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days before the bankers of Richmond had imparted to General Halleck the important secret as to Davis' movements, designed doubtless to stimulate his troops to march their legs off to catch their treasure for their own use. *

I know now that Admiral Dahlgren did receive my letter on the 26th, and had acted on it before General Halleck had even thought of the matter; but I don't believe a word of the treasure story; it is absurd on its face, and General Halleck, or anybody, has my full permission to chase Jeff. Davis and Cabinet, with their stolen treasure, through any part of the country occupied by my command.

The last and most obnoxious feature of General Halleck's dispatch is wherein he goes out of his way and advises that my subordinates, Generals Thomas, Stoneman, and Wilson, should be instructed not to obey "Sherman's" commands.

This is too much, and I turn from the subject with feelings too strong for words, and merely record my belief that so much mischief was never before embraced in so small a space as in the newspaper paragraph headed "Sherman's truce disregarded," authenticated as "official" by Mr. Secretary Stanton, and published in the New York papers of April 28.

During the night of May 2, at Hilton Head, having concluded my business in the Department of the South, I began my return to meet my troops, then marching toward Richmond from Raleigh. On the morning of the 3d we ran into Charleston Harbor, where I had the pleasure to meet Admiral Dahlgren, who had, in all my previous operations from Savannah northward, aided me with a courtesy and manliness that commanded my entire respect and deep affection; also, General Hatch, who, from our first interview at his Tullifinny camp, had caught the spirit of the move from Pocotaligo northward, and had largely contributed to our joint success in taking Charleston and the Carolina coast. Any one who is not satisfied with war should go and see Charleston, and he will pray louder and deeper than ever that the country may in the long future be spared any more war. Charleston and secession being synonymous terms, the city should be left as a sample, so that centuries may pass away before that false doctrine is again preached in our Union.

We left Charleston on the evening of the 3d of May, and hastened with all possible speed back to Morehead City, which we reached at night of the 4th. I immediately communicated by telegraph with General Schofield, at Raleigh, and learned from him the pleasing fact that the lieutenant-general commanding the Armies of the United States had reached the Chesapeake in time to countermand General Halleck's orders, and prevent his violating my truce, invading the area of my command, and driving Johnston's surrendering army into fragments. General Johnston had fulfilled his agreement to the very best of his ability; and the officers charged with issuing the paroles at Greensborough reported about 30,000 already made, and that the greater part of the North Carolina troops had gone home without waiting for their papers, but that all of them would doubtless come into some one of the military posts, the commanders of which are authorized to grant them. About 800 of the rebel cavalry had gone south, refusing to abide the terms of the surrender, and it was supposed they would make for Mexico. I would sincerely advise that they be encouraged to go and stay; they would be a nuisance to any civilized Government, whether loose or in prison.

*See Sherman to Dahlgren, April 25, Part III.

With the exception of some plundering on the part of Lee's and Johnston's disbanded men, all else in North Carolina was "quiet." When to the number of men surrendered at Greensborough are added those at Tallahassee, Augusta, and Macon, with the scattered squads who will come in at other military posts, I have no doubt 50,000 armed men will be disarmed and restored to civil pursuits by the capitulation made near Durham Station, N. C., on the 26th of April, and that, too, without the loss of a single life to us.

On the 5th of May I received and here subjoin a further dispatch from General Schofield, which contains inquiries I have been unable to satisfy, similar to those made by nearly every officer in my command whose duty brings him in contact with citizens. I leave you to do what you think expedient to provide the military remedy.

Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN,

Morehead City:

RALEIGH, N. C., May 5, 1865.

When General Grant was here, as you doubtless recollect, he said the lines had been extended to embrace this and other States south. The order, it seems, has been modified so as to include only Virginia and Tennessee. I think it would be an act of wisdom to open this State to trade at once. I hope the Government will make known its policy as to organization of State governments without delay. Affairs must necessarily be in a very unsettled state until that is done; the people are now in a mood to accept almost anything which promises a definite settlement.

