sionally [seen] making off out of sight. The plan of attack here on their part has always been by a landing at Masonborough, six miles from the city, and attack by their navy on Fisher. To this may be added a boat entrance in the river by night in force. Our naval force here being entirely useless for defense, I have only to say that as now situated any expedition they may make, unless providentially frustrated, will be suc cessful. There is nothing to prevent their cutting off communication with the forts, even if they do not force the town, and I am satisfied they contemplate it. I am trying to get as many citizens as I can under arms, but with results not at all encouraging. I have been compelled to leave a large and important part of the railroad imperfectly guarded in order to watch the coast merely by pickets, and the town guard is not sufficient for the daily routine of duty. I hope you will not think me importunate or too careful of my trust, or too fearful, but totally unable to secure even labor to complete my designs (four months hav ing been already lost without any work, in spite of repeated endeavors and constant entreaties to procure it, and still without it) and wanting that support which the topography makes absolutely essential, this place can be taken now with ease. And so I give warning. I shall do all I can whatever the result. I can only add that considering the present condition of our communications and the importance of the place too much is left to chance, especially with our present light, and if you hear of disaster it will occur in the manner I have stated, though, for that matter, without a supporting force, there are half a dozen other modes equally possible and against which I am equally powerless. The case here is not at all that of a place which attacked may hold out until relieved, nor can such be predicated of it. There are too many vital points and it is too open. I think the circumstances warrant the utmost foresight and preparation. Look! The information I received from New York and forwarded, from New Berne and Beaufort to the same effect; preparation of small boats at the North, especially flat bottoms; movement of troops from Foster's command; the two expeditions of Cushing and his immediate departure for the North, especially the present movements of the fleet. If this was like some places still held by us, the taking of which would not materially influence the war, I would not say a word at this crisis. As its commanding officer I would trust to such poor resources as I might command, the people, chance, a storm, what not, and take the consequences; but this is different and every one knows it; still none but myself is aware of the extreme hazard which it now runs, and of which I think it my duty to warn you. Please to lay this before the President. Inclosure.] W. H. C. WHITING, HDQRS. DEFENSES MOUTH CAPE FEAR RIVER, Maj. Gen. W. H. C. WHITING, Smithville, July 3, 1864. Dept. North Carolina and Southern Virginia, Wilmington: GENERAL: I am as fully, if not more anxious than you are concern. ing any attack the enemy may at any moment make upon the defenses of Wilmington. I have a full appreciation of the dangers to which my command is exposed and am sadly aware of my weakness. At the same time that I will use all exertions, spare no pains and labor to meet any attack of the enemy and fight him as long as possible, I must be per mitted to state here and put on record that my present force of available troops is, in my opinion, inadequate to a successful defense. Ant examination of my last tri-monthly report will prove how weak my available force is for the defense of all the points at which I may be attacked. It must not be overlooked that at the same time that each of my posts has not men enough for its own proper defense, the means of re-enforcing one post by troops from another cannot be counted upon in case of a sudden attack; and you are well aware that sudden attacks, attacks of which we can know nothing till they actu ally commence, can and will probably be the ones made. The reported sayings of Lieutenant Cushing, U. S. Navy, I take at their proper value, only believing portious, but his words come very near the truth. when he says what could be done by our enemies. His two entrances into the river and safe exits, besides being a proof of my inability to guard myself, must necessarily have furnished him pretty correct information of our strength as to troops and the position and quality of our works. I am, like yourself, in the belief that something will be attempted by the enemy soon. Another matter which places me under constant and anxious apprehensions is the fact that I do not believe there can be reliance placed in the loyalty of all the people of this and the adjoining counties. I will go farther and state that I do not place full reliance in all my soldiers. I very much fear that some disloyal sentiments are entertained by some of them; how many must, of course, remain unknown. But I am satisfied that some disloyalty does exist, and, however limited ́it may be, it is dangerous. Such sentiments