on the same afternoon the enemy had made several assaults on our lines, all of which were handsomely repulsed by the troops under command of Maj. R. A. Wayne, First Georgia Regulars, in the temporary absence of Major Jenkins. A report of that engagement is herewith inclosed.

Learning that a renewal of the attack was anticipated early next morning, I immediately ordered forward the Fourth Georgia Cavalry (dismounted), under Lieutenant-Colonel Harris, and pushed on with my staff. Having been informed that re-enforcements would be landed during the night at Townsend's (opposite Fort Pemberton), I at once resolved to attack the enemy and prevent his fortifying the position then held, commanding our works on James Island; but an accident to the steamer prevented the arrival of the troops.

About 2 p. m. on the 8th, Col. G. P. Harrison reported with the Thirty-second Georgia Regiment, Forty-seventh Georgia Regiment, and Bonaud's battalion of Georgians. Having reconnoitered the enemy's position, and finding him strongly posted and intrenched, both in front and rear of Burden's Causeway, and knowing that a perfectly practicable road, not exceeding 5 miles, led around his left to the rear of his second line, I determined to detach Colonel Harrison's command to execute this flank movement, while with the remaining force I would attack in front. I submitted my plan to the several commanders summoned for the purpose, and after a thorough discussion of the ground by Captain Walpole and others acquainted with the country it was fully concurred in. Half past 3 o'clock was the hour selected, and signal rockets were distributed to insure unanimity of action. Unfortunately the ambulances, medical stores, and ammunition wagons of Harrison's brigade had been sent around by Church Flats and did not arrive until next morning. I was thus compelled to abandon a movement from which I had every reason to expect the most splendid results.

I then gave the necessary orders for assaulting the enemy's works at daylight, placing Colonel Harrison's brigade in front. The remaining force-consisting of the First Georgia Regulars, Fourth Georgia Cavalry (dismounted detachment), and three companies of Thirty-second Georgia Regiment-I placed under the orders of Maj. John Jenkins, with instructions to support Colonel Harrison. Owing to the nature of the ground but little artillery could be used. The line of attack was quietly and rapidly formed, and the alacrity displayed in their preparations for a forward movement reflected great credit upon those gallant Georgians. They had advanced but a few hundred yards when our line of skirmishers encountered the enemy, who fired and immediately fell back. With shouts of defiance and amid the deadly bullets of the foe our brave men pressed steadily onward to the enemy's breast-works, from which they quickly drove them in confusion to their second line, beyond Burden's. Causeway.

Our loss, though heavy, would have been much greater but for a thick fog and the density of the atmosphere, which prevented the smoke from rising. A dense forest skirted the enemy's front lines, which enabled him to carry off under cover many of his dead and wounded, as was clearly evinced by the signs everywhere visible. His loss was considerable. We took but few prisoners. Our occupation of his front line completely thwarted the enemy's plans, as it secured to us the elevated ground between Burden's Causeway and

Gervais' house, upon which a clearing was discovered, doubtless made with the intention of erecting batteries to enfilade our works on James Island.

The second position taken by the enemy was in rear of a causeway flanked by marshes, which were commanded by a line of breast-works. The bridge over causeway was destroyed in the enemy's retreat. Knowing that many lives would be sacrificed in dislodging him, I preferred strengthening my own lines and making a flank attack, which, however, was rendered unnecessary by the enemy's retreat during the night. A quantity of commissary stores, ammunition, and camp and garrison stores fell into our hands.

For the information of the major-general commanding I desire to state that negro prisoners assert that Colonel Silliman, commanding Twenty-sixth Regiment U. S. Colored Troops, in the presence of Brig. Gen. R. Saxton (who has always commanded negroes), gave orders to show no quarter; also, that on Thursday, when the right of our line was temporarily pressed back, Private Cooper, Company B, Second South Carolina Cavalry, who was wounded, fell into the enemy's hands. When we recovered the ground it was discovered that he had been bayoneted in six or seven different places. I respectfully recommend that the Yankee General Foster be held to a strict accountability for such violation of civilized warefare. You will please find inclosed the reports of separate commanders. Our entire loss is 37 killed and 91 wounded.

The artillery, consisting of the Washington, Marion, and one section of Inglis Light Battery, all under command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper, was well served and did admirable execution. Colonel Harrison, Major Jenkins, and Major Wayne managed their troops with coolness and skill. First Sergeant Gervais, of the Stono Scouts, rendered me invaluable assistance on frequent occasions, and I would especially recommend him to the favorable notice of the commanding general. Privates Miller and Bryan, of same company, volunteered their services and gallantly charged with the Forty-seventh Regiment. Private Augustus J. White, Company I, Second South Carolina Cavalry, displayed the most signal courage, charging on horseback with the infantry advance.

