sion, and would certainly be lost with her under the decree, and moreover he was ordered jointly with her to pay the plaintiff's costs. This appeal will, therefore, I think, go to the whole case.

The question is now whether the cause of action was one upon which the plaintiff was entitled to a decree. The Respondent's pleaders urged upon the Court the well-known precedent of Bolákí Bíbí, Appellant.* That decision, not the unanimous decision of the Court, has been generally looked upon as extremely harsh, and it has been since modified, especially by the observations of the Sudder Court in the case of Golak-muni Dási, Appellant,† and I think looking at the light in which the status of a Hindu widow is now viewed, it would always be ruled at this day that to justify a suit for divesting the widow of possession, there must be clear evidence of acts on her part tending to injure the property, so that interference of the Courts is necessary to prevent ultimate injury to the eventual heirs. The criterion, therefore, in this case would be the plaintiffs' success or failure in showing that ultimate loss to them would result from the widow's act. I do not see that any of the sort is established. The Principal Sudder Ameen calls the granting of this patní an alienation, but I cannot see that it is so. It has the effect of diminishing the gross sum which the widow will receive by way of rental. It cannot be doubted that she might grant a lease for years, or one not going beyond her life-time. If on her death the next heirs, seeking to enter on the estate, should be met by the allegation of patní, they will no doubt sue to get rid of the incumbrance and will presumably succeed. The attempts to oust a widow invariably arise from family quarrels, and there is ample evidence of such a quarrel in the present case. But I see no act of waste on the part of the widow, and nothing which gives any foundation for the present suit. I, therefore, concur with Mr. Justice Morgan in reversing the decree. It is accordingly reversed with costs of all the Courts against the special respondents.

I may add that if this were an honest suit, complaining of the patni and praying that it might be set aside, or at least that it might be declared good for her life-time only, I should have been disposed to

* Nand-lál Bábu v. Bolíkí Bíbí, S. D. A. 1454, p. 851. (Ante, p. 138.) ↑ Golak-mani Dásí v. Krishna-prasád Kánúngo. S. D. A. 1859.p. 291, (Ante, p. 142.)

grant such a declaration with costs in proportion. But the complexion of the suit is different; it calumniates the widow in addition to seeking to divest her of possession.

Decree Reversed.

26th August 1862. H. C. A. Marshall's Reports, Vol. I. part 1, page 113.

Hem-chánd Majumdár versus Tárá-mani and another.

Case

vasthas Nos. 51,35,

36,41 & 43.

Súrja-mani, widow of Bhoirab-chander, executed a bearing on the vya- deed of relinquishment to Hem-chánd, acknowledging and confirming an alleged transfer by her husband to Hem-chánd, in payment of his debt. Claim being preferred by Tàrà-mani, mother of the deceased proprietor (Bhoirab-chander) on behalf of herself and Rài-mani, daughter of the deceased, to possession of the estate during the life-time of the widow, on the ground of the debt and transfer being false. The provincial court reversed the zillah decree, and adjudged possession of the lands claimed to Musst. Tàrà-mani. The Sudder Court admitted the appeal on consideration of the insufficiency of the proceedings of the Provincial court, and the erroneous adjudication of possession to Tárà-mani, who obviously was not the legal heir of Bhoirab-chander, his wife and daughter surviving. Rài-mani was, on petition, admitted as joint Respondent with Tàrà-mani.

In answer to a reference by the Court, the Hindu law officers gave a Vyavastha to the following effect:-"If a proprietor of a landed estate die leaving a grandmother, mother, step-mother, wife, unmarried daughter, and son of his father's uucle, his wife succeeds to the sole possession of the estate, but she cannot, without sufficient cause, or the consent of the above mentioned relations, transfer the property by gift or sale. The widow may transfer the real and personal estate of her deceased husband in discharge of his debts, if the amount of the debt exceed or equal the value of the estate; but if the value of the estate exceed the amount of the debt, the widow is only entitled to sell such part as may suffice to cover the debt. In order to render such sale by the widow valid, the debt must be proved by documentary evidence, or the testimony of witnesses, the declaration of the widow herselt, whether she state that the debt was acknowledged by her husband, or merely herself acknowledges the justice of the debt, not being ad

missible. If in the present case, the widow have transferred her deceased husband's estate in payment of his just debts, and the creditor under such sale obtained possession of the estate, the other heirs of the deceased are not entitled to set aside the sale by payment of the debt; but if, on judicial investigation, it be proved that the value of the estate exceed the amount of the debt, the court may pass such decision as they judge equitable. Debts incurred by any member of a family living jointly on account of any private concern, are exclusively demandable from that person and his heirs, and not from the other members of the family. Lastly, although the lá-dáví in question was not in itself sufficient to convey to the appeallant the proprietary right in the lands, yet if it were established by evidence (as stated in the documents in question,) that the husband of Súrjamani had verbally made over his share of the joint estate to Hem-chánd in payment of his debt, then Hem-chánd is entitled to the lands in question, and his right thereto would not be precluded, although it should appear that the value of the lands in question exceeded the amount of the debt, in payment of which they were so transferred".

