ditor, but to the debtor, in the creditor's presence. By this act the surety intimated that he became in a legal sense one with the debtor.

2. OF PLEDGES.-We have above noticed the practice of lending on pledge; but as this was liable to considerable abuse, the following judicial regulations were adopted.-(1.) The creditor was not allowed to enter the house of the debtor to fetch the pledge; but was obliged to stand without the door, and wait till it was brought to him, Deut. xxiv. 10, 11. This law was wisely designed to restrain avaricious and unprincipled persons from taking advantage of their poor brethren in choosing their own pledges.-(2.) The upper garment, which served by night for a blanket (Ex. xxii. 25, 26; Deut. xxiv. 12, 13), and mills, and mill-stones, if taken in pledge, were to be restored to the owner before sunset. The reason of this law was, that these articles were indispensable to the comfortable subsistence of the poor; and for the same reason it is likely that it extended to all necessary utensils. Such a restoration was no loss to the creditor. For he had it in his power at last, by the aid of summary justice, to lay hold of the whole property of the debtor, and if he had none, of his person; and in the event of non-payment, as before stated, to take him for a bond slave.

3. OF USURY, OR INTEREST.-In the first and second laws relative to the taking of interest (Ex. xxii. 25; Lev. xxv. 3537), mention is made of poor Israelites only, from whom it is expressly prohibited to be taken, not only for money, but also for victuals, and of course for fruits and corn. It was therefore still lawful to lend upon interest to a rich man. But as this was found to give rise to many abuses, and covert violations of the law, it was ultimately rendered unlawful to take interest of any Israelite, whatever his circumstances may have been, Deut. xxii. 19, 20.

4. OF INJURIES DONE TO THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS. Although the Hebrew legislator has no where enjoined by a general statute, restitution in the case of injuries committed upon the property of another, he has nevertheless made some express ordinances on this subject, from the analogy of which we may conclude that this was the tenor of his law. See Lev. xxiv. 18; Ex. xxi. 23, 24, 32, 35, 36; xxii. 5.*

* Michaelis on the Laws of Moses, vol. ii. pp. 294-367.

SECTION III.

JEWISH COURTS OF JUDICATURE AND LEGAL PRO-
CEEDINGS.

I. Tribunals II. Judicial procedure III. The sacred lot.

I. Concerning the judicial tribunals among the Hebrews, during the earliest periods of their history, our information is far from being satisfactory. The notices which we meet with in the writings of Moses are very imperfect, and the Jewish rabbis, and their generally accurate historian Josephus, are strangely at variance. We learn, however, that every city had its elders, who formed a court of judicature, with a power of determining lesser matters in their respective districts. Deut. xvi. 18; xvii. 8, 9. See also Deut. xxi. 1-9. According to the Rabbis, every city which contained a hundred inhabitants possessed a court of judicature, consisting of three judges; but those cities which were larger had twenty-three of these officers. But Josephus, in whose time these courts existed, states that Moses ordained seven judges of known virtue and integrity to be established in every city, to whom two ministers were added out of the tribe of Levi; so that there were in every city nine judges: seven lay-men and two Levites.* The Hebrew legislator enjoins the strictest impartiality on the judges, in the discharge of their judicial functions, and prohibits their taking of gifts under any circumstances (Ex. xxiii. 8); reminding them, at the same time, that a judge sits in the seat of God, and that therefore, no man should have any pre-eminence in his sight, neither ought he to be afraid of any man in declaring the law, Ex. xxii. 6,7; Lev. xix. 15; Deut. i. 17; xxi. 18-20.

The numerous references in the Old Testament to the gate of the city as the seat of justice, are well known to every reader of the Scriptures. The custom was well adapted for an agricultural people, amongst whom this must have been the most convenient place of resort. See Gen. xxiii. 10, 18; xxxiv. 24; Ruth iv. 1-10.

From Deut. xvii. 8-11, we see that appeals lay from the courts already mentioned to a supreme tribunal. But the

* Antiq. b. iv. c. 14; Wars, b. ii. c. 20.

earliest mention of any such tribunal is under the reign of Jehoshaphat, and which, it is expressly stated, was erected for the decision of such cases, 2 Chr. xix. 8-11. The Jewish writers insist that this was the Sanhedrim, to which there are so many allusions made in the New Testament, and which they also assert to have existed from the time of Moses, possessing the supreme authority in all civil matters. Of this, however, there is not a vestige of proof: indeed it seems not to have been instituted till the time of the Maccabees. After

this period it is frequently spoken of as the supreme judicial tribunal. It consisted of seventy, seventy-one, or seventy-two members, chosen from among the chief priests, Levites, and elders of the people, of whom the high priest was the president, and took cognizance of the general affairs of the nation. It gave judgment, however, only in the most important causes, reserving inferior matters for the lower courts, appeals from which, as we have before stated, lay here.*