Too much credit cannot be given a portion of the Second South Carolina Cavalry, under Captain Clark, who in the action on Thursday held the right of our line against an almost overwhelming force of the enemy. Out of 21 men 7 were killed and 6 wounded. My thanks are due to Maj. W. W. Harvie, commissary of subsistence; Captain Worthington, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieut. T. Henry Johnston, aide-de-camp; Capt. William Waller, and Lieut. A. G. Taylor, members of my staff, for their prompt transmission of orders on the field. Privates J. R. Wilson and W. C. Meggett, acting couriers, were exposed to heavy musketry fire and behaved well.

In conclusion, I would respectfully recommend the erection of works commanding the approach to Burden's Causeway. The position is an important one to the enemy, who will doubtless again attempt its possession.

I am, major, respectfully, your obedient servant,
B. H. ROBERTSON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.

Maj. CHARLES S. STRINGFELLOW,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Charleston, S. C.

No. 33.

Report of Brig. Gen. Henry A. Wise, C. S. Army, commanding Sixth Military District, of operations February 8-12.

HDQRS. SIXTH MIL. DIST., DEPT. OF S. C., Ga., and Fla., February 13, 1864.

GENERAL: The night of Monday, the 8th instant, the enemy landed in force on Kiawah Island, forded the estuary between that and Seabrook Island, crossed from the latter at the Haulover to John's Island, and drove in Major Jenkins' pickets from that point. Their objects were two, I think-one, general, to make a reconnaissance in force, and the other, special, to destroy the battery lately erected at Grimball's, on the right bank of the Stono River. Their object may have been also to divert your forces from other points.

The intelligence of the movement was received at Adams' Run at 12.30 p. m. on Tuesday, the 9th instant. I immediately dispatched orders to Colonel Tabb, at Church Flats, and to Colonel Page, at John's Island Ferry, to re-enforce Major Jenkins with all their available force, leaving only enough for guards and to support the heavy batteries. Colonel Tabb crossed immediately at the bridge, and Colonel Page was delayed only by the totally inadequate ferry. The infantry already on John's Island and the Marion Battery (one section being already with Major Jenkins) were also ordered down, and I dispatched Charles' battery and all the cavalry I had here, 64 men, under Captain Whilden, from this place; and in the evening, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison, of the Fourth Regiment Virginia Volunteers, who ordered three companies of that regiment from Meggett's and Young's Islands, I followed in person to Church Flats, and thence about 11 o'clock on the morning of the 10th overtook our forces fronting the enemy in line of battle on the Bohicket road, just below Dr. W. Jenkins', about a mile above the Haulover. We had two batteries (Charles' had just reached there), about 200 cavalry, and 550 infantry. Colonel Page and Major Jenkins both reported the force of the enemy as at least 2,000. Before I had time to reconnoiter or make any observations, the enemy were reported to be flanking us on the left. They were distinctly seen deploying their infantry in a heavy forest on a line with our left, while shelling with two pieces on our right and four on the left in front. I instantly ordered my forces to fall back to a triangle in the roads called the Cocked Hat. Above that point took position and sent back for all my reserve at Adams Run, for three more companies of the Fourth, and for the working parties at Pineberry and Willstown. The companies of the Fourth and Forty-sixth Regiments Virginia Volunteers vied with each other in the rapidity and promptitude of their marches, and they reached me, to their honor, hours before I expected them; but they were much rest-broken and fatigued from night marches and without any rations except a short supply of bread. The men of Major Jenkins also were severely worn from fighting and marching two days and nights. I cannot speak too strongly of their gallantry and the cool and sagacious bravery of their heroic commander. With but about 150 men, composed of the Stono Scouts, the Rebel Troop, the Cadets, and Sullivan's company of cavalry, one section of the Marion Artillery, and one company of infantry (Captain Jennett's company) of the Fiftyninth Regiment Virginia Volunteers he held the whole force of the

enemy in check; fought and fell back some 2 or 3 miles only, and in turn drove them back nearly the whole distance by such repeated charges all day Tuesday that he made them fear he was supported, and he held his ground manfully until night, when he was reenforced by Colonel Tabb with a battalion of the Fifty-ninth Virginia Volunteers and a section of the Marion Artillery. Before Colonel Tabb arrived he attacked the enemy at night and stunned him to a pause, capturing 4 prisoners almost within his line of encampment.

In the morning of the 10th, they were re-enforced by Colonel Page with five companies of the Twenty-sixth Virginia Volunteers, who took command, and was under fire in the attack again when I came up and ordered the retreat on Wednesday, the 10th. The enemy

on that day made no advance, and on the morning of the 11th, they had advanced only a few hundred yards to the position we had left the day before.

