Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 151 |
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Page 167
... equilibrium . Because evolution stops working at an equilibrium , biologists say that Nash equilibria are evolutionarily stable . Each relevant locus on a chro- mosome is then occupied by the gene with maximal fitness . Since a gene is ...
... equilibrium . Because evolution stops working at an equilibrium , biologists say that Nash equilibria are evolutionarily stable . Each relevant locus on a chro- mosome is then occupied by the gene with maximal fitness . Since a gene is ...
Page 176
... equilibria are also usually present in large numbers.5 One way of selecting an equilibrium is to delegate the task to a leader or an elite , but our foraging ancestors had no leaders or elites . Some other equilibrium selection device ...
... equilibria are also usually present in large numbers.5 One way of selecting an equilibrium is to delegate the task to a leader or an elite , but our foraging ancestors had no leaders or elites . Some other equilibrium selection device ...
Page 179
... equilibrium selection problems . But Nature does not jump from the simple to the complex in a single bound . She tinkers with existing structures rather than creating hopeful monsters . To make a naturalistic origin for the device of ...
... equilibrium selection problems . But Nature does not jump from the simple to the complex in a single bound . She tinkers with existing structures rather than creating hopeful monsters . To make a naturalistic origin for the device of ...
Contents
Foundlings Lostlings Changelings | 1 |
Coercion and Consent in Nazi Germany | 53 |
A E Housmans Rejected Addresses | 83 |
Copyright | |
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