Brig. Gen. R. S. RIPLEY, CHARLESTON, S. C., February 14, 1864. Mount Pleasant: Order a good regiment of infantry to Green Pond with as little delay as possible from Sullivan's Island. It will carry tents, cooking utensils, and baggage. Quartermaster's department will supply you transportation. Communicate with Major Pringle to what wharf you want it sent. Acknowledge dispatch. By command of General Beauregard : JNO. M. OTEY, Assistant Adjutant-General. CHARLESTON, S. C., February 14, 1864. Brig. Gen. B. H. ROBERTSON, or, in his absence, Green Pond : Anderson's regiment must be detached for temporary service in Florida. He will move in light marching order to Trader's Hill, Ga., with the utmost dispatch. Heavy baggage can be sent afterward if wanted. Celerity is all important to the end in view. A regiment of infantry will be sent you from here at once to replace. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff. CHARLESTON, S. C., February 14, 1864. Brig. Gen. B. H. ROBERTSON, Green Pond: General Walker has been directed to send you squadron of his cavalry. THOMAS JORDAN, Chief of Staff. ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT, Adams' Run, S. C., February 14, 1864. Brig. Gen. HENRY A. WISE, Commanding Sixth Military District: The GENERAL: On Tuesday, the 9th instant, ascertaining that news of the landing of the enemy on John's Island had taken you thither, I remained here until the next morning, as the troops going thither might make requisition upon me for ammunition and arms. next day I left here for John's Island, after giving particular instructions to Messrs. Davis and Dix that all calls for ammunition and arms were to be promptly supplied. I went to your headquarters on John's Island "without instructions," because a considerable portion of our brigade seemed to be in position for an early fight with the enemy, and I considered it my duty to be ready to issue or see issued the ammunition in reserve which had been taken there in wagons. Unfortunately all the ordnance wagons (so called) but those at these headquarters had been sent off for forage and, as I understood from the district quartermaster, without his orders. But for this I could have had originally more ammunition than I did. On account of this, too, 1 was subsequently embarrassed upon receiving a dispatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper that Parker's battery needed ammunition. More than the six wagons ordered to this command for ordnance were needed to haul the ammunition from Rantowles or some point on John's Island to where the battery was stationed, and I had but one. The next morning, 10th, I received orders from you to return here to order all the ammunition and forage that might be needed for the troops on John's Island, and ordered to come there. Upon arriving at Adams' Run, the wagon of the Fourth was sent off with ammunition, and the wagon at district headquarters was likewise sent. I had met the wagon of the Forty-sixth with the requisite ammunition for that regiment upon my journey here. I found it too late after your orders were obeyed to return to John's Island the same night, my horse being much jaded. I therefore concluded to start early next morning to reach your headquarters on John's Island by 9 o'clock. During the night I received a dispatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper to send "an abundant supply of ammunition" for Parker's battery, as he had "exhausted his ammunition." I was somewhat surprised at this, as Captain Parker, according to his report to me, had 422 rounds in his chests; 24 rounds were on the road which I passed; in all, 446 rounds, when the capacity of his four-gun battery, caissons, and limbers was only 512 rounds, the rest having been expended in practice. Captain Parker reported on hand before the fight as follows: This statement shows that Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper was mistaken in his note to me when he says "Parker has exhausted his ammunition." He may not have meant that it was entirely "exhausted," and at any rate doubtless thought it prudent to ask for "an abundant supply." Captain Parker's horses are in bad condition, and I have since learned, though not from himself, that some of his ammunition on that account had been left some miles in the rear. I promptly made requisition for whatever ammunition Captain Parker has hitherto drawn for and have furnished him from time to time, although all my supplies come in slowly. Captain Charles, Inglis Light Artillery, went on John's Island with two 3.5-inch Blakely rifles and two 12-pounder howitzers. For every want of Captain Charles of which he informed me I had made timely requisition. I was informed two days ago in Charleston, at the ordnance department, that the Blakely ammunition had been sent for to Augusta, and that the ammunition sent did not suit, and that the spherical case for the 12-pounder howitzers drawn for along with shell and canister could not be furnished, as it was not now manufactured at