destroyed, as also the railroad trestles and bridges down as far as Darlington. An expedition of mounted infantry was also sent down to Florence, but it encountered both cavalry and infantry, and returned, having ouly broken up in part the branch road from Florence to Cheraw. Without unnecessary delay the columns were again put in motion, directed on Fayetteville, N. C., the Right Wing crossing the Pedee at Cheraw, and the Left Wing and cavalry at Sneedsborough. General Kilpatrick was ordered to keep well on the left flank, and the Fourteenth Corps, moving by Love's Bridge, was given the right to enter and occupy Fayetteville first. The weather continued unfavorable and roads bad, but the Fourteenth and Seventeenth Corps reached Fayetteville on the 11th of March, skirmishing with Wade Hampton's cavalry, that covered the rear of Hardee's retreating army, which, as usual, had crossed Cape Fear River, burning the bridge. During the march from the Pedee General Kilpatrick had kept his cavalry well on the left and exposed flank. During the night of the 9th of March his three brigades were divided to picket the roads. General Hampton detecting this dashed in at daylight and gained possession of the camp of Colonel Spencer's brigade, and the house in which General Kilpatrick and Colonel Spencer had their quarters. The surprise was complete, but General Kilpatrick quickly succeeded in rallying his men, on foot, in a swamp near by, and by a prompt attack, well followed up, regained his artillery, horses, camp, and everything save some prisoners whom the enemy carried off, leaving their dead on the ground. The 12th, 13th, and 14th were passed at Fayetteville, destroying absolutely the U. S. Arsenal and the vast amount of machinery which had formerly belonged to the old Harper's Ferry U. S. Arsenal. Every building was knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and ruined by the First Regiment Michigan Engi neers, under the immediate supervision of Col. O. M. Poe, chief engi neer. Much valuable property of great use to an enemy was here destroyed or cast into the river. Up to this period I had perfectly succeeded in interposing my supe rior army between the scattered parts of my enemy. But I was then aware that the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been re-enforced by Cheatham's corps from the West and the garrison of Augusta, and that ample time had been given to move them to my front and flank about Raleigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear River ahead of me, and could therefore complete the junction with the other armies of Johnston and Hoke, in North Carolina. And the whole, under the command of the skillful and experienced Joe Johnston, made up an army superior to me in cavalry, and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify me in extreme caution in making the last step necessary to complete the march I had undertaken. Previous to reaching Fayetteville I had dispatched to Wilmington from Laurel Hill Church two of our best scouts with intelligence of our position and my general plans. Both of these messengers reached Wilmington, and, on the morning of the 12th of March, the army tug Davidson, Captain Ainsworth, reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, bringing me full ntelligence of events from the outer world. On the same day this tug carried back to General Terry, at Wilmington, and General Schofield, at New Berne, my dispatches to the effect that, on Wednesday, the 15th, we would move for Goldsborough, feigning on Raleigh, and ordering them to march straight for Goldsborough, which I expected to reach about the 20th. The same day the gun-boat Eolus, Captain Young, U. S. Navy, also reached Fayetteville, and through her I continued to have communication with Wilmington until the day of our actual departure. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville, two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape Fear River, one opposite the town, the other three miles below. General Kilpatrick was ordered to move up the plank road to and beyond Averasborough. He was to be followed by four divisions of the Left Wing, with as few wagons as possible; the rest of the train, under escort of the two remaining divisions of that wing, to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsborough. In like manner General Howard was ordered to send his trains, under good escort, well to the right, toward Faison's Depot and Goldsborough, and to hold four divisions, light, ready to go to the aid of the Left Wing if attacked while in motion. The weather continued very bad, and the roads had become mere quagmire. Almost every foot of it had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of wheels. Still, time was so important that punctually, according to order, the columns moved out from Cape Fear River on Wednesday, the 15th of March. I accompanied General Slocum, who, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the river or plank road that day to Kyle's Landing, Kilpatrick skirmishing heavily with the enemy's rear guard about three miles beyond, near Taylor's Hole Creek. At General Kilpatrick's request General Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades. Next morning the column advanced in the same order, and developed the enemy, with artillery, infantry, and cavalry, in an intrenched position in front of the point where the road branches off toward Goldsborough through Bentonville. On an inspection of the map it was manifest that Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow, swampy neck between Cape Fear and South Rivers, in hopes to hold me to save time for the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point to his rear, namely, Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsborough. Hardee's force was estimated at 20,000 men. It was necessary to dislodge him that we might have the use of the Goldsborough road, as also to keep up the feint on Raleigh as long as possible. General Slocum was, therefore, ordered to press and carry the position, only difficult by reason of the nature of the ground, which was so soft that horses would sink everywhere, and even men could hardly