Proceedings of the British Academy, Volume 151 |
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Page 167
... Nash equilibrium . Nash equilibria are of interest for two reasons . If it is possible to sin- gle out the rational solution of a game , it must be a Nash equilibrium . For example , if Adam knows that Eve is rational , he would be ...
... Nash equilibrium . Nash equilibria are of interest for two reasons . If it is possible to sin- gle out the rational solution of a game , it must be a Nash equilibrium . For example , if Adam knows that Eve is rational , he would be ...
Page 174
... Nash equilibria when a one - shot game is repeated indefinitely often ? The answer provided by the folk the- orem is very reassuring . Any outcome whatever of the one - shot game— including all the outcomes that are not Nash equilibria ...
... Nash equilibria when a one - shot game is repeated indefinitely often ? The answer provided by the folk the- orem is very reassuring . Any outcome whatever of the one - shot game— including all the outcomes that are not Nash equilibria ...
Page 190
... Nash equilibrum in a game if each is a best reply to the other . The rational reason for caring about Nash equilibria can be expressed in terms of what should be written in an authoritative book on how games should best be played . Such ...
... Nash equilibrum in a game if each is a best reply to the other . The rational reason for caring about Nash equilibria can be expressed in terms of what should be written in an authoritative book on how games should best be played . Such ...
Contents
Foundlings Lostlings Changelings | 1 |
Coercion and Consent in Nazi Germany | 53 |
A E Housmans Rejected Addresses | 83 |
Copyright | |
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