otherwise was much exposed. I directed the officers in command there to throw up breast-works during the night, and it is due to their zeal that early in the morning of August 31 we had a strong, substantial line of rifle-pits commanding the intermediate ground between the right of our line and Flint River. On the morning of the 31st of August my position, in reserve to the Second and Fourth Divisions, was materially altered, as I endeavored, under orders from the corps commander, to connect the extreme right of the first line of our corps (Fourth Division) with the refused line of our right, erected during the night, by a permanent and systematic line. This was really an extension of the position in front, and required all the troops of my Second and Third Brigades to make it sufficiently strong. The enemy were very active during the night and all morning, a number of railroad trains arriving loaded with troops. The depot being within full view of our skirmish line, I could after daylight see these troops arrive, debark, and go into position. I, therefore, in order to prevent these re-enforcements on the part of the enemy, ordered a battery of two light 12-pounder Napoleon guns to be erected in front of, and within 1,000 yards of, the depot and surrounding houses; this battery could also play on the enemy's line in my whole front. The site of this battery was about 200 yards to the right and 120 yards to the rear of my line. I, therefore, ordered a very strong support of infantry, commanded by Captain Bowman, Ninth Iowa Infantry, and Lieutenant Eicks, Twenty-ninth Missouri Infantry, to support this section, Lieutenant Haug, of Fourth Ohio Battery, commanding. Another section of 12-pounder light Napoleon guns, commanded by Lieutenant Hust, of same battery, was in position in the center of the refused line on the right flank. In these operations the rebels resisted us with some determination. I was now ordered to send two of my largest regiments, the Seventy-sixth Ohio and Thirtieth Iowa, of the First Brigade, to support the left of the first line of our corps, Second Division, while the two regiments of infantry which covered our right flank were relieved by a brigade from the Sixteenth Corps. I refer to the annexed plan for the position of my troops.* The section commanded by Lieutenant Haug was ready to open fire about noon, and did so with telling effect. The infantry, however, had not as yet completed their intrenchments, and at 2.30 p. m. there was still a considerable gap in the work connecting them with the refused line on the right. While I was still engaged in pushing forward this part of the work, considerable movement was observed on the rebel side. Colonel Wangelin, commanding Third Brigade, reported that very heavy columns of rebel infantry had sallied from their left and advanced in double-quick around our line of skirmishers, evidently with the intention of passing to our right and rear. The rebels had to pass over an open field to the right of Colonel Wangelin's front, and this gallant officer opened a most withering fire on them, but was unable to prevent their flanking maneuver. Lieutenant Haug's shells exploded with terrible precision among the enemy, but with no better success. Regardless of this destructive fire, the enemy's columns rushed forward, and I, of course, directed Lieutenant Haug to withdraw his pieces, while Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Eicks were ordered to hold their position at all hazards until the guns were withdrawn. These two officers gallantly held their position while Lieutenant Haug removed his section with admirable precision; when I brought this party back into our main work, the rebel avalanche was at our very heels. I placed Lieutenant Haug's section of artillery and the supporting infantry, under Captain Bowman and Lieutenant Eicks, in position on the left of the rifle-pits occupied by the Sixteenth Army Corps and Lieutenant Hust's pieces. They all opened at once a most deadly fire on the rebels (the artillery with canister), whose front line was now within 100 yards of ours; at the same time the troops of Colonel Williamson's brigade, who formed the connection with the refused line, poured their fire into the assaulting column. Here I cannot omit to mention the splendid conduct of the officers and men of the Fourth Iowa * See p. 138. Infantry, who were ordered to occupy that portion of this connecting line where as yet no breast-works had been thrown up; they whirled in and held the place most gallantly. The effect of our fire was immediate and terrible; the enemy's line, compact until now, broke and dispersed in all directions. A number came over into our lines; the masses, however, fell back into the timber on their right and rear to find protection from our fire. The enemy formed again several times under cover of this timber, and attacked again, though very feebly, showing their first repulse to have been a very severe and decided one. The Twenty-fifth Iowa Infantry (Second Brigade) which was afterward thrown forward in advance of the Fourth Iowa, completely secured our right, and permitted us to finish our intrenchments, the enemy slowly retiring before our skirmishers. I take great pleasure in mentioning those officers who came under my special notice during the sudden and decisive movements of the day. Colonels Wangelin and Williamson, whose men were mostly engaged, displayed the same promptness, zeal, and bravery which they exhibited on so many occasions during the past months. Captain Anderson, acting assistant adjutant-general of Colonel Williamson, was wounded while bearing orders. Lieutenant Haug, Fourth Ohio Battery, Captain Bowman, Ninth Iowa Infantry, and Lieutenant Eicks, Twenty-ninth Missouri Infantry, deserve praise for their faithful obedience to orders under most trying circumstances. Lieut. H. E. Williams commanding pioneer corps, was wounded, I fear mortally, while assisting me, with his wonted contempt of danger, in bringing off Lieutenant Haug's guns. During the following night and on the morning of September 1 we strengthened our lines as well as possible, keeping up a lively fire from our skirmish line, which we pushed forward vigorously. Lieutenant Hust's section of 12-pounder light Napoleon guns was relieved by four pieces of Battery F, Second Missouri Artillery, in the center of the refused line, and placed in position on Colonel Wangelin's front. The section had just been placed in position, and had hardly opened fire, when Lieutenant Hust was killed by a rebel sharpshooter. He was a brave and in every respect [an] exemplary officer. In the afternoon I received your orders to make a spirited demonstration in my front, to prevent the enemy from re-enforcing his right, which was threatened by our troops advancing along the railroad from Rough and Ready, the impression made on the rebels becoming more and more visible as the firing approached from the north. My skirmish line was re-enforced and pushed forward gallantly, while the shells from the artillery kept the rebels close behind their works. At about 4 p. m. I ordered Colonel Wangelin to follow the skirmishers with a strong reserve. Colonel Gage, of the Twenty-ninth Missouri Infantry, was the first man over our rifle-pits; LieutenantColonel Simpson, of the Thirty-first Missouri, and Major Seay, of the Thirty-second Missouri, followed, and with their regiments, altogether under 200 men, advanced on the rebels, drove them from their advanced pits, and established a new line far in advance of our old skirmish line, and in close proximity to the rebels. Before night all guns which could be brought to bear on the place opened fire, by direction of the commanding general, as it was supposed the rebels were about to leave the town, which was being rapidly inclosed by our troops. During the night the rebels did evacuate Jonesborough. At 3 a. m. my men were in town, and had evidence of the terrible execution of our last day's fire. We prepared for immediate march and pursued the enemy four miles, when he took refuge behind earth-works previously prepared. We advanced and intrenched a line along the crest of a range of hills, within from 300 to 500 yards of the enemy's works; there we remained until the night of September 5, when we commenced our retrograde movement toward Atlanta, which had been evacuated on the 1st instant and was in possession of our troops 2d instant. The list of casualties has already been forwarded to you. Its numbers give ample evidence of the bravery and patriotism of our troops, and for the campaign commencing May 9 foots up as follows: Commissioned officerskilled, 8; wounded, 47; missing, 2; total, 57. Enlisted men-killed, 121; wounded, 676; missing, 35; total, 832. Aggregate-killed, 129; wounded, 723; missing, 37; total, 889. I am, colonel, very respectfully, your most obedient servant, Lieut. Col. R. R. TOWNES, Assistant Adjutant-General, Fifteenth Army Corps. Recapitulation of casualties in First Division, Fifteenth Army Corps. |