make their way over the common pine barren. The Twentieth Corps, General Williams, had the lead, and Ward's division the advance. This was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the position of a brigade of Charleston heavy artillery armed as infantry (Rhett's) posted across the road behind a light parapet, with a battery of guns enfilading the approach across a cleared field. General Williams sent a brigade (Case's) by a circuit to his left that turned this line, and by a quick charge broke the brigade, which rapidly retreated back to a second line better built and more strongly held. A battery of artillery (Winegar's) well posted, under the immediate direction of Major Reynolds, chief of artillery of Twentieth Corps, did good execu tion on the retreating brigade, and on advancing Ward's division over this ground General Williams captured 3 guns and 217 prisoners, of which 68 were wounded and left in a house near by with a rebel officer, four men, and five days' rations. One hundred and eight rebel dead were buried by us. As Ward's division advanced he developed a second and stronger line, when Jackson's division was deployed forward on the right of Ward, and the two divisions of Jeff. C. Davis' (Fourteenth) corps on the left, well toward the Cape Fear. At the same time Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert with General Williams, was ordered to draw back his cavalry and mass it on the extreme right, and, in concert with Jackson's right, to feel forward for the Goldsborough road. He got a brigade on the road, but it was attacked by McLaws' rebel division furiously, and though it fought well and hard the brigade drew back to the flank of the infantry. The whole line advanced late in the afternoon, drove the enemy well within his intrenched line, and pressed him so hard that next morning he was gone, having retreated in a miserable stormy night over the worst of roads. Ward's division of infantry followed to and through Averasborough, developing the fact that Hardee had retreated, not on Raleigh but on Smithfield. I had the night before directed Kilpatrick to cross South River at a mill-dam to our right rear and move up on the east side toward Elevation. General Slocum reports his aggregate loss in this affair, known as that of Averasborough, at 12 officers and 65 men killed and 477 wounded.* We lost no prisoners. The enemy's loss can be inferred from his dead (108) left for us to bury. Leaving Ward's division to keep up a show of pursuit, Slocum's column was turned to the right, built a bridge across the swollen South River, and took the Goldsborough road, Kilpatrick crossing to the north in the direction of Elevation, with orders to move eastward, watching that flank. In the meantime the wagon trains and guards, as also Howard's column, were wallowing along the miry roads toward Bentonville and Goldsborough. The enemy's infantry, as before stated, had retreated on Smithfield, and his cavalry retreated across our front in the same direction, burning the bridges across Mill Creek. I continued with the head of Slocum's column and camped the night of the 18th with him on the Goldsborough road, twenty-seven miles from Goldsborough, about five miles from Bentonville, and where the road from Clinton to Smithfield crosses the Goldsborough road. Howard was at Lee's Store, only two miles south, and both columns had pickets three miles forward to where the two roads came together and became common to Goldsborough. All the sigus induced me to believe that the enemy would make no further opposition to our progress, and would not attempt to strike us in flank while in motion. I therefore directed Howard to move his Right Wing by the new Goldsborough road, which goes by way of Falling Creek Church. I also left Slocum and joined Howard's column with a view to open communication with General Schofield, coming up from New Berne, and Terry from Wilmington. I found General Howard's column well strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and did not overtake him in person until he had reached Falling Creek Church, with one regiment forward to the cross-roads near Cox's Bridge across the Neuse. I had gone from General Slocum about six miles when I heard artillery in his direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff officers overtaking me, explaining that his leading division (Carlin's) had encountered a division of rebel cavalry (Dibrell's), which he was driving easily. But soon other staff officers came up, reporting that he had developed near Bentonville the whole of the rebel army under General Johnston himself. I sent him orders to call up the two divisions guarding his wagon trains, and Hazen's division of the Fif teenth Corps, still back near Lee's Store, to fight defensively until I could draw up Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive Station, and with the remaining three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps come up on Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's Bridge. In the meantime, while on the road, I received couriers from both Generals Schofield and * But see revised table, p. 66. Terry. The former reported himself in possession of Kinston, delayed somewhat by want of provisions, but able to march so as to make Goldsborough on the 21st; and Terry was at or near Faison's Depot. Orders were at once dispatched to Schofield to push for Goldsborough and to make dispositions to cross Little River in the direction of Smithfield, as far as Millard; to General Terry to move to Cox's Bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and establish a crossing; and to Blair to make a night march to Falling Creek Church; and at daylight the Right Wing, General Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in rapid motion on Bentonville. By subsequent reports. I learned that General Slocum's head of column had advanced from its camp of March 18, and first encountered Dibrell's cavalry, but soon found his progress impeded by infantry and artillery. The enemy attacked his head of column, gaining a temporary advantage, and took three guns and caissons of General Carlin's division, driving the two leading brigades back on the main body. As soon as General Slocum realized that he had in his front the whole Confederate army he promptly deployed the two divisions of the Fourteenth Corps, General Davis, and rapidly brought up on their left the two divisions of the Twentieth Corps, General Williams. These he arranged on the defensive, and hastily prepared a line of barricades. General Kilpatrick also came up at the sound of artillery and massed on the left. In this position the Left Wing received six distinct assaults by the combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, under the immediate command of General Johnston himself, without giving an inch of ground, and doing good execution on the enemy's ranks, especially with our artillery, the enemy having little or none. Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield with great rapidity, and without unnecessary wheels, intending to overwhelm my left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating columns. But he "reckoned without his host." I had expected just such a movement all the way from Fayetteville, and was prepared for it. During the night of the 19th General Slocum got up his wagon train with its guard of two divisions, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps, which re-enforcement enabled him to make his position impregnable. The Right Wing found rebel cavalry watching its approach, but unable to offer any serious opposition until our head of column encountered a considerable body behind a barricade at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the battle-field of the day before. This body of cavalry was, however, quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. On moving forward the Fifteenth Corps, General Logan found that the enemy had thrown back his left flank, and had constructed a line of parapet connecting with that toward General Slocum, in the form of a bastion, its salient on the main Goldsborough road interposing between General Slocum on the west and General Howard on the east, while the flanks rested on Mill Creek, covering the road back to Smithfield. General Howard was instructed to proceed with due caution until he had made strong connection on his left with General Slocum. This he soon accomplished, and by 4 p. m. of the 20th a complete and strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his intrenched position, and General Johnston, instead of catching us in detail, was on the defensive, with Mill Creek and a single bridge to his rear. Nevertheless, we had no object to accomplish by a battle, unless at an advantage, and therefore my general instructions were to press steadily with skirmishers alone, to use artillery pretty freely on the wooded space held by the enemy, and to feel pretty strongly the flanks of his position, which were, as usual, covered by the endless swamps of this region of country. I also ordered all empty wagons to be sent at once to Kinston for supplies, and other impediments to be grouped near the Neuse, south of Goldsborough, holding the real army in close contact with the enemy, ready to fight him if he ventured outside his parapets and swampy obstructions. Thus matters stood about Bentonville on the 21st of March. On the same day General Schofield entered Goldsborough with little or no opposition, and General Terry had got possession of the Neuse River at Cox's Bridge, ten miles above, with a pontoon bridge laid and a brigade across, so that the three armies were in actual connection, and the great object of the campaign was accomplished. On the 21st a steady rain prevailed, during which General Mower's division, of the Seventeenth Corps, on the extreme right, had worked well to the right around the enemy's flank, and had nearly reached the bridge across Mill Creek, the only line of retreat open to the enemy. Of course there was extreme danger that the enemy would turn on him all his reserves, and, it might be, let go his parapets to overwhelm Mower. Accordingly I ordered at once a general attack by our skir mish line from left to right. Quite a noisy battle ensued, during which General Mower was enabled to regain his connection with his own corps by moving to his left rear. Still he had developed a weakness in the enemy's position of which advantage might have been taken; but that night the enemy retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets to fall into our hands, with many dead unburied, and wounded in his field hospitals. At daybreak of the 22d pursuit was made two miles beyond Mill Creek, but checked by my order. General Johnston had utterly failed in his attempt, and we remained in full possession of the field of battle. General Slocum reports the losses of the Left Wing about Bentonville at 9 officers and 145 men killed, 51 officers and 816 men wounded, and 3 officers and 223 men missing, taken prisoners by the enemy; total, 1,196.* He buried on the field 167 rebel dead, and took 338 prisoners. General Howard reports the losses of the Right Wing at 2 officers and 35 men killed, 12 officers and 289 men wounded, and 1 officer and 60 men missing; total, 399. He also buried 100 rebel dead and took 1,287 prisoners. The cavalry of Kilpatrick was held in reserve, and lost but few, if any, of which I have no report as yet. Our aggregate loss at Bentonville was 1,595.‡ I am well satisfied that the enemy lost beavily, especially during his assaults on the Left Wing during the afternoon of the 19th; but as I have no data save his dead and wounded left in our hands I prefer to make no comparisons. Thus, as I have endeavored to explain, we had completed our march on the 21st, and had full possession of Goldsborough, the real objective, with its two railroads back to the sea-ports of Wilmington and Beaufort, N. C. These were being rapidly repaired by strong working parties directed by Col. W. W. Wright, of the railroad department. A large amount of supplies had already been brought forward to Kinston, to which place our wagons had been sent to receive them. I therefore directed General Howard and the cavalry to remain at Bentonville during the 22d, to bury the dead and remove the wounded, and on the But see revised table, p. 75. |