Big Escambia by building bridge; turned prisoners over at Canoe Station 28th of March; my regiment taking the advance every third day. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANK MOORE, Major, Commanding Regiment.

Capt. E. V. HITCH.

No. 96.

Medals of Honor awarded for distinguished services under Resolution of Congress, No. 43, approved July 12, 1862, and section 6 of Act of Congress approved March 3, 1863.

Report of Brig. Gen. Randall L. Gibson, C. S. Army, commanding forces on Eastern Shore of Mobile Bay, of operations March 23-April 11.

MERIDIAN, MISS., April 16, 1865. MAJOR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the forces under my command on the eastern shore of Mobile Bay:

On the 23d of March I was ordered by Major-General Maury, commanding District of the Gulf, to report with my brigade to Brig. Gen. St. John R. Liddell, at Blakely, and by him directed to move toward Deer Park, near Fish River, and with two regiments of Holtzclaw's brigade, Col. Bush Jones commanding, and Col. P. B. Spence's cavalry to hold the enemy in observation. The following day I disposed these troops for this purpose, and early the next morning the enemy moved in force on the Durant road toward Sibley's Mills, about two miles to the east beyond Spanish Fort in the direction of Blakely. I had selected a line of battle on the north side of D'Olive's Creek, intending

to dispute its passage and develop him, having already thrown my small cavalry force upon his flanks with orders to harass him. At this point the major-general commanding District of the Gulf came up to offer battle with his whole force, but in consequence of the rapid movement of the enemy to our left and rear, as above indicated, the larger portion of the troops were ordered to Blakely under BrigadierGeneral Liddell, and my instructions were to assume immediate command of the defenses of Spanish Fort. Set apart for this purpose were Brig. Gen. Bryan M. Thomas' brigade of Alabama Reserves, about 950 muskets strong; Col. Isaac W. Patton's artillery, 360 effectives, and my own brigade of 500 rifles, Col. F. L. Campbell commanding. Batteries Huger and Tracy likewise constituted a part of this general command, and the garrisons in them, under Maj. Wash. Marks, Twenty-second Louisiana Artillery, formed Patton's artillery, but are not included in the above estimate, for though they rendered valuable services, they only furnished occasional re-enforcements in defense of the field-works near the water battery called Spanish Fort. Upon examination I discovered the line of defense to be about 3,500 yards long, inclosing a battery of four heavy guns in Spanish Fort overlooking the bay, and strengthened by three redoubts, so located that they commanded very well the right and center of the position. The whole artillery consisted of six heavy guns, fourteen field pieces, and twelve Coehorn mortars. Several additional guns were received during the operations. Of this line there were 400 yards on the extreme right, in front of which the forest had been cut down, but no defensive works constructed; about 350 yards in the center, across a deep ravine, in front of which was only a slight curtain partially complete, and about 600 yards on the extreme left with no works of any kind, and the dense forest covering that flank untouched. The three redoubts gave no mutual support, with the exception of two guns in Redoubts 2 and 3, and no cross-fire could be obtained. The main line from Redoubt 3 was retired without any deviation, and the left flank was thrown back and fell off into such low ground that artillery could not be used to any extent along its front as in a regularly laid out crémaillère. The works from Redoubt 3 were placed so far back on the retreating slope that the infantry could only command its crest, but not the ravine beyond; and generally, from the center to the extreme left flank, the enemy's line was upon the highest ground. Such was the extent and incomplete condition of the defenses at Spanish Fort when, on assuming command, I carefully inspected them. It was apparent that an immense work with the spade, pick, and ax was before us, and that some decisive measure must be adopted to prevent the large army already upon our front from coming upon us vigorously or by an onset. At once the main body was disposed along the rifle-pits and set hard at work, though there was quite a deficiency of tools. Special parties were detailed to lay off a long line of battle as far in advance of the position as they could go, and to make camp-fires along its whole length; and other devices were employed to create an exaggerated impression of our numbers, and to conceal the exact locality of our positions. To gain time, and by show of confidence and boldness to make the enemy cautious, I resolved to attack him before daylight the next morning. Lient. Col. R. H. Lindsay with 550 men in gallant style charged his lines, surprised and drove in his skirmishers, capturing a few prisoners and a large number of arms and accouterments, and was only recalled after the enemy was revealed in a heavy and extended