In the mean time you had ordered up General Colquitt with two and a half regiments, and my own infantry force had increased to about 1,000 men, when the enemy began to advance, at first slowly, up the Bohicket and Mullett Hall roads, and then rapidly to the Cocked Hat. I made the best dispositions I could, when General Colquitt and Colonel Harris arrived. In the act of showing them the ground I had chosen the enemy came up, and at the same moment one regiment of General Colquitt arrived. I placed my right on the Bohicket River, across the Bohicket road, and extended my line across the open field on a ditch back to the woods on my left, and through them to the Legareville road. I gave the command of the right to Colonel Page, with portions of the Twenty-sixth, Fortysixth, Fifty-ninth, and Fourth Virginia Volunteers, and the left to General Colquitt, with his regiment of 900 Georgians. LieutenantColonel Kemper commanded the artillery. I placed one section of Charles' battery on the right between the Bohicket road and river, the Marion Battery in front immediately on the left of the road, and the other section of Charles' battery to protect the rear and left flank.

Major Jenkins had been ordered in the morning to reconnoiter the left and rear of the enemy_across the Bohicket, on Wadmalaw, which he and Capt. G. D. Wise, assistant adjutant and inspector general, did, and in Major Jenkins' absence the cavalry were disposed on the right and left. By the time this alignment was made the enemy appeared in the field, and the Marion Battery at 3.20 p. m. opened upon them at about 1,200 yards distance, when they fell back to the woods, at about 1,500 yards distance. The artillery practice was very efficient in everything except the friction primers. Three-fourths of them at first failed. The enemy soon replied with (I thought) three pieces only, but one of their positions was concealed by a hedge-row, and after their retreat I found they had two positions for field pieces-one on the right and the other on the left of the road. A section of Charles' battery also opened from our right, and was very effectively served. In one hour and twenty minutes their fire began to slacken and be more distant, firing as they retired. By 5 p. m. their fire ceased. We were 4 miles from the Haulover. They had about 14 miles the start of us, and I at once determined not to follow them, for the following reasons:

10 R R-VOL XXXV, PT I

First. Captain Parker, of the Marion Battery, the most efficient, reported that he had exhausted all his shells and had but a few round shot left.

Second. The men were exhausted by rapid, long night marches, want of food, and by constant watching and fighting for two days and nights.

Third. Major Jenkins returned and reported that he found they had about 300 men, whom he could see in reserve, well posted, with three pieces of artillery at the Haulover, and there were two large gun-boats and two tugs just off the mouth of Bohicket, in the Edisto, and a small gun-boat was reported in the Kiawah as high up as she could get, and in range, and I was uncertain as to the number the enemy had on Kiawah Island.

Fourth. There was no practicable way to flank them, and the lower part of the Bohicket road in front is very narrow, between high ditch banks, dense woods on either side at some places, and tangled hedge-rows at other places, the whole way impassable at night but in columns on the roads, which could be easily swept.

Fifth. The possibility of being flanked by boats and barges right and left.

Sixth. The lateness of the hour; a pursuit would have brought us to the Haulover in the night.

Seventh. All the lower ground for a considerable distance from the Haulover was in range of the gun-boats on both sides.

Eighth. The danger of the enemy getting in my rear at Walpole's or on the Burgess road from Legareville.

Ninth. The hazard of withdrawing from John's Island in case of a disaster, there being but one bridge (that at Church Flats), and John's Island Ferry being useless for more than two or three companies in rapid retreat.

Tenth. The object of relieving General Colquitt as certainly and soon as possible.

Eleventh. Colonel Zachry had not come up, and my forces were weakened by a reserve left at Walpole's and by the large number of pickets and vedettes I had to place on the Legareville and Edendale roads.

Twelfth. The want of sufficient cavalry.

For these reasons I determined to rest on my line for the night and move early the next morning. In this conclusion General Colquitt concurred; but I put forward all the available cavalry I had (about 40 men) to pursue and watch the enemy closely and to report their movements; and I ordered a section of Kanapaux's battery (two Napoleons) to be met and sent over Church bridge to Rose Dew, on the Wadmalaw Island, to enfilade their reserve and rear at the Haulover from the opposite side of the Bohicket. Up to about 4 o'clock the reports were that they were strongly picketed about a mile or more above the Haulover. At 4 a. m. on the 12th, their gunboats commenced to shell heavily, and I inferred at once they were covering a retreat, and commenced to move as early as possible.

My orders at 6 a. m. were to advance upon the enemy, General Colquitt on the left, Colonel Page on the right of the Bohicket road; Major Jenkins in front, with cavalry to be dismounted when near the enemy, and four companies of infantry to act as skirmishers and flankers; Lieutenant-Colonel Kemper, with the artillery, to advance on the Bohicket road between the two wings of the main body; and the orders were to drive the enemy across the Haulover or to crush