Where all men did their duty it is hard to distinguish. Sergeants Alonzo Priest and Henry L. Childs, chiefs of pieces, for coolness and general efficiency; Corporals Reuben Bixler, detailed from Company K, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and J. W. Ratliff, detailed from Company D, Fifth Kentucky Cavalry, for accuracy of fire; John W. Pratt, Tenth Wisconsin Battery, and Jacob McKinley, detailed from Company C, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, acting at post No. 6; George Farbar, detailed from Company B, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, and Philip I. Whitman, Company H, Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, acting at post No. 1, for good conduct and efficiency deserve mention.

Respectfully submitted.

Second Lieutenant, Comdg. Section Tenth Wisconsin Battery.

Report of Lieut. Oscar A. Clark, Tenth Wisconsin Battery, of operations January 28-March 24.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND BRIGADE ARTILLERY,

In the Field, March 29, 1865.

CAPTAIN: In compliance with circular from Second Brigade, Cavalry Command, I have the honor to report that this section of Tenth Wisconsin Battery on the 17th day of January, 1865, reported to Second Brigade, Third Cavalry Division, for duty. It left camp near Savannah, Ga., on the 28th day of January, 1865, then marched to Sister's Ferry, on the Savannah River.

February 3, crossed the Savannah River. February 6, in action near Barnwell, S. C., shelling the enemy and driving him from his intrenchments. February 7, struck the Augusta and Charleston Railroad at Blackville. February 11, in action at Aiken; retired to Johnson's Station; here this section was posted behind barricades, where it shelled and checked the enemy's advance and drove them back through the woods. February 14, in action at the North Edisto River, shelling the enemy; crossed the river, and drove him from his barricade. February 17, crossed the Saluda River at Train's Ferry. February 20, crossed Broad River. February 22, were at Black Stocks, on the Columbia and Charlotte Railroad. February 23, crossed the Catawba River at Rocky Mount. February 25, camped at Lancaster Court-House. March 4, in action near Hornsborough, S. C. March 6, crossed the Great Pedee River near Rockingham. March 12, lost one man captured, Joseph Unselt, private. March 13, crossed Cape Fear River at Fayetteville. March 15, in action at Moore's Cross-Roads. March 20, were in line of battle in rear of our infantry at Bentonville. March 22, the enemy left our infantry's front; campaign ended.

This section of the Tenth Wisconsin Battery, since breaking camp near Savannah, has marched nearly 500 miles. It has drawn but five days' rations of hard bread and eight of coffee, subsisting almost entirely on the country.

This plain, unvarnished report has not much in it to dazzle the imagi nation, but if ceaseless energy and cheerfully performing our duties throughout a long and tedious campaign should meet with the appro

bation of our commander, we shall feel proud of the humble part which we were permitted to take in the great and glorious campaign which has just ended so successfully to our arms and our cause and with such disaster to the arms and cause of the enemies of our common country. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant, O. Á. CLARK,

Capt. H. J. SMITH,

Second Lieutenant, Tenth Wisconsin Battery.

A. A. A. G., 2d Brig., 3d Cav. Div., Mil. Div. of the Miss.

No. 231.

Report of Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield, U. S. Army, commanding Department of North Carolina, Army of the Ohio (or Center), of operations January 1-March 24.

HDQRS. DEPT. OF NORTH CAROLINA, ARMY OF THE OHIO,

Goldsborough, N. C., April 3, 1865. GENERAL: I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of the troops under my command since January 1, 1865, the date of my last report,* addressed to Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas, commanding Department of the Cumberland, under whose command I was then serving:

On the 2d of January, 1865, I marched with the Twenty-third Army. Corps from Columbia, Tenn., and arrived at Clifton, on the Tennessee River, on the 8th, under orders to embark my troops at that point and move to Eastport, Miss. But before the embarkation had commenced I received, January 14, an order from the lieutenant-general commanding, through the chief of staff of the army, to move with the Twentythird Army Corps to Annapolis, Md. Accordingly the movement was commenced on the following day. The troops moved with their artillery and horses, but without wagons, by steam transports to Cincinnati, Ohio, and thence by rail to Washington, D. C., and Alexandria, Va., a second order from Washington having changed the destination from Annapolis.

Although in midwinter, and weather unusually severe even for that season, the movement was effected without delay, accident, or suffering on the part of the troops. By the 31st of January the whole command had arrived at Washington and Alexandria.