order of battle. Our object seemed to be accomplished, for it was not until late in the evening that he advanced, feeling his way cautiously, and making no assault, invested our defenses. My scouts had reported two corps d'armée in front of us (the Thirteenth and Sixteenth), MajorGeneral Canby commanding. From information derived from the prisoners, and from drawings and maps captured with one of the engineers of the Sixteenth Corps, I estimated the force to be not less than 20,000 muskets strong; perhaps much larger. On his first advance he succeeded at some points in pushing his skirmishers to within 200 yards; on the center and right he was driven back. Our artillery fire was reserved until his light batteries came well up, when it was suddenly opened, and it appeared to be with decided effect. On the left the ground was more favorable to the enemy, and to this fact and the want of works may be ascribed the nearness with which he was enabled to establish himself. On the right and center he was held at bay to the very close of the operations, nor did he at any time gain any decided advantage without severe contests and heavy losses. He sat down before us and developed rapidly a system of regular approaches by parallels. He gradually converted his advanced lines into heavy works, and after the first week displayed an exceedingly large armament of artillery. The absolute necessity of first completing our lines and the smallness of my force prevented the attempt to meet his approaches by any system of advance. There was a great deficiency of tools. Spades, axes, and every available instrument that could be of service in any way, were kept busy night and day from the commencement to the close.

In the first days of the investment (the third, I believe) Thomas' brigade of Alabama Reserves was relieved by Holtzclaw's and Ector's brigades, both together exceeding Thomas' by about 100 muskets. Large detachments from these commands did not rejoin them. While the transfer was being made my force was greatly swollen, but the troops were for the most part out of position awaiting transportation. Sickness and constant heavy details diminished the number of muskets. For the first ten days my artillery, aided by well-trained sharpshooters, was able to cope with that of the enemy, sometimes silencing his guns, and often broke up his working parties in handsome style; but after this time it was evident, from his overwhelming resources in men and guns, that it would be impossible with the means at my disposal to arrest his gradual advance. While he was steadily digging up to our front and flanks, his fleet kept up a well-directed and heavy fire in our rear, and mortars dropped over the entire surface shells of the largest size; his batteries in rear of his right flank bombarded Batteries Huger and Tracy, exposing our communication, and sweeping the woody flat upon the left flank, enfiladed for several hundred yards that part of the line, and took in reverse-the center and right-the batteries and rifle-pits, so his batteries in front of Redoubt McDermott, No 2, looked down upon our whole right, and took in reverse the left center and left. Our works were shaped a good deal like a horseshoe pressed open, and those batteries at the toe and heels could command every part of the line, and these batteries were of the weightiest metal. An expedition between us and Blakely in Bay Minette was daily growing more formidable, and it became necessary to guard our water flanks by picketboats, and to dispose a considerable force to protect our rear and the telegraph lines and the headway against his fleet and barges. Several attempts were made by concentrated bombardment from day to day to demoralize the troops, with the intention to take advantage of any acci

dent, and likewise repeated efforts to advance his lines without digging, but in each instance he was repulsed with a loss proportioned to the vigor of the attack.

At one time he established himself very close to Redoubt 2, and it became necessary, in order to hold this battery and use it effectively, to dislodge him. It was designed to make a general attack on his part of the line to the extreme right, and Capt. Clement S. Watson, my inspector-general, led the sortie in front of the battery, and was completely successful. This party captured three times their own number of the enemy under cover of our artillery, and the moral effect was still more important, for it inspired our troops with a bolder spirit and the enemy with increased caution. After this the enemy guarded carefully against sudden dashes, and though frequent combats at particular points took place, and a few more sorties were contemplated, none could be undertaken with a reasonable prospect of success. I found by the 8th of April that all my artillery was about silenced; that the enemy had largely increased his; that his working parties, greatly re-enforced at every point and carefully protected against sorties, were pushing forward at a rate that would bring them up to our main works; that the pressure upon my flanks, especially the left, was so heavy that it would take my whole force to resist it successfully; that his preparations of launches in the Bay of Minette had assumed formidable proportions; and, finally, that there was unusual activity and movements in his lines. I determined to develop the situation, to discover as accurately as possible his strength and intentions, and to measure our ability for further defense. It was apparent from his superiority in heavy guns and numbers and the nearness of his approach at several points, that unless extraordinary re-enforcements could be had, the moment had at length arrived when I could no longer hold the position without imminent risk of losing the garrison. Not an officer or man had taken any unbroken rest, except such as they could snatch while on duty in the main works. When there was no fighting there was digging, cutting, moving ammunition, taking down and putting up heavy guns, and repairing damages, and extending the main lines. Two weeks of constant work, night and day, with the musket and spade, failed to discourage, but could not fail to fatigue and jade, the troops. Just at sunset, therefore, all the batteries were ordered to open, and the skirmishers and parts even of the main line to keep up a brisk fire, and all officers to observe the enemy closely, and to hold themselves in readiness for any contingency. My artillery was soon disabled and silenced, and the fire from his advanced lines showed them to be well filled with men-strong lines of battle. Shortly after dark, while the firing was very heavy from all points, and especially upon the flanks, the enemy broke through the line on the extreme left, completely turned the flank of the main works, and captured some of the men in them. He was enabled to do this, for the ground here was covered with water, a marshy and densely wooded flat, and it had been impossible to get earth to throw up works or to make any covering for Our men. A battery from an elevated point on the enemy's line, just in front of this flat, swept through it and rendered it almost untenable. He was at once attacked with the force disposed in advance for this very contingency, and the moment General Holtzclaw gave the information, re-enforcements were hastened to him with orders to drive back the enemy by a front and flank attack. The general reported his force not sufficient for this purpose, and there was some confusion among the troops on the extreme left; that in the dark woods and fallen timber the necessary disposition could not be made, and that the enemy was cer