are more liable to spread in a weak force (I mean a force which conceives itself weak against the enemy) than in a large and strong force. The remedy would then be to increase the force materially, and it would be better still if the increase was effected by means of troops from another State than this, and who can have no affiliation with our present ones. My men are on guard and picket duty every other day, and during the dark of the moon and on account of blockade-running steamers almost nightly, and sometimes twice in the night, every man is under arms from alarms. Sickness is also now greater than it has been. The accessions of the Junior Reserves to my command cannot be said to have added to my strength. They are as yet totally ignorant of all military knowledge, and many are so weakly that they can perform but very little duty. They have besides brought diseases with them, and I particu larly mention the measles, of which many are now ill. Their officers are nearly as inexperienced and untaught as themselves. It is impossible for me with my means to picket the waters more effectually than I do. Flag Officer Lynch and myself are in daily consultation and he will do cheerfully all he can. His means are, however, very insufficient also. I have strengthened the garrisons at Fort Anderson and Battery Lamb as much as I could. I have not written this letter, general, to give an exaggerated expression of my fears. I have no other object than to state facts as they are and to show that I understand the dangers to which I and my command are exposed. Knowing and fully estimating those dangers I will meet them to the best of my ability and with my present means, should it be out of your power to furnish me additional ones. It is right, however, for me to say that I do ask for more troops. I remain, general, respectfully and truly, your obedient servant, &c., LOUIS HÉBERT, Brigadier-General. ALTERNATE DESIGNATIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS MENTIONED IN THIS VOLUME.* Abbot's (Henry L.) Heavy Artillery. See Connecticut Troops, 1st Regiment. Alger's (Russell A.) Cavalry. See Michigan Troops, 5th Regiment. Allcock's (Thomas) Heavy Artillery. See New York Troops, 4th Regiment, 3d Battalion. Allen's (Campbell) Infantry. See New York Troops, 44th Regiment. Armistead's (Frank S.) Junior Reserves, Infantry. See North Carolina Troops, Arthur's (William; Heavy Artillery. See New York Troops, 4th Regiment, 2d Battalion. Atwill's (James W.) Infantry. Avery's (Martin P.) Infantry. See North Carolina Troops, Union, 1st Regiment. Baird's (Andrew D.)Infantry. See New York Troops, 79th Regiment. Ball's (William H.) Infantry. See Ohio Troops, 122d Regiment. Ballier's (John F.) Infantry. See Pennsylvania Troops, 98th Regiment. Barker's (Thomas E.) Infantry. See New Hampshire Troops, 12th Regiment. See New York Troops, 62d Regiment. Barnett's (William) Infantry. Barney's (Benjamin G.) Heavy Artillery. See Pennsylvania Troops, 2d Regiment, Barnum's (Joseph H.) Infantry. See Connecticut Troops, 16th Regiment. *References, unless otherwise indicated, are to index following: (719) Bassett's (Isaac C.) Infantry. See Pennsylvania Troops, 82d Regiment. Beers' (Edmund O.) Engineers. See New York Troops, 50th Regiment. Benjamin's (Samuel N.) Artillery. See Union Troops, Regulars, 2d Regiment, Battery E. Biddle's (William M.) Cavalry. See Pennsylvania Troops, 4th Regiment. Bixby's (Phin P.) Infantry. See New Hampshire Troops, 6th Regiment. Blackford's (William W.) Engineers. See Confederate Troops, Regulars, 1st Regiment. Blanchard's (Clifton A.) Infantry. See Massachusetts Troops, 35th Regiment. Blunt's (Matthew M.) Infantry. See Union Troops, Regulars, 12th Regiment. Bowerman's (Richard N.) Infantry. See Maryland Troops, Union, 4th Regiment. Bradford's (William D.) Artillery. See Confederate Guards, Artillery, post. Brainerd's (Wesley) Engineers. See New York Troops, 50th Regiment. Breck's (George) Artillery. See New York Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery L. Brinckle's (John R.) Artillery. See Union Troops, Regulars, 5th Regiment, Battery E. Brooker's (Albert F.) Heavy Artillery. See Connecticut Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery B. Bross' (John A.) Infantry. See Union Troops, Colored, 29th Regiment. Brown's (James F.) Infantry. See Connecticut Troops, 21st Regiment. Brown's (T. Fred.) Artillery. See Rhode Island Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery B. Burns' (Michael W.) Infantry. See New York Troops, 73d Regiment. Burt's (Mason W.) Infantry. See Massachusetts Troops, 22d Regiment. See New York Troops, 152d Regiment. See New York Troops, 11th Battery. Burton's (John H.) Heavy Artillery. See Connecticut Troops, 1st Regiment, Battery I. Butler's (Benjamin C.) Infantry. See New York Troops, 93d Regiment. Cady's (Nahum Ward) Cavalry. See New York Troops, 2d Regiment (Mounted Rifles). Cary's (N. R.) Heavy Artillery. See Virginia Troops, 19th Battalion. Catlin's (Theodore B.) Infantry. See Wisconsin Troops, 5th Regiment. Chamberlain's (Abial G.) Infantry. See Union Troops, Colored, 37th Regiment. |