the arsenals. This is usually supplied for howitzers with shell in the ratio of 4 to 3. Captain Charles shot but very few rounds. Much of the ammunition of these batteries has been expended in practice, under orders. On receiving Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper's dispatch, at 2.30 a. m., Thursday, I telegraphed to Lieutenant-Colonel Waddy: Dispatch just received from Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper and General Wise, on John's Island, that the supply of ammunition for Parker's battery of four Napoleon guns is exhausted, in the face of the enemy. Although Kanapaux had nearly 500 rounds, fearing that his and Charles' batteries might be exhausted very soon, I added : For Parker's and Kanapaux's batteries there are needed at once 700 12-pounder Napoleon shells, fixed, 200 12-pounder Napoleon shot, fixed, 1,000 fuses, assorted, from 5-inch to 10-inch, and 2,000 good friction primers. Send this to me immediately at Rantowles Station, with a full supply of fixed ammunition for four 12pounder howitzers and two 3.5-inch Blakely rifles. I confidently expect you will send this ammunition by the train this morning, or by special train. Hearing from the operator that he could not get my message through, I rode to the depot, where I waited until 8 o'clock, only to find that communication with Charleston by telegraph was closed. I rode to Rantowles from thence, hoping soon to hear from Colonel Waddy, momentarily expecting that the telegraph would be again operating, which was the case about 12 o'clock. At 3 p. m., hearing nothing from Charleston, I took the train for that place. Upon arriving there I found Colonel Waddy had shipped 400 12-pounder gun shells, 200 12-pounder gun canister, 272 12-pounder howitzer shells, and 120 12-pounder howitzer canister to John's Island, via Fort Pemberton. This ammunition did not reach Captain Parker whilst I was on the island. Going to Rantowles Station next morning I found that the troops had returned and that the steamer Chesterfield was off Fort Pemberton with the ammunition aboard. I dispatched word to her to bring to Church Flats, where it was landed under my supervision the same day. Very respectfully, your obedient servant, JAMES M. WISE, Captain, Ordnance Officer, Sixth Military District. [Indorsement.] HEADQUARTERS SIXTH MILITARY DISTRICT, Adams' Run, S. C., February 17, 1864. Respectfully referred to Captain Parker, through LieutenantColonel Kemper, for report. His attention is called to the fact that on evening of 11th instant he reported to the brigadier-general commanding that his ammunition was exhausted; that he had but few solid shot, and no shells. On the morning of the 12th, he reported that he had raked up 100 rounds of shot and 30 shells. By the inclosed report of the ordnance officer it appears he ought to have had on hand on the 11th, after the fight, 120 solid shot, 50 shells, and 67 canister. Please explain the discrepancy in the report made on the field. By command of Brigadier-General Wise : 39 R R-VOL XXXV, PT I J. H. PEARCE, Assistant Adjutant-General. [Inclosure.] CAMP OF MARION ARTILLERY, S. CAROLINA VOLS., Capt. J. H. PEARCE, A. A. G., Adams' Run, S. C.: 66 CAPTAIN: On my return from the city last evening I found awaiting my remarks the report of Captain Wise, ordnance officer, and the indorsement of yourself. I would respectfully say that I cannot pretend to exact accuracy in recalling my words, but that I can state the facts precisely, and can only presume that there was no contradiction. On the afternoon of the 11th February, before I ceased firing, my ordnance officer (Sergeant Haig) reported to me that my shell were nearly out, not more than 6 rounds per gun remaining." I reported the fact to Colonel Kemper, and by his orders fired more slowly, and at my own suggestion used solid shot. When the order to cease firing was given I ordered all the few shell put into my gun limbers and rode to the right, where the brigadiergeneral commanding was stationed, and there I think I stated "I had some solid shot and a few shell." I was not asked for an official report and made_none; in fact, I could not at that moment have done so. When I returned to my battery I found the statement of my ordnance sergeant nearly correct, 27 shell being on hand; solid shot I did not then count; canister I had my full supply of, and I did not in any way allude to it. Captain Wise is mistaken in supposing that the enfeebled state of my horses had anything to do with ammunition being sent to the rear. On the morning of the 9th, before my arrival on the island, the caissons of my first section had been ordered to the rear, and I found them at Curtis Townsend's place. As soon as my extra horses arrived the caissons were brought to the front, and were there both on 10th and 11th. Three boxes of shell had been sent by me to the first section two days before the 9th. On the morning of the 9th, when the section received orders to move to the front, this unpacked ammunition was sent to