tainly in overwhelming strength. My staff officers and scouts brought similar intelligence. Col. F. L. Campbell, commanding Gibson's brigade, was at once withdrawn from the right and directed to dispose a part of his command in skirmish order around the enemy, and to post the rest as a rear guard at the headway, so as to hold and secure the retreat. They at once drove back the advancing line of the enemy, and so strong and vigorous were these attacks that they soon compelled his overwhelming and constantly swelling forces to assume the defensive. He set to work to intrench. Our left might have been thrown back and re-established, but the labor for such an undertaking was altogether beyond our ability. Moreover, he had advanced several hundred yards in rear of our works, and the probability arose almost to a certainty that, as soon as he discovered where he really was, a general assault would be ordered; and he surely would ascertain this fact either during the night, or beyond all question at daylight. His lodgment, too, when developed, would have enabled him to cut off retreat. I determined, therefore, to withdraw my troops. My standing orders from Maj. Gen. D. H. Maury, commanding District of the Gulf, had been not to hold Spanish Fort for a moment after the garrison was in danger of capture; not to risk, in the defense of an outpost, forces intended to occupy and defend the stronghold and the works around Mobile. It was always a difficult and delicate task to decide, but I thought the moment had at length arrived, contemplated by my instructions, when, however painful to the devoted defenders, the position had to be given up. The guns were ordered to be spiked, and time was allowed for this purpose; the few remaining stores were issued; the sick and wounded were carefully removed; the infirmary corps and several hundred negroes who arrived that evening to be employed in the defense, and, finally, in good order, the whole garrison was withdrawn. The retreat was along a narrow treadway, about eighteen inches wide, which ran from a small peninsula from the left flank across the river, and over a broad marsh to a deep channel opposite Battery Huger. It was about 1,200 yards long, and was commanded throughout by the enemy's heavy batteries in front of our left flank. It was concealed by the high grass and covered with moss, and the troops pulled off their shoes, and thus, in a noiseless manner, succeeded in retiring without attracting the attention of the enemy. The night was rather dark and the movement could not be hurried. From the end of the treadway they were conveyed in light boats to Battery Huger, and thence to Blakely in steamers, except a few under Col. Bush Jones, who was directed to go up the marsh to Blakely. My scouts had already moved along this route with a view of ascertaining whether it was practicable. This was necessary in order to enable all the troops to get beyond range of the enemy's batteries before daylight. From Blakely they were ordered to Mobile by the major-general commanding District of the Gulf.

I regret to report that some of the skirmishers, in spite of the precautions taken and the ample time given, and the pointed inquiries made on the occasion, and the vigilance of brigade commanders and staff officers, which I did not fail to observe, were left upon the lines. The officers in command reported all their men called in and safe. It is to be hoped and presumed that these accidents will be satisfactorily explained. I deeply deplore the capture of even a part of these brave I desire to express in the strongest terms my admiration of the steady valor and cheerful endurance of the officers and members of Ector's, Holtzclaw's, and Gibson's brigades, as well as of Patton's artil

men.