By images taken from these Jewish courts, our Lord, in a very striking manner, represents the different degrees of future punishments to which wicked men would be doomed, according to the respective heinousness of their crimes. "But I say unto you, that whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause shall be in danger of the judgment: whoso→ ever shall say to his brother Raca, shall be in danger of the council; but whosoever shall say, Thou fool, shall be in danger of hell fire," Matt. v. 22. That is, whosoever shall indulge causeless and unprovoked resentment against his christian brother, shall be punished with a severity similar to what is inflicted by a court of judgment—he who shall suffer his passions to transport him to greater extravagancies, so as to make his christian brother the object of derision and contempt, shall be exposed to a punishment still severer, corresponding to what the council imposeth—but he who shall load his fellow-christian with odious names and abusive language, shall incur the severest degree of all punishments, adequate to that of being burnt alive in the valley of Hin

nom.†

II. Of judicial procedure, or form of process, as we call it, our information is still more scanty than with regard to the courts of judicature. In the early period of the Hebrew

*

Godwyn's Moses and Aaron, b. v. ; Lightfoot's Prospect of the temple, ch. xxii.; Lamy's Apparatus Biblicus, b. i. ch. 12; Michaelis on the Laws of Moses, vol. i. p. 247, &c.

+ Bourne's Sermons, vol. i. p. 393. See also Lamy, b. i. c. 12; Macknight, and others, on the place, and Harwood's Introduction, vol. ii. pp. 188, 189.

D D

commonwealth judicial procedure was no doubt very summary, as it still continues to be in many parts of Asia, and therefore very few rules are prescribed for conducting it. Of advocates, such as ours, there is no appearance in any part of the Old Testament. Every man managed his own cause; of which an instance is furnished in 1 Kin. iii. 15-28. From a passage in Job (xxix. 15-17) Michaelis infers that men of wisdom and influence might be asked for their opinions in difficult cases, and that they might also interfere to assist those who were not capable of defending themselves against malicious accusers. The exhortation in Isa. i. 17, he also thinks to have a reference to such a practice.

In criminal cases the judges' first business was to exhort the accused person to confess the crime with which he stood charged, "that he might have a portion in the next life." Thus Joshua exhorted Achan to "make confession and give glory to the Lord God of Israel," Josh. vii. 19. The oath was then administered to the witnesses (Lev. v. 1),* who offered their evidence against him; after which he was heard in defence, John vii. 51. In matters where life was concerned, one witness was not sufficient (Numb. xxxv. 30; Deut. xvii. 6,7; xix. 15.); but in those of lesser moment, particularly those merely relating to money and value, it seems that a single witness, if unexceptionable, and upon oath, was enough to decide between the plaintiff and defendant. From the account of our Saviour's trial before the supreme council, we see that witnesses were examined separately, and without hearing each other's declaration, and that it was necessarily in the presence of the accused. This is evident, from the contradiction in the evidence of the two witnesses brought against him (Mark xiv. 15.), which would doubtless have been avoided, had they been admitted into court together.

Sentence having been pronounced on a person found guilty of a capital crime, he was hurried away to the place of execution; and in cases where the punishment of stoning was inflicted, the witnesses were compelled to take the lead, Deut. xvii. 7; Acts vii. 58, 59. It was also customary for the judge and the witnesses to lay their hands on the criminal's head saying, "Thy blood be upon thine own head." In allusion to this usage, which was a declaration of the justice of the sentence, the Jews alluded, when they said with reference to our Lord," His blood be upon us and our children," Matt. xxvii. 25. In Matt. xxvi. 39, 42, where our Lord says,

* In general, the person to be sworn did not pronounce the formula of the oath; he only heard it pronounced, subjecting himself to the curse it contained, by pronouncing Amen. See Matt. xxvi. 63.

"Father, if it be possible let this cup pass from me," there is an allusion to the practice which obtained among the Jews, of giving to the malefator, a cup of wine, in which there was infused a grain of incense, for the purpose of intoxicating and stupefying him, that he might be the less sensible of pain.*

III. For the purpose of deciding in disputed cases of property, where no other means of decision remained, recourse was had to the sacred lot, which was regarded as the determination of God, Prov. xvi. 33; xviii. 18. It was for this purpose that the urim and thummim was employed. This was likewise used in criminal cases for the purpose of discovering the guilty, but never for convicting them.†

SECTION IV.

OF THE ROMAN JUDICATURE AND MANNER OF TRIAL, ALLUDED TO IN THE SCRIPTURES.

The right of trial-Privileges of a Roman citizen-The tribunal. We have already noticed the subjugation of Judea by the victorious arms of the Romans, and the administration of the law by Procurators or governors sent thither from Rome. During the time of the New Testament history, the Roman tribunal was of necessity the last resort, in cases of a criminal nature: the Jews could put no man to death without the consent of the governor (John xviii. 31.), though they had the power of inflicting inferior punishments, and in most other respects lived according to their own laws. Hence the allusions to the Roman law, mode of trial, &c. in the New Testament are numerous, and demand consideration. The following sketch is chiefly compiled from Dr. Harwood, who has availed himself of the best authorities in the consideration of the subject.

I. The Roman law, in conformity to the first principle of nature and reason, ordained that no one should should be condemned and punished without a previous public trial. This obtained not only in Italy, but also in the provinces; and hence there are several allusions to it in the New Testament. St. Paul, who, with the rest of the Apostles, availed himself of every legal method, which the usages and maxims of the

* Godwyn's Moses and Aaron, b. v. c. 6.

Michaelis on the Laws of Moses, vol. iv. pp. 313-362; Lamy's App. Bib. b. i. c. 12.