Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. HandelRichard K. Betts, Thomas Mahnken Part of a three part collection in honour of the teachings of Michael I. Handel, one of the foremost strategists of the late 20th century, this collection explores the paradoxes of intelligence analysis, surprise and deception from both historical and theoretical perspectives. |
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Abwehr achieve adversary Agranat Agranat Commission Allied AMAN's analysis Army assessment Bandman believe Betts Britain British deception British intelligence campaign capabilities Chief of Staff Churchill Clausewitz cognitive command coordination Dayan decision defense Division doctrine effect Egypt Egyptian Eli Zeira enemy enemy's example forces gence German Handel Hitler Ibid induction initiative intelligence analysts intelligence community intelligence failure intelligence officers intelligence organizations intelligence process intentions Israel Israeli ISSB Japanese John Ferris Joint Vision 2020 judgment leaders London Michael Handel Middle East Military Intelligence mobilization Moshe Dayan National Intelligence Estimates National Security Naval October offensive one's operational deception Pacific War paradox Pearl Harbor Perception plans policymakers political politicization prediction problem professional reports risk Sherman Kent signals Soviet strategic deception strategic surprise success surprise attack Syrian theory of surprise tion University Press warning Wavell World XX Committee Yom Kippur Yom Kippur War Zeira