the rear with all the camp equipage, and there it remained until the 11th. I did not know until after I was on the field that it had not been put into the caissons. I had it hurried forward, and found it at Matthews' place on my return from the field, on the 11th. It was put into the limbers as soon as the second section returned from picket, on the morning of the 12th, and gave me on that day 119 shot, 51 shell, and 67 canister. Any remarks made about ammunition to the general were made solely with reference to the supply on the field, and I regret that there should be the slightest misapprehension on the subject. I did say to some one while with the brigadier-general that "I had shot enough to finish them," but the remark had no relevancy. I was of course very anxious to have my wants supplied, and my previous experience, which is borne out by Captain Wise, was that supplies came in very slowly. As to any slight inaccuracy as to the exact number of shot and shell, I do not think it necessary to make any apology. It may very well occur to any one under the same circumstances. I had many other important details to look after for the feeding of my men and horses, and when not in the field was constantly employed in doing so. I deeply regret that I should unintentionally have misled any one, and must in conclusion beg to assume for myself any blame which may attach to any portion of the conduct of my battery. EDWARD L. PARKER, Captain, Commanding Marion Artillery. [First indorsement.] HEADQUARTERS SIXTH MILITARY DISTRICT, Adams' Run, S. C., February 24, 1864. Captain Parker ought to have been precise in his words on 11th instant, and he does not state the facts precisely which he reported to Brigadier-General Wise, and his report of 22d instant is not in accordance with his verbal statement to General Wise in the field. On the 11th, he rode up to where General Wise was in position and reported verbally to him in person that he had left in his battery solid shot only and a few shells. He was interrogated specially and particularly, both by General Wise and Colonel Harris, as to whether his effective ammunition was exhausted, and his reply was that his ammunition was so nearly exhausted that he might say all was exhausted. He never mentioned canister at all. He made no formal official report, but he did make a verbal informal report in person to General Wise in the presence of Colonel Harris, in substance as stated. General Wise relied upon his report, and it was one of many reasons stated by him in his official report to General Beauregard of not pursuing the enemy on evening of the 11th instant. Captain Parker not only made a report as stated on evening of 11th instant, but on the morning of 12th instant he made another verbal report that he had on hand 100 solid shot and 30 shell, without naming canister at all. The result is that neither he or Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper knew the precise amount of ammunition that he had in hand on the field, and that General Wise was misled as to that amount by the statements of Captain Parker. He was not called upon by General Wise for a formal report, but he was interrogated by General Wise on the field and answered as above stated. It turns out that Captain Parker had left part of his ammunition on the way in the rear which he never reported to General Wise, and that the ordnance officer at Charleston and in this command were not in the least fault for the deficiency of ammunition. His present report shows that he was not accurate and not precise in the report which he made to General Wise on the field. He did not inform General Wise that he had his full supply of canister, and now admits it. His report shows that he did not know where his ammunition was on the 11th. On the morning of the 12th, he reported that he had 100 round shot, 30 shell, and never mentioned his canister. He now states that on the morning of the 12th he had 119 shot, 51 shell, and 67 canister, and he then reported that what ammunition he had "he had raked up.' General Wise understood him to report as to the ammunition on the field and General Wise regrets that Captain Parker did not have his ammunition on the field on the 11th instant and that he did not precisely report the ammunition he had in hand. His supplies of ammunition were amply sufficient; the effect of his verbal report was that they were very deficient. Captain Parker ought to have known the amount of his ammunition before he went on the field and before he was disturbed by the circumstances to which he alludes. General Wise regrets to say that Captain Parker was not precise and accurate in his reports on the field, and that he is not precise and accurate in his present written report of 22d instant. In no other respect whatever is he or his battery subject to any blame for their conduct on the field on the 11th instant. He was brave, cool, and very effective in his fire. General Wise took great pride in him and his battery on that occasion and has so |