On consideration of the evidence taken, the Court (present Harington and Stuart, Judges) were of opinion that there was no sufficient proof either of Bhoirab-chander having incurred the debt (on which the deed of relinquishment (lá-dáví) was grounded; or of his having in his life-time made over the lands to the appeallant Hem-chánd. A final decree was therefore passed, amending the decree of the Provincial Court as far as it went to give possession to Tárá-mani, and providing that after the death of Súrja-mani the deed of relinquishment executed by her should not operate to preclude the right of the other surviving heir or heirs.-18th December, 1811, S. D. A. Rep. Vol. I. p. 359.

Case

bearing on the vyavastha No. 51.

I. In the case of Krishna-gobinda Sen and another versus Gangá-narayan Sircar, the Supreme Court declared a decided opinion that Ujjal-mani (who had inherited property from her late husband) had no right to make any grant of her interest in the estate, which could enure beyond her own life. The defendant finding that the grant (he had) from Ujjal-maņi would not avail him, declined further contest, and verdict was given for the plaintiff.-Macn. Cons. H. L. P. 19.

Rámánanda Mukhopádhyay (Mookerjea) versus Rám

krishna Dull.

11. In. this case it was admitted by all the (then) Judges of the Supreme Court, that the grant which was made by the widow Púraní Dósí of the property she inherited from her husband, (and which it clearly appeared was not made for the benefit of her husband's soul,) is good for her life; and that if, after the death of Púraní Dási, the heirs of her husband Nayan Shah shall proceed against Rámánanda Mukhopadhyay (the donee,) the case will be very different. I do not foresee that he cau have any defence as against them.-Macn. Cons. H. L. pp. 19, 20.

The Hon'ble SIR BARNES PEACOCK, Kt. Chief Justice, and the Hon'ble A. T. RAIKES, H. V. BAYLEY, F. B. KEMP, and L.

S. JACKSON, Puisne Judges.

CASES NO. 79, 84, 201 AND 210 or 1862.

Nos. 78 AND 84 of 1862.

No. 79.

Musst. Gobindo-mani Dásí, (Plaintiff,) Appellant, versus Sham-lál Basák and others, (Defendants,) Respondents.

Regular Appeal, from decisions of the P. S. A. of Dacca.

Case

bearing on the vyavasthás Nos. 44, 47 & 51.

The question, which was referred for the consideration of a full Bench in these appeals, is whether a conveyance by a Hindu widow of immovable perty which she takes by descent from her husband, is valid during the widow's life, if the conveyance is made for causes other than those allowed by the Hindu law; and if not, whether the reversionary heirs of the husband can interfere by suit to cause the property to be delivered up to themselves or to the widow.

The case has been very fully and elaborately argued on both sides. The principal authorities on the subject are collected in the VyavastháDarpana, a very useful book upon Hindu law, by Baboo Shámá-charan Sircar.

KÁTYÁYANA says:

"Let the childless widow, preserving unsullied the bed of her lord and abiding with her venerable protector, enjoy the property, restraining herself until her death. After her, let the heirs take it." (Colebrooke's Dá, bhá, Chap. XI, Section I, para. 56.)

Again:

"The widow is only to enjoy her husband's estate. petent to make a gift, mortgage, or sale of it." (Idem.)

She is not com

In Colebrooke's Digest, Vol. III., p. 465, it is said:

"It fully appears that the widow's disposal of her husband's property at pleasure, otherwise than by the simple use of it or by donation for the benefit of the lord, is invalid."

Sir William Macnaghten, a very great authority, appears to have been of opinion that a gift or conveyance by a widow other than for allowable cause, was void, not only as against reversionary heirs of the husband, but also as against herself. (See Macnaghten's Hindu law, Vol. I, pages 19&20.)

In the case of Doe-dem Banerjea versus Banerjea, the plaintiff was non-suited. The decision turned upon another point, and is no authority upon the question now under consideration, but it is important as containing the opinion which was delivered to East, C. J., by Macnaghten, J., drawn up by his son Sir William Macnaghten.

"If a widow make a sale in perpetuity of her husband's lauded perty, by a deed to that effect, the purchaser, as she had no right to make the sale, will not be benefited by it, nor will he be entitled, in virtue of it, to the interest which the widow has in the estate. This is founded upon the principle of the sale being without ownership, which renders it void, ab initio, and not, as I before thought, upon the principle of a greater interest being conveyed by the deed than the widow was competent to grant. The Pandits whom I have to-day consulted agree in saying that, if one of four brothers make a deed of sale of the whole patrimonial property, it will hold good, as far as his share is concerned, because the sale creates ownership in the purchaser, and not the deed, which is only proof of the sale, and may be taken to prove it, as far as will serve that purpose, though invalid with respect to the conveyance of the property of the other brothers, it is valid against himself, and is proof of his intention. Not so in a deed made by a widow she has no unlimited proprietary right over any part of her husband's property, but merely a general usufructuary right over the whole indiscriminately. It is clear, therefore, that she cannot convey