What is to be done with the freedmen is the question of all, and it is the all-important question. It requires prompt and wise action to prevent the negro from becoming a huge elephant on our hands. If I am to govern this State it is important for me to know it at once. If another is to be sent here it cannot be done too soon, for he will probably undo the most of what I shall have done. I shall be most glad to hear from you fully when you have time to write.

I will send your message to Wilson at once.

J. M. SCHOFIELD,
Major-General.

I give this dispatch entire, to demonstrate how intermingled have become civil matters with the military, and how almost impossible it has become for an officer in authority to act a pure military part.

There are no longer armed enemies in North Carolina, and a soldier can deal with no other sort. The marshals and sheriffs with their posses (of which the military may become a part) are the only proper officers to deal with civil criminals and marauders. But I will not be drawn out in a discussion of this subject, but instance the case to show how difficult is the task become to military officers, when men of the rank, education, experience, nerve, and good sense of General Schofield feel embarrassed by them.

General Schofield, at Raleigh, has a well-appointed and well-disciplined command, is in telegraphic communication with the controlling parts of his department, and remote ones in the direction of Georgia, as well as with Washington, and has military possession of all strategic points.

In like manner General Gillmore is well situated in all respects except as to rapid communication with the seat of the General Government. I leave him also with every man he ever asked for, and in full and quiet possession of every strategic point in his department; and General Wilson has in the very heart of Georgia the strongest, best appointed, and best equipped cavalry corps that ever fell under my command; and he has now, by my recent action, opened to him a source and route of supply by way of Savannah River that simplifies his military problem, so that I think I may with a clear conscience leave them and turn my

attention once more to my special command, the army with which I have been associated through some of the most eventful scenes of this or any war.

I hope and believe none of these commanders will ever have reason to reproach me for any "orders" they may have received from me, and the President of the United States may be assured that all of them are in position, ready and willing to execute to the letter and in spirit any orders he may give. I shall henceforth cease to give them any orders at all, for the occasion that made them subordinate to me is past, and I shall confine my attention to the army composed of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, the Fourteenth and Twentieth Corps, unless the commanding general of the Armies of the United States orders otherwise.

At 4 p. m. of May 9 I reached Manchester, on the James River, opposite Richmond, and found that all the four corps had arrived from Raleigh, and were engaged in replenishing their wagons for the resumption of the march toward Alexandria.

I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

General JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C.

W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General, Commanding.

ADDENDA.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,
Washington, D. C., May 25, 1865.

Maj. Gen. W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi:

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GENERAL: General Grant directs me to call your attention to the part of your report in which the necessity of maintaining your truce, even at the expense of many lives, is spoken of. The neral thinks that in making a truce the commander of an army can control only his own army and that the hostile general must make his own arrangements with other armies acting against him. Whilst independent generals, acting against a common foe, would naturally act in concert, the general deems that each must be the judge of his own duty and responsible for its execution. If you should wish, the report will be returned for any change you deem best.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

T. S. BOWERS, Assistant Adjutant-General.

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Washington, D. C., May 26, 1865.

Col. T. S. BOWERS,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.:

COLONEL: I had the honor to receive your letter of May 25 last evening and I hasten to answer. I wish to precede it by renewing the assurance of my entire confidence and respect for the President and Lieutenant-General Grant, and that in all matters 1 will be most willing to shape my official and private conduct to suit their wishes. The past is beyond my control and the matters embraced in the official report to which you refer are finished. It is but just the reasons that actuated me, right or wrong, should stand of record, but in all future cases, should any arise, I will respect the decision of General Grant, though I think it wrong. Supposing a guard has prisoners in charge, and officers of another command should aim to rescue or kill them, is

it not clear the guard must defend the prisoners? Same of a safeguard. So jealous is the military law to protect and maintain "good faith" when pledged that the law adjudges death and no alternative punishment to one who violates a safeguard in foreign parts. (See Article of War, No 55.) For murder, arson, treason, and the highest military crimes, the punishment prescribed by law is death, or some minor punishment, but for the violation of a safeguard death and death alone is the prescribed penalty. I instance this to illustrate how, in military stipulations to an enemy, our Government commands and enforces "good faith." In discussing this matter I would like to refer to many writers on military law, but am willing to take Halleck as the text. (See his chapter No. 27). In the very first article he prefaces that "good faith" should always be observed between enemies in war, because, when our faith has been pledged to him, so far as the promise extends, he ceases to be an enemy. He then defines the meaning of compacts and conventions, and says they are made sometimes for a general or a partial suspension of hostilities for the surrender of an army, &c. They may be special, limited to particular places, or to particular forces, but, of course, can only bind the armies subject to the general who makes the truce, and coextensive only with the extent of his command. This is all I ever claimed and clearly covers the whole case. All of North Carolina was in my immediate command, with General Schofield, its department commander, and his army present with me. I never asked the truce to have effect beyond my own territorial command. General Halleck himself, in his Orders, No. 1, defines his own limits clearly enough, viz, "Such part of North Caro lina as was not occupied by the command of Major General Sherman." He could not pursue and cut off Johnston's retreat toward Salisbury and Charlotte without invading my command, and so patent was his purpose to defy and violate my truce that Mr. Stanton's publication of the fact, not even yet recalled, modified, or explained, was headed "Sherman's truce disregarded," that the whole world drew but one inference. It admits of no other. I never claimed that the truce bound Generals Halleck or Canby within the sphere of their respective commands as defined by themselves. It was a partial truce of very short duration, clearly within my limits and right, justified by events, and, as in the case of prisoners in my custody, or the violation of a safeguard given by me in my own territorial limits, I was bound to maintain "good faith." I prefer not to change my report, but again repeat that in all future cases I am willing to be governed by the interpretations of General Grant, although I again invite his attention to the limits of my command and those of General Halleck at the time, and the pointed phraseology of General Halleck's dispatch to Mr. Stanton, wherein he reports that he had ordered his generals to pay no heed to my orders within the clearly defined area of my command.

I am, &c.,

W. T. SHERMAN,. Major-General, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES,

Hon. E. M. STANTON,

Secretary of War:

Washington, D. C., May 27, 1865.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith Maj. Gen. W. T. Sherman's official report of the operations of his armies in the campaign of

the Carolinas from April 1, 1865, to May 10, 1865;* also copy of my notet calling his attention to that part of his report in which he speaks of the necessity of maintaining his truce even at the expense of many lives, and giving him my views thereon, with permission to amend it, and his answer thereto.‡

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT,
Lieutenant-General.

HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,

Washington City, May 30, 1865.

Bvt. Maj. Gen. JOHN A. RAWLINS, Chief of Staff:

GENERAL: I have the honor to request that the following corrections be made in my last official report, dated May 9, 1865, already forwarded, viz: On page 8 [31] of the report, referring to my letter of April 18, 1865, addressed to Major-General Halleck, substitute in lieu of the words "into his hands," the words "at Washington," and on page 24 [37], before the word "received" (beginning line), insert the words "must have."

At the time the report was written Major Hitchcock, who bore the letter in question to Washington, was not with me, and I was under the impression that he had placed the letter in question in General Halleck's own hands on the 21st of April. Having now just learned that though the letter was delivered on that day at General Halleck's former office in Washington, it arrived just after his departure for Richmond, I wish the statement to be made accordingly. But as I am satisfied, for other reasons, that my views as contained in that letter were made known to General Halleck before his dispatch of April 26 was sent, the inferences drawn in my report remain unchanged.

I have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. T. SHERMAN,
Major-General, Commanding.

Abstract from returns showing the effective strength of the army in the field under Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman, Ü. S. Army, January 31, February 28, March 31, and April 10, 1865.

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