At Alexandria great and unavoidable delay was caused by the freezing of the Potomac, which rendered its navigation impossible much of the time for several weeks. Meanwhile I met the lieutenantgeneral commanding at Fortress Monroe and went with him to the mouth of Cape Fear River to consult with Rear-Admiral Porter and Major-General Terry relative to future operations. On my return to Washington an order was issued from the War Department creating the Department of North Carolina, and assigning me to its command. My instructions from the lieutenant-general commanding, as well as those received from you, through Major-General Foster, made the ultimate object of my operations the occupation of Goldsborough, the opening of railroad communication between that point and the sea coast, the accumulation of supplies for your army, and the junction of

*See Vol. XLV, Part I, p. 339.

my force with your main army at or near Goldsborough. Wilmington was made my first objective, because it would afford a valuable auxiliary base to Morehead City in the event of our junction being made at Goldsborough, as designed, and because its possession by us would be of great value to you in case the movement of the enemy's main army or other circumstances should render advisable a concentration of your army at some point farther south than Goldsborough.

As soon as it became possible to navigate the Potomac I started from Alexandria with the Third Division, Twenty-third Army Corps, under command of Maj. Gen. J. D. Cox, and reached the mouth of Cape Fear River on the 9th of February, and landed upon the peninsula near Fort Fisher.

Maj. Gen. A. H. Terry, with about 8,000 men, then held a line across the peninsula about two miles above the fort, and occupied Smithville and Fort Caswell, on the south side of the river, while the naval squadron, under Rear-Admiral Porter, occupied positions in Cape Fear River and off the coast, covering the flanks of General Terry's line.

The enemy occupied Fort Anderson on the west bank, with a collateral line running to a large swamp about three-quarters of a mile distant, and a line opposite Fort Anderson running across the peninsula from Cape Fear River to Masonborough Sound. His position was impregnable against direct attack, and could be turned only by crossing Masonborough Sound above his left, or passing around the swamp which covered his right.

The force I then had seemed too small for so extended a movement as either of those mentioned; but time being important I determined to make the attempt without waiting for the arrival of more of my troops. On the 11th of February I pushed forward General Terry's line, supported by General Cox's division; drove in the enemy's pickets, and intrenched in a new position, close enough to the enemy's line to compel him to hold the latter in force. I then made preparation to send a fleet of navy boats and pontoons by sea to a point on the beach above the enemy's position, while a force composed of General Cox's and General Ames' divisions was to march along the beach in the night to the point where the boats were to land, haul them across the beach into the sound, and cross the latter to the main land in rear of Hoke's position. The weather, however, became so stormy as to render the execution of this plan impossible.

On the night of February 14 I attempted to move the pontoons upon their wagons along the beach with the troops, but the unusually high tides caused by the heavy sea wind made it impracticable to reach the point of crossing before daylight in the morning, when our movement would be discovered by the enemy before a crossing of the sound could be secured. Hence, after a hard night's work, the attempt was abandoned, and I turned attention to the enemy's right, where I would not have to contend with the difficulties of both land and sea. General Cox's and General Ames' divisions were crossed over to Smithville, where they were joined by Colonel Moore's brigade of General Couch's division, which had just debarked, and advanced along the main Wilmington road until they encountered the enemy's position at Fort Anderson and adjacent works. Here two brigades were intrenched to occupy the enemy, while General Cox, with his other two brigades and General Ames' division, started around the swamp covering the ene my's right, to strike the Wilmington road in rear of Fort Anderson. The distance to be traveled was about fifteen miles. The enemy, warned by his cavalry of General Cox's movement, hastily abandoned his works

on both sides of the river during the night of February 19 [18], and fell back behind Town Creek on the west, and to a corresponding position, covered by swamps, on the east. We thus gained possession of the main defenses of Cape Fear River and of Wilmington, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance, and a large amount of ammunition. Our loss was but trifling.

On the following day General Cox pursued the enemy to Town Creek, behind which he was found intrenched, and had destroyed the only bridge. General Terry also encountered the enemy in his new position, and in force superior to General Terry's. General Ames' division was recrossed to the east bank and joined General Terry in the night of the 19th.

On the 20th General Cox crossed Town Creek below the enemy's position, by the use of a single flat-boat found in the stream, and by wading through swamps reached the enemy's flank and rear, attacked and routed him, capturing 2 pieces of artillery, 375 prisoners, besides the killed and wounded, and dispersed the remainder. During the night General Cox rebuilt the bridge, crossed his artillery, and the next morning pushed on toward Wilmington without opposition.

General Terry was unable to make any further advance, but occupied the attention of all of Hoke's force, so that he could not send any to replace that which Cox had destroyed. On the 21st General Cox secured a portion of the enemy's pontoon bridge across Brunswick River, which he had attempted to destroy, put a portion of his troops onto Eagle Island, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear above Wilmington. The enemy at once set fire to his steamers, cotton, and military and naval stores, and abandoned the town. Our troops entered without opposition early on the morning of February 22, and General Terry pursued the enemy across Northeast River.

Our total loss in the operations from February 11 to the capture of Wilmington was about 200 officers and men killed and wounded; that of the enemy was not less than 1,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. Fifty-one pieces of heavy ordnance, fifteen light pieces, and a large amount of ammunition fell into our hands.

It affords me pleasure to acknowledge the cordial and constant co-operation of the naval squadron, under Rear-Admiral Porter, so far as the nature of the operations would admit.

Having no rolling-stock at Wilmington, and being nearly destitute of wagon transportation, I was compelled to operate from New Berne alone for the capture of Goldsborough. I had already sent to New Berne about 5,000 troops belonging to the various corps of your army, and directed Brig. Gen. I. N. Palmer to move, with as little delay as practicable, with all his available force, toward Kinston, to cover the workmen engaged in repairing the railroad. As soon as Wilmington was secured, I also sent General Ruger's division, Twenty-third Army Corps, which was then arriving at Cape Fear Inlet, by sea to Morehead City, to re-enforce the column moving from New Berne. On the 25th, finding that General Palmer had not moved, as was expected, I sent Major-General Cox to take command at New Berne and push forward at once.

General Couch's division, which had nearly completed its debarkation when Wilmington was captured, was brought to that place, and that division, with General Cox's, temporarily commanded by BrigadierGeneral Reilly, was prepared as rapidly as possible to join the column moving from New Berne by a land march. These arrangements were made because of the scarcity of both land and sea transportation. It

was not until March 6 that I was able to obtain wagons enough, including those belonging to General Terry's command, to move the two divisions from Wilmington to Kinston.

On the 6th General Couch started with two divisions, Second and Third, of the Twenty-third Corps, and marched, via Onslow and Richlands, for Kinston. On the same day I went by sea to Morehead City and joined General Cox beyond New Berne on the 8th. General Cox had advanced to Wise's Forks, about one mile and a half below Southwest Creek, and the railroad was in rapid process of reconstruction. The force in frout of General Cox, which appeared to consist of Hoke's division and a small body of reserves, had fallen back behind Southwest Creek, and General Cox had sent two regiments, under Colonel Upham, Fifteenth Connecticut Infantry, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. The enemy, having been re-enforced by a portion of the old Army of Tennessee, recrossed the creek some distance above the Dover road, came down in rear of Colonel Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, about 700 men.

The enemy then advanced and endeavored to penetrate between General Carter's and General Palmer's divisions, occupying the Dover road and the railroad respectively, but was checked by General Ruger's division, which was just arriving upon the field. There was no engagement during the day beyond light skirmishing, and the loss on either side, with the exception of the prisoners captured from Colonel Upham, was insignificant.

It being evident that the enemy's force was at least equal to that of General Cox, and that re-enforcements were arriving as rapidly as they could be brought by rail, I directed General Cox to put his troops in position, intrench them securely, and await the arrival of General Couch.

On the 9th the enemy pressed our lines strongly, and felt for its flanks. Heavy skirmishing was kept up during the day, but no assault was made. On the 10th, the enemy having been largely re-enforced, and doubtless learning of the approach of General Couch's column, made a heavy attack upon General Cox's left and center, but was decisively repulsed, and with heavy loss. Both attacks were met mainly by General Ruger's division, a portion of that division having been rapidly transferred from the center to the left to meet the attack there, and then returned to the center in time to repel the attack on that portion of the line. The enemy retreated in confusion from the field, leaving his killed and wounded, also a large number of arms and intrenching tools, and during the night fell back across the Neuse and burned the bridge. Our loss in this engagement was about 300 killed and wounded;* that of the enemy probably about 1,500 in killed, wounded, and prisoners. General Couch effected his junction with General Cox on the following day.

Having no pontoon train I was unable to cross the Neuse until the bridge could be repaired or the pontoons which had just arrived from the North could be brought by rail from Morehead City. The crossing was effected without opposition on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned Kinston and moved rapidly toward Smithfield to join the force under Johnston, which was concentrating to oppose your advance from Fayetteville.

*But see table, p. 62.