Knowledge, Thought, and the Case for DualismThe relationship between mind and matter, mental states and physical states, has occupied the attention of philosophers for thousands of years. Richard Fumerton's primary concern is the knowledge argument for dualism - an argument that proceeds from the idea that we can know truths about our existence and our mental states without knowing any truths about the physical world. This view has come under relentless criticism, but here Fumerton makes a powerful case for its rehabilitation, demonstrating clearly the importance of its interconnections with a wide range of other controversies within philosophy. Fumerton analyzes philosophical views about the nature of thought and the relation of those views to arguments for dualism, and investigates the connection between a traditional form of foundationalism about knowledge, and a foundationalist view about thought that underlies traditional arguments for dualism. His book will be of great interest to those studying epistemology and the philosophy of mind. |
Contents
versions of physicalism and dualism | 29 |
taking phenomenology seriously | 91 |
Knowledge arguments revisited | 150 |
Indirect thought and informative identity | 182 |
the last hope | 208 |
Objections and replies | 233 |
a brief postscript | 257 |
271 | |
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Common terms and phrases
analysis argue assertion aunt’s favorite color behavior brain can’t causal causal role causal theory cause Chapter characterize claim cognitive color experience concept controversial define definite description Descartes difficult direct direct realism directly acquainted directly aware distinct doesn’t empirical epistemic epistemic probability epistemological example exemplified exist fact feeling pain find firing first foundationalism functional functionalist Hume idea identity intentional internalist intrinsic introspective justification for believing justified belief kind knowledge argument least looking red Mary Mary’s meaning mental properties nature non-inferential obvious occur one’s ontological paradigmatically mental perception phenomenal properties phenomenological philosophers philosophy of mind physical objects physical properties physical world physicalist plausible possible predicate expressions problem property dualist propositional knowledge propositions describing qualia question radical reference regress argument reject relation relevant scientific seems sensation sense sentences skepticism sort substance suggest suppose talk theorist thing thought experiment tion true truth truth